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ABSTRACT
This study has the principal aim of emphasising the success of Sultan Turki b.
Sa id's attempts to take power in Oman after the death of his father in 1856. It
describes in detail his attempts, and his period of government, with reference to the
British presence and attitude towards the Sultan, which had for some time given him
considerable assistance in settling his problems with his opponents inside the country.
This study also gives details of the British policy towards Oman from the early
sixteenth century and the regional situation with reference to the appearance of the
Ottoman Empire in Central Arabia and the Wahhabi dispute with the Government of
Muscat.
Chapter 1 provides a historical background, relating to British policy towards
Oman, and the Ottoman Empire's influence in the Arabian Peninsula and the Wahhabi
threat to Oman. It discusses the internal circumstances which were to help Sultan
Turki gain power in Oman. Chapter 2 concentrates on the discussion of the situation
in Oman that followed the death of Sayyid Sa'id b. Sultan, and the reign of Sayyid
Thuwaini 1856-1868, with reference to the role of Sayyid Turki b. Sa'id in this
period. It also describes the troubles between Muscat and Zanzibar that were settled
by Lord Canning s Arbitration in April, 1861. The third chapter describes the Turki-
'
Azzan dispute during the time of Sayyid 'Azzan b. Qais, 1868-1871, including the
British attitude towards that dispute, and the India Government's action through their
representatives in Muscat and the Persian Gulf. The subject of the fourth chapter is a
description of Sayyid Turki b. Sa'id as one of the paramount characters in the modern
history of Oman. Furthermore, it examines the manner in which the Sultan regained
the throne, and British policy towards his Government. The discussion in the fifth
chapter concerns the Sultan's arguments with his opponents, such as Sayyid 'Abd
'al- 'Aziz, Ibrahim b. Qais, and Shaikh Salihb. 'Ah al-Harthi, and the Sultan's efforts
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GLOSSARY OF ARABIC WORDS APPEARING IN THIS THESIS
Amir: Prince.
Baghlah: An Arabic sailing vessel used for trade in the Indian Ocean by the Omanis
and the Arabs of the Peninsula.
Banian\ A title still in use today for the Indian merchants residing in Oman and East
Africa.
Ghafiri and Hinawi: The principal political divisions of Omani tribes. These
emerged as a result of the Civil war in Oman in the early eighteenth century (1723-
1728) and acquired the names of Hinawi and Ghafiri in Omani society. The names of
these political divisions have been used in Oman from that time onwards. However,
the main fact in this tribal division is that the majority of the Hinawi tribes are
descended from Qahtani, or Yemeni roots, or the Arabs of the South, e.g. Bani Hina,
al-Hirth, al-Hajriyyin, al-Habus, BaniRawahah, etc. The majority of the Ghafiris are
descended from Adnani, Nizari roots, or the Arabs of the North, e.g. Banu Reyam,
al-'Abriyyin, al-Janabah, Bani Bu 'Ali, Bani kharus, etc. The civil war was headed
by two famous military men, Muhammed bin Nasir al-Ghafiri (those who supported
him were known as the Ghafiri faction), and Khalaf bin Mubarak al-Hinaie, titled "al-
Qusayyer" whose supporters were known the Hinawi faction. This war led to the
establishment of the A1 Bu Sa'id Dynasty (which still rules Oman), when the Omani
tribes elected Ahmad b. Sa'id b. Ahmad as their Imam in 1744, until his death in
1782. This political division of the tribes played an authoritative role in the history of
this country during the period of troubles.
Ibadi. An Islamic sect to which a large number of Omani tribes.
Itawa: A certain amount of money paid annually by one side to another, according
to an agreement between the two parties, or because of political influence.
xii
al-Jabal al-Akhder: The highest mountain in Oman, about 3,000m above sea
level, located in the interior.
Khor: Inlet or creek.
Naib. A representative for someone, to achieve something on his behalf or to be his
representative somewhere.
Nokhada. Master or Captain of a Dhow.
Qadi: Judge, or Magistrate
Riai. Omani National Currency.
Sayyid. The title of the A1 Bu Sa'id Dynasty. It is equal to Master, and appeared in
Oman as a ruling title during the Ya'aribah Dynasty, but became more official under
the A1 Bu Sa'id Dynasty.
Tamimah: The paramount figure among the tribal Shaikhs; the leader with control
over all members of his tribe, and dependent upon their support in the course of
internal Omani disputes. He played a powerful role in the internal politics of Oman
throughout its history, until some time in the second half of the twentieth century.
Shaikh: Synonym of the word Ameer; he can be the leader of a tribe, a district and
even a country, like the Shaikhs of theUnited Arab Emirates for example.
'Ulema: Paramount religious scholars who have a powerful spiritual influence on
ordinary people, and are highly respected by them in any situation.
Wadv. Valley.
Wakeel: Synonym of Naib.
Wali: The Governor, or the representative of the Imam or the Sultan, in the towns.
xiii
Wazir: A Government Minister.
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INTRODUCTION
From the second half of the nineteenth century Omani history has been an important
topic for many historians, in particular it has become the focus of European
researchers who have contributed greatly to studies. The many different aspects of
Omani history such as political, social, and economic, have contributed to its
distinctive character. Omani1 s complex tribal history involves many disputes, the
outcome ofwhich sometimes influenced the political course of events. Omani history
is worthy of discussion by numerous researchers attempting to provide a more detailed
analysis.
In this study we take the opportunity to attempt to investigate part of Omani
political history, relating to SultanTurkib. Sa'id's reign, 1871-1888, and the dispute
concerning British interests and influence in this state during that period. This study
will take into consideration British aims during the period discussed, which can be
summarised as trying to find a way of controlling key issues in Oman, helping them to
establish a strong position in the region. The study will also follow up the rationale
behind Sultan Turki's policy regarding his position and the attitude of the tribes.
The period which followed the death of the great Sayyid Sa id b. Sultan in
1856, has been considered the most critical period in the history of Oman and
Zanzibar, for it witnessed many internal and external events, and the most important
issue was the unity of Muscat and Zanzibar which had been brought about by the
efforts of Sultan Thuwaini. The question of the takeover of Zanzibar by the
Government of Muscat, however, was seen as unrealistic and would have been very
difficult to achieve after the year 1856; indeed all Sayyid Thuwaini's attempts in this
regard ended in failure. Consequently the matter was resolved by Lord Canning's
Award in 1861, in which the British Government confirmed the separation of Muscat
and Zanzibar, and respect for their independence and the dignity of their Sultans.
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In general this study will outline the main course of events and provide
reference material onwhich this study largely depended.
In essence the main area of this research will be concentrated on Sayyid
Turki s time in power and his relations with the British Government with regard to his
internal policy, analysing the factors which culminated in his successes in dealing with
his own difficulties, with British support to achieve his objectives. This study
includes the question of Sultan Turki's activities during his brother Sayyid Thuwaini's
reign (1856-1866), the period of Sayyid Salim b. Thuwaini (1866-1868), and the
reign of Sayyid 'Azzanb. Qais (1868-1871). Under the wise leadership of Sayyid
Turki b. Sa'id most of the tribes of Oman had come under his control, and he
managed to re-gain the right of Sa id b. Sultan to rule the country despite all attempts
to force him to resign the sovereignty of Oman. He succeeded in defeating Salih b.
'Ali, Ibrahim b. Qais and his brother Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz b. Sa'id's attempts to
dismiss him from power. In overcoming all these troubles he also managed to avoid
Omani disunity and discord.
A detailed analysis of the continued troubles and the Sultan1 s attitude towards
the British Government is also given taking into account their respect for the
independence of Oman, resulting from the Anglo-French Declarationin Paris in 1862.
However, although they had always offered advice and suggestions to Sayyid Turki
and later his son Sultan Faisal, the British Government widened the scope of their
relations with Muscat to further their interest in the country. On the other hand Sultan
Turki gained practical British support in his time of need, as well as the continued
guarantee of the payment of the Zanzibar subsidy to Muscat, despite the fact that
Muscat was not a British colonial state.
Various studies relating to this period have provided additional information
about the history of Oman, such as J. B. Kelly's valuable work "Britain and the
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Persian Gulf 1795-1880". The book contains much useful information regarding
British policy in Oman and the Persian Gulf region in the period between 1795 and
1880, and relevant facts associated with British rule in India. The work has put
substantial value on the political history of the Gulf, and presents a valuable
description of the foundation and the growth of British political influence in the
Persian Gulf in the nineteenth century. Kelly's work covers a significant period of
events inPersia and the Arabian Peninsula, including the activities of the Wahhabis of
Nejd who were to be a dominant political force in central and eastern Arabia with
influence extending to the Gulf coast for most of the nineteenth century. He also gives
a clear explanation of the development of British policy in the Gulf itself, and
describes the position of the Gulf as an outgrowth of overall British Near-Eastern
policy. Additionally, he takes into consideration the Turkish challenge over different
places in Arabia and the Gulf. With respect to Oman the author provides significant
information relative to the history of Muscat and its relations with Zanzibar over the
traffic in slavery. The work is an important source for those who intend to study the
history of the Gulf and Oman and British political influence in the region.
R. G. Landen's work "Oman since 1856", is another significant study in the
history of Oman and the Anglo-Omani relations through the Government of India.
Landen's study of the period between 1856 and 1914 narrates the growth of British
imperial involvement in Oman in particular, and in the Persian Gulf in general. The
study covers the history of Oman's indigenous population during the period of this
study and much about the way it reacted to British exploratory policy exercised in the
time of troubles in Oman. Landen tries in this study to analyse the events and trends
within Oman after 1856, during a crucial period when its ancient maritime and tribal
society was buffeted by change beyond its control and the understanding of most of its
local population. Foremost attention has been devoted to the 1862-1903 period, when
various accommodations to the new economic, and internal political realities were
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reached. The final chapter presents an outline of Oman's history in the twentieth
century until the early 1960s.
R. Kumar's book "India and the Persian Gulf Region 1858-1907", is also an
important work, especially with regard to British political relations with the Gulf
region and Oman. The work provides useful background to the British political
involvement in the Gulf principalities, and describes the Turkish position and activities
in the Gulf, and the first international conflicts in the Persian Gulf and Oman. The
book outlines the British representatives' views on different issues in Omani s affairs
during the second half of the nineteenth century, as well as helpful information
concerning the Government of India's relations with Muscat from 1858-1905, and its
instructions on how to deal with these troubles without affecting its position in the
country. He tries to show Britain's position in the development of events in Oman
and Britain's attempts to actwithout giving assurances.
In the first two chapters of his Ph.D. "A history of Omani-British Relations,
with Special Reference to the Period 1888-1913", al-Mousawi provides a general
background of Anglo-Omani relations, from 1620 to 1856. The study also gives an
enlightening explanation of the Sultan Faisal b. Turki's relations with the British
alongside material on the Government of India's views on British intentions towards
Oman. The study discusses extensively the British project for protectorship over the
Sultanate of Muscat and Oman in 1890-1895, and British action to establish
themselves in Muscat, whilst exclude any foreign powers like France from doing so.
The main part of this study provides details on the arms traffic to Oman in particular,
and to the Persian Gulf in general, providing essential information on the export
companies, and the impact of the trade on the Gulf and Oman, from the first traffic
operations until 1920. In this study al-Mousawi is faithful to the official attitude of
trade in the region and the British restrictions on the arms trade with reference to
Sultan Faisal's cooperation with the British in this matter.
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These studies have examined the issues of this period under general
discussion, and concentrated on many different matters, and continue to be prominent
pieces of research in Omani's history.
The principle aim of this study is an attempt to provide some additional
knowledge, on the history of Oman, British influence, and the policy of the Sultans of
Muscat during the relevant period. This policy led to much criticism by those who
considered it foreign interference in Omani internal affairs, and resulted in several
revolts against Muscat, led by for example Shaikh Salih b. 'Ali al-Harthi, 'Abd al-
'Azizb. Sa'id, and Sayyid Ibrahim b. Qais on the Batinah coast. The reason for
choosing Sultan Turki's reign was mainly to show the importance of this period in
Omani history, and outline the role he played in uniting Oman by re-establishing the A1
Bu Sa id Dynasty in the state of Oman.
The chapters of this thesis will show the range of internal problems which
arose in relation to conflicts in Oman. As far as we know, no previous attempt has
been made to discuss all matters which faced Sayyid Turki, and the internal situation
of Oman in this period within a single work. The study is an attempt to describe and
analyse Britain's actual relations with the Government of Oman and the consequences
of these relations on Oman's history, a fascinating factor in the history of modern
Oman. We will also outline the British Government of India's policy and order,
relating to the various problems which troubled the Government of Muscat, as it was
the guardian of the British interests there. In the context of highlighting Omani
political history during the relevant period, we have investigated the roles of the
British Political Agent, and the British Political Resident in the Gulf, because of the
importance of their position in helping the Government of India to make its decisions.
The unity of Oman was the main thrust of Sultan Turki's policy.
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In essence the unity of the country had collapsed when the Sultanate was
declared in the twentieth century. Muscat and Oman appeared separate and distinct
and this indicates that Muscat, like Oman, is a region or country. In reality, Oman is
the entire country, while Muscat is its capital but had been included in the title in the
previous years of the twentieth century because of the city's reputation and
importance. The situation remained like this until 1970, when on the 9th of August
1970 Sultan Qaboos b. Sa'id declared that the country would no longer be called
"Muscat and Oman", but would be unified as the Sultanate of Oman.
A review of the sources used in the study
From the start of this research, we have aimed to accumulate as many of the available
documents as possible and any information specifically related to our study. During
the time of our research, we have covered a number of source materials, contemporary
works of travellers and politicians, articles, reference books, Hansard, the
Parliamentary Papers, the Records of Oman and some other sources. In this study we
relied primarily on British material. Undoubtedly this reflected British interests,
however, we tried to analyse the subjects of this official information and examine the
situations that they dealt with. The published British Archives were also important
sources for this study, as they sometimes provided copies of Arabic letters sent to the
Government of India, giving the views of the Sultans and the Imam on the problems
in the country. The letters always showed the interest of the Omani Governments to
be in accordance with the member of the Government of India and the British
representatives in Muscat and the Persian Gulf.
A cosiderable problem facing this study was the disappearance of (in the
meantime virtually unknown) Omani primary sources, which presumably provided a
contrast to Arabic letters written by rulers or their opponents which can be found
among the huge volumes of the India Office Records. The only Arabic and Omani
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source for the period of this research is the book of 'Abdullah b. Humayd., al-Salimi,
Tuhfat al-A'van bi SiratAhl 'Uman , Muscat; 1978. This important work provides
the opinion of an Omani historian on many issues throughout the history of Oman.
The book is divided into two volumes. The first one deals with the history of the
Arabs of Oman from early times to the establishment of the State of the Bani Nabhan
in Oman. The second volume is an account of the establishment of the sixth Imamate
of the Ya'aribah in 1624-1743, and the establishment of the A1 Bu Sa'id dynasty in
1743. The work also contains important information on the history of Oman during
the Imamate of 'Azzanb. Qais, the reign of Sayyid Turki b. Sa id, and Sultan Faisal
b. Turki.
Here we would like to introduce briefly the most important material which has
been consulted in the course of this study's investigation.
Official and unpublished documents
The India Office Records, especially the material of the Indian Foreign Department,
Political and Secret Department, were among the most important documents used in
this study. We have used these documents for the history of Oman and her relations
with Great Britain and the Government of India. They comprise various collections of
letters and reports, which are contained as enclosures in the correspondence sent by
the British representatives in the Gulf, to the Government of India, and the
correspondence sent by the Political Agent at Muscat (PAM) 1800-1951, (549
volumes), and many European manuscript collections, such as the Eur. Mss. of Sir
Lewis Pelly (1825-1892) relating to the Persian Gulf States, as well as to Oman
Public Records Office
Among the documents available in this library in Surrey are the many different series
of Records like reference 27 (France) with many files dealing with Anglo-French
7
relations concerning Muscat, reference 54 (Muscat), containing 36 volumes which
also have a great deal of information relating to Muscat and its relations with France
and Britain, reference 60 (Arms Trade), and reference 84 (Slave Trade). The Public
Records material has been essential to this study, regarding the Franco-Omani
relationship.
National Library ofScotland
The library contains many original documents and manuscripts relating to the history
of Oman during the time of Sayyid Sa'id b. Sultan and during the period of this study,
such as Ms. 12659 which provides a summary of the proceedings of the Government
of India in the Foreign Department during the Viceroyalty of His Excellency the Earl
ofMinto, from November 1905 to July 1910. There are also other original Papers in
the library, lilce those of Lord Curzon of Kedleston under the classification number
Ms. 12593, which were examined. The manuscripts give a summary of the principal
measures taken by the Viceroyalty of His Excellency Lord Curzon between January
1899 and April 1904, including some correspondence between the Government of
India and the Foreign Office and information about the Viceroy's tour of the Gulf
states in 1903, as well as including information on significant events of the time.
Published documents
This material is based on published archive collections and documents.
1. The Administration Reports of the Persian Gulf Political Residency and the
Muscat Political Agent, especially volumes 1-6 of the years 1873-1911. These reports
contain a summary of the annual reports of the principal events in Muscat and other
parts of the Persian Gulf up to 1947 relating to the internal affairs of the region, trade,
ad the economic situation, and the tribal situation.
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2a. Aitchison, C. U., (ed). A Collection of Treaties, Engagements, and
Sanads Relating to India and Neighbouring Countries.
2b. Lorimer, J. G., Compiler. Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman and
Central Arabia. These two archive works provide very important information to
anyone researching the history of the Gulf states, tribes, politics and economy, from
the beginning of the European presence in this region until the early twentieth century.
They also give a valuable collection of treaties signed between Britain, Oman, and the
rest of the Persian Gulf states and principalities. There are some other works similar
to these documents which were investigated in this study, such as Hurewitze, J. C.
Diplomacy in the Near and the Middle East: A Documentary Record: 1535-1914;
Scott, J. B. (ed). The Hague Court Reports: and Tuson, P. & E. Quick, (eds.).
Arabian Treaties 1600-1960; All these documents have essential information
regarding many different treaties and events in the Gulf states and Oman.
3. The Parliamentary Papers Series volumes between the years 1871 and 1906
have considerable data, reports, and correspondence relative to the Persian Gulf and
Omani internal affairs from the early nineteenth century to the year 1861. These
Papers have been very useful to this study regarding the slave trade, and reports and
material on the Anglo-French dispute in Muscat up to the announcement of the Hague
Court's Award in August 1906.
4. Saldanha, J. A. (ed). Precis series volumes as follows Muscat Affairs
1869-1905; Naval Arrangement in the Persian Gulf 1892-1905; Correspondence
on Internal Rivalry and British Policy in the Persian Gulf, 1872-1905; Slave
Trade in the Gulf of Oman and the Persian Gulf, 1873-1905. All these archive
documents can be considered detailed works on Omani history and affairs until 1905,
which have also provided indispensable information to researchers of the history of
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the Gulf region with clear explanatory notes on British policy in the Gulf and Oman
during the relevant years.
5. Baily, R. W. (ed). 1988. Records of Oman 1867-1947. (12 Vols). This
is a huge collection of official information relating to Muscat and its relations with the
Government of India, the British attitude to the Sultans of Oman, and the tribal
situation, with events in Oman during our period of study. Volume 6 of these
Records provided essential information with regard to Oman's relations with France.
Most of its information has been taken from the India Office Records documents
which can also be found under the title R/15/6, Political Agency, Muscat, 1800-1947,
and L/P&S/, Political Residency, Persian Gulf.
6. The Times newspaper, printed books and important articles. These sources, which
are listed in the bibliography at the end of this thesis, helped us to complete this work.
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CHAPTER ONE
British Policy towards Oman and the Regional Context
More than any other power, Britain was aware of the situation in Oman. Britain had
long been a party to the rivalry factors in Oman. In 1646 a treaty between Oman and
British was signed, between the Ya'arabi Imam Nasir b. Murshid and the British East
India Company, which gave the Company exclusive trading rights in Oman. Since
this Company administered India from the early sixteenth century to the year 1858, the
history of the East India Company is crucial to any explanation of the background of
the early relations between the rulers of Muscat and the British Governments.1
From about 1650 until the early nineteenth century Anglo-Omani relations
were dominated by British commercial interests and the trade with the Persian Gulf
region, which had created a foundation for British political interests.2 The British
exploited the influence that the East India Company had established to strengthen their
political and strategic position in Oman and the Persian Gulf. However, the true
origins of British political relations with Muscat go back to 1798, when Napoleon s
expedition to Egypt threatened British interests in India, and aroused fears that the
French aim was to use Muscat as a base for attacks on British and Indian shipping, or
even for an invasion of India. From that time on the British were very careful about
the presence of any Frenchmen at Muscat for any reason, as the British suspected this
might extend the French influence in the Oman territories.3 The British took this issue
seriously and this was a factor in establishing a Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,
who was based in Bushire. Initially, their policy towards Oman was directed
primarily to commercial interests, and only later did the British seek political influence
over Muscat. In fact the following British policy towards Oman showed their anxiety
over competition with other European countries and France in particular, which might
threaten their interests in India, the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf.4 As a result of
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this policy, Britain made certain agreements with Oman, in order to limit the freedom
of rival powers to establish an influential position with the governments of Oman.5
The protection of the routes to India was the main British interest in Oman.
This encouraged them to increase their influence in Oman and the Arabs shaikhdoms
of the Persian Gulf and the Persian tribal groups in the southern Persian provinces for
the rest of the nineteenth century.6 This was primarily to thwart rival European
powers such as France or Russa.
British political relations with the rulers of Muscat developed rapidly after the
death of Sayyid Sa'id b. Sultan in 1856. In 1864 Sultan Thuwaini agreed to become
more agreeable to British policy in his country, and signed with them a telegraphic
agreement for the use of Muscat as a terminus for a submarine telegraph cable.7 This
indication of mutual interests was one of the factors that persuaded Britain to conclude
the anti-slavery treaty in 1873, and the treaty of March 1891. These treaties led the
British to object strongly to any European plan for a foothold in Muscat. The dispute
with France over Oman emerged after 1861, and intensified British objections to
French activity over the protection of the Sultan of Muscat's subjects.
Herewith the situation had changed rapidly towards the consolidation of the
British position in the region. From the beginning of the British involvement in Gulf
affairs, Muscat proved an important factor in altering their policy to assert a strong
influence over the coastal area of the Sultanate.
1.1. British involvement increases in Oman
The dispute between the Sultan of Oman and Zanzibar over the division of the
country after Sayyid Sa'id's death soon extended British involvement. The Sultan of
Zanzibar refused to continue the payment of the Zanzibar subsidy to Muscat. The
Sultan of Muscat then planned to mount an expedition against Zanzibar to reunite it
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with Muscat and to force Sultan Majid to relinquish his power. The British were very
concerned about this matter and the Government of Bombay found themselves in
favour of settling the issue through Lord Canning's Arbitration in 1861, opening a
new era of Anglo-Omani relations.8 Subsequently the affairs of Oman from then on
were conducted primarily to serve British interests. In effect this amounted to British
jurisdiction over the State of Muscat giving them a valuable trading port, naval base,
and control of the entrance to the Persian Gulf. The Sultan of Muscat had been
reasonably well disposed towards the British who guaranteed receipt of the Zanzibar
subsidy and supported his government in internal disputes. Ater 1870, British Omani
relations were consistently friendly, building on their mutual support on the afore¬
mentioned issues. It was also clear that the British representatives in the Persian Gulf
and Muscat were more suitably qualified, and the British Government of India easily
took control of Gulf affairs. Accordingly successful British policy towards Muscat,
was dependent on the disputes in the country, which regularly increased their naval
presence off Muscat's waters.
The subsequent appointment of the British Political Agent in Muscat made the
Government of India free to defend their political interests in the Sultanate. The
activities of the Political Agents in Muscat and the Political Residents in the Gulf, were
mainly controlled by the Government of Bombay until 1873, and then by the
Government of India until 1947, and any action beyond their authority might cost
them their position, as happend to Pengelley when he supported Sayyid Thuwaini
without proper authorisation.
In July 1861, the British Political Agent in Muscat, Lt. Pengelley acted hastily
in surrendering Sayyid Turki at the time of his trouble with Sayyid Thuwaini, without
the government of Bombay's approval, and as a result his employment as Political
Agent in Muscat was terminated.9 Lt. Colonel Pelly, the British Political Resident in
the Persian Gulf, also acted without authorisation from the Bombay Government
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when he left his position in Bushire to watch Sayyid Turki's movements off the coast
of Oman. This had not been approved and the Governor-General in Council
instructed him not to go beyond his authority as a Political Resident.
However, British policy in Oman was principally shaped by the opinions of
the Political Agents and the Political Residents' towards events inside the country.
These opinions were not always determinant in the course of events, for example
when Sayyid 'Azzan b. Qais, overthrew Sayyid Salim b. Thuwaini in 1868, Pelly was
instructed to proceed to Muscat and proposed an armistice, but Sayyid 'Azzan was not
to be deflected and began operations against Sayyid Salim.10 However, Sayyid Salim
(
finally complied with the Resident1 s advice to surrender the status to Sayyid Azzan,
and to leave Muscat on board H.M.S. Vigilant with British Government approval,
although no official recognition to the 'Azzan government had been granted. This
policy strongly affected Sayyid 'Azzan position in the eyes of Sayyid Turki who was
the main challenger, and encouraged him to act effectively against his government
throughout his time in power.11
During the conflict between 'Azzan and Sayyid Turki, and Sayyid Turki with
his opponents, the British Government of Bombay always advised against the Omanis
transporting their forces by sea. This policy was made official under the conditions of
the treaty of 24th August 1853, concluded between the Shaikhs of the Trucial Coast
and the British Government in the interests of a perpetual maritime truce. The
conditions of this treaty enforced a complete halt to hostilities at sea upon the lives or
property of those of any of the parties to this agreement, and the British were
immediately authorised to punish the assailants and proceed to offer full redress to
those being brought to their notice. The treaty ensured that the British would take the
necessary steps to obtain the peace at sea and prevent any hostilities that might be
attempted at sea. 12
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During the time of the conflict between Sayyid Turki and Azzan b. Qais, a firm
policy on the question of the maritime truce was extended to the Gulf of Oman.
Commodore Heath, the Commander-in-Chief, East Indies Squadron had brought this
matter to the Governor-General's attention in February 1869. The Governor pointed
out that while the instructions issued by the Admiralty and the India Office in August
1869 confined the operation of the truce to the Persian Gulf, henceforth, the
Government of India had forbidden operations by sea or against the regime at Muscat.
The discussion of this matter had resulted from the authorities of the British
Government of India not having hesitated in the past in maintain maritime peace and
preventing warfare at sea by states not party to the truce. This resulted from a
realisation on their part that the India Office and Admiralty instructions were too
narrow in scope. The Foreign Secretary to the Government of India C.U. Aitchison,
declared that the extension of the maritime truce to the Gulf of Oman was embraced
within a line drawn from the southern coast of Muscat territory to Gwader on the
Mekran coast.13 The maritime truce had now become a strategic point in British
policy to supervise themovements of Omani rivals at sea. The British policy towards
the matter was based on maintaining their telegraphic lines in the region, and ensuring
the protection of the British Indian subjects on the Omani coast who were seen to be
under a direct threat from the use of force by the conflicting parties in Muscat.
The treaty of 1853 was an extension to the one which had been signed with
Trucial Oman in 1835 for the purpose of maintaining peace at sea and the protection of
neutral commerce. The signatories were agreed that a portion of the Gulf on the
Persian side should be placed out of bounds for tribal warfare, even during the times
when no truce existed.14 The essence of this policy emerged with the increase trade in
British Indian subjects trading in the region. In early 1870, a great deal was moving
into the hand of the Indians merchants, and some other merchants who were agents of
modern business concerns, with headquarters in India or Europe.15 Muscat had
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remained unquestionably the most important centre for Indian traders in the Gulf area,
though the trade to Muscat was declining rapidly as a port and business centre in the
region, affected by the introduction of steamers.16
1.2. The Banian community's appearance in Oman
It is very difficult to define when the first Indian merchant decided to settle or to
establish themselves as a merchant community in Muscat, or indeed anywhere on the
Omani coast. However, according to S.B. Miles there was settlement in Muscat
territory occurring no later than the fifteenth century.17 His main evidence was the old
Hindu temple ruin in Qalhat, the main Omani port during the Portuguese occupation of
the country. The premise of fifteenth century settlement is supported further by de
Albuquerque, who indicated that the Hindu merchants from Gujerat escaped from
Khor Fakkan on the Gulf of Oman before his occupation of the port in 1507.18
During the period of the Portuguese in Muscat, the Portuguese depended strongly on
the Indian Hindus in their attempts to keep the trade in the Indian Ocean under
Portuguese control and assisting them in their occupation of the country. The
merchants of the Indian community had managed throughout the following centuries
to keep themselves in the main group that dominated the trade of Muscat and the Gulf
region, despite the political disputes and the dynastic conflicts in the nineteenth
century.
The first serious crisis which faced them, and the most hard-hitting commercial
disaster occured during Sayyid 'Azzan b. Qais's reign. However, the peaceful
situation of this merchant community was gradually restored in the reign of Sayyid
Turki b. Sa'id, and once again the Banians assumed control of trade, and set about
recovering Muscat's commercial importance by trading with India, Europe and
America19 The Banian traders' position in Oman today is highly regarded and they
have the right to reside in Oman as long as they wish to be there.
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British commercial interests in Oman in the nineteenth century were to keep
these groups of Banians in a safe haven, and keep the import and the export of goods
under their control. There were also American traders in Muscat who had possibly
been involved in competition, but Muscat customs were usually farmed out to a
Banian merchant for £110,000 yearly.20 It was believed that the trade into the ports of
Oman, such as Sur, Sohar, Barka and al-Masna'ah fluctuated depending on the
peacefulness of the situation in the country, and the Sultan of Muscat always expected
a small amount for his treasury from these ports.21
1.3. Bombay and the role of the Government of India
These two British Governments were Britain's most important and influential
authorities outside the geographical area of theUnited Kingdom during the eighteenth,
nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth century, after taking over responsibility
from the East India Company. In the first decade of the nineteenth century, the
Government of Bombay had become the direct superior of the British Political
Residents in Baghdad and Basra, as the Resident at Bushire was already under the
control of the Government of Bombay. These Residents were prohibited from
corresponding directly with the Governor-General in Council of the India
Government. The Muscat Agency also was put under the direct observation of the
Bombay Government through their Resident in the Persian Gulf at Bushire, whose
political actions had largely appeared as a mediator in the transmission of letters and
reports between Muscat and Bombay. The Resident's role was also apolitical one,
giving advice to the Agency in times of difficulties in Muscat. All Agents and Political
Residents in the region were considered to be civil servants in the Bombay
Government. In August 1834, it was suggested that the entire affairs of the Persian
Gulf be transferred from the Government of Bombay to the Government of India, and
that the Government of Bombay should have nothing to do with the Residency at
Bushire, but this did not happen. Instead, it was decided that the Government of
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Bombay should continue to act on its own initiative and only if a question arose
involving British political relations in the general region of the Gulf would a reference
to the Government of India became necessary. The Resident continued to receive his
political orders from Bombay until 1873, when these responsibilities were finally
transferred to the Government of India. However, until that time they were obliged to
address all their orders and despatches to the Government of India, sending them by
way of Bombay.22 They were to act for themselves in all matters in the Gulf of
importance or involving political questions, and they had to refer first to the
Government of Bombay, and afterwards to the Government of India, if they had time,
but if not they should judge the situation and act on their own responsibility. The
Political Agent in Muscat was more restricted, and his responsibility was to refer to the
Resident on any important question, but sometimes he had to act on his own authority,
or to refer directly to the Government of India, which mostly approved his actions, but
he had to communicate to the Resident by sending him a copy of his correspondence
with India.
In fact issues of political importance were despatched to London, mostly to
inform the Foreign Office of what was going on in the region. Under these
circumstances, London and the British authorities in India co-ordinated their responses
to events. The Foreign Office left the total responsibility for taking decisions about
their policy in the region entirely in the hands of the British authorities in India. A
strong London stance towards British policy in Muscat can only be seen during the
Anglo-French disputes over Muscat in the last decade of the nineteenth century
onwards. The matter of French policy in Muscat in 1899 seemed to be a sensitive
question which needed more care from the Foreign Office to deal with, and more
discussion before a decision was made.23
From Sultan Turki's reign onwards, British policy towards Oman had rapidly
changed to his favour, with the settlement of his internal situation and the continuation
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of their financial and armed support to his government becoming the priority of British
responsibility towards Muscat. The interest of protecting their British Indian traders,
and the maintenance of the maritime truce in the region would strength their superiority
over other competitive powers. The Government of India had committed itself to a
policy of involvement for which there was no clear legal basis but which was
expedient for them to adhere in order to enable trade to continue without hindrance.
This policy was exercised by the India Government until 1947, when the Foreign
Office afterwards continued the action from London directly.
1.4. The Ottoman Empire in Arabia
In the early sixteenth century the Ottoman Turks, having now occupied Eygpt
extended theire influence in the area. In about the last decade of the same century they
occupied al-Hasa, of which Fatih Pasha became the first military governor and the
Hejaz was a completely independent province under its Sharifs. During the second
half of the seventeenth century the Ottoman influence had been extended by the
occupation of Basra by Mustafa Pasha on behalf of the Ottoman Sultan Muhammed b.
Ibrahim b. Ahmad, but the Hejaz was again out of the Ottoman influence. At this
stage the Ottoman administration was troubled by the Muntafiq tribe in what is now
Iraq, when they revolted against their authority in 1694.24 At one time the Hasa had
been under the control of the Ottoman Empire, but by the eighteenth century the only
remaining evidence of Ottoman rule was the presence of few families of Turkish origin
at al-Hofuf. However, at the close of the eighteenth century the Ottoman Empire
administrated the whole ofmodern-day Iraq.25
By the end of the eighteenth century, nearly all of central and eastern Arabia
was mostly under the Al-Sa'ud influence. This appearance of the Saudis in Arabia
persuaded the Ottoman Sultan to take action against Arabia. In 1811 the wali of
Egypt, Muhammed Ali Pasha sent an expeditionary force to Hejaz, which expelled the
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Wahhabis from Makkah and Madinah, and continued his advance into the heart of
Arabia to capture the Wahhabi capital of Dir'iya.26 The action had demonstrated the
Ottoman intention, which was based on ensuring secure communication routes to
Egypt and good relations with the local people in Arabia. The wali tried to make a
favourable impression on the Arabs by his aristocratic behaviour and by keeping all of
his promises. In fact the Egyptians were not able to send large numbers of troops to
Nejd, as they might face difficulties in returning back in the event of defeat. Despite
this, the situation was not completely in favour of the Egyptians. In January 1818
Ibrahim's army occupied Shaqra, and moved towards Durma, where he massacred its
people as a punishment for their resistance, and the road to al-Dir'iya was now
open.27 In April 1818, Ibrahim Pasha had started his campaign against al-Dir'iya,
where the Wahhabis gathered with A1 Sa'ud in the town to take part in the final battle.
The strength of the Egyptian forces and their superior artillery enabled them to destroy
the A1 Sa'ud and the Wahhabi's defences and the town fell to the conquerors on 11th
September 1818.2 8
Following the Egyptian success, the British supported Ibrahim. Captain G.F.
Sadlier of the 47th Regiment had been sent with a letter of congratulations to Ibrahim
Pasha, and a proposal for joint action against the Gulf pirates. The suggestion was
that Ibrahim should besiege Ras al-Khaima by land, and the British would attack it
from the sea. The British also were seeking from the Imam of Muscat cooperation in
this campaign, but they found Sayyid Sa'id strongly opposed to the proposal on
account of Ibrahim's acts of cruelty against the Arabs.29 The British aim of
cooperation with the Egyptian troops hereby came to an end, and the expedition
against the Qawasim was made under British supervision, when the British force
landed in Ras al-Khaima in 1819 without any real trouble, with Sayyid Sa'id b. Sultan
cooperating by accompanying the British fleet in his own ship.3 0
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In late 1819, the Egyptians decided to withdraw from Arabia, and Ibrahim
Pasha evacuated most of his forces from Nejd and eastern Arabia, convinced that his
father's (Muhammed 'Ali Pasha), aim was to control the Red Sea rather than central
Arabia.31 In 1836, a large number of Egyptian troops was assembled at Madinah, and
Faisal b. Turki A1 Sa'ud was treated as a representative who would surrender his
troops to the Egyptian General. Faisal refused the demand in the beginning, but
finally he made a full submission. In fact this action was too late to avoid the Egyptian
armywhich advanced towards Nejd, and entered into battle against the Wahhabis near
Riyadh, resulting in the Egyptians soon becoming the masters of the country.32 As a
result of this success on the part of the Egyptians, Colonel Campbell, the British
Consul-General in Cairo, warned Muhammed 'Ali Pasha against any further extension
of his position in the Gulf region and in Bahrain in particular. The British
Government of India instructed Admiral Maitland, the Commander of the naval
squadron in the Gulf to protect Bahrain Island in the event of danger.33 The British
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf had also protested against the Egyptian advance
and tookwritten assurances from the maritime chiefs of Oman that they would follow
British advice and instructions, and above all resist to the last all attempts of Khurshid
Pasha the Eygeptian representative to control their affairs. The powerful British stance
in this dispute, had its desired effect, and in May 1840 the Egyptian troops evacuated
Nejd.34
1.5. The Wahhabi's policy towards Oman
During the last part of Sayyid Sa'id's reign, the Wahhabi danger threatened Oman
from the Nejd border, but the troubles from the Nejd remained insignificant compared
with problems of local affairs which required consideration. The Wahhabi threats
resulted chiefly from the difficulties through which the Wahhabi authority itself passed
during this period.
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The confirmation of the British authorities in India of lack of responsibility for
the protection of Sayyid's internal territories had encouraged him to enter into a
friendly understanding with the Wahhabi Amir. Consequently, an agreement was
made in 1833 between Sayyid Sa'id and the Wahhabis underwhich the limits of direct
government of the contracting powers were defined and Sayyid Sa'id agreed to pay
$MT 5,000 as a tribute to the Amir of the Nejd.35 The settlement also stipulated that
each party was obliged to provide support in suppressing rebellion in the territories of
the other. This was considered imprudent by the British authorities, because of the
hostile relations existing between the Wahhabis and Muhammed 'Ali Pasha of
Egypt.36
In early 1845, during Sayyid Said's visit to East Africa the Amir of Nejd
Faisal b. Turki had sent Sa'd b. Mutlaq, to move to al-Buraimi and capture Majis on
the Omani coast and gain the neighbouring Arab tribes allegiance to the Wahhabis in
the Nejd. Sa'd successfully achieved all this and accordingly demanded an immediate
tribute of $MT 20,000 and $MT 5,000 annually thereafter. The British Political
Resident in the Gulf advised Sayyid Thuwaini, the Imam's representative in Muscat,
to accept the demands, and that $MT 5,000 should be paid on account of Sohar, while
the rest of the amount referred to Sayyid Sa'id.
However, this settlement was not enough to keep the Wahhabi threat away
from the Omani territories. In 1852, another appearance of the Wahhabi force took
place on the Omani border. 'Abdulla b. Faisal was the leader of this new threat to the
entire Muscat territory, and in particular the Batinah coast, where the Imam had
recently assured his authority in Sohar. Faisal took up his position at al-Buraimi, and
as on previous occasions the Arab tribal chiefs offered him their allegiance and
assistance.38 The British Political Resident in the Gulf again appeared on the scene,
and advised Sayyid Thuwaini to enter into negotiations with the Wahhabi leader. The
result was that the Government of Muscat agreed to pay to the Wahhabi Amir an
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annual amount of $MT 12,000 besides arrears to the extent of $MT 60,000, and the
customary supply of provisions and food stuffs.39 The Wahhabis now used their
ability to enforce their influence in the area, and imposed tribute on the Sultan of
Muscat, theTrucial Shaikhs of Oman and the tribes of al-Buraimi district to the Riyadh
government. They also tried to convert these tribes to the Wahhabi doctrine and make
them acknowledge the spiritual authority of the Wahhabi.
When Sayyid Thuwaini b. Sa'id took power in Muscat, the differences
between the Sultan of Muscat and the Wahhabi representative Turki b. Ahmad al-
Sudairi had arisen again, as the Wahhabi supported Sayyid 'Azzan b.Qais against the
Sultan. Sultan Thuwaini then turned to the British formilitary support, which had not
been confirmed as long as the Wahhabis were in terms of moral understanding with
the British authorities in the region. Subsequently the British Political Resident
Colonel Pelly offered his mediation in that dispute, and on 14th February 1865 the
Resident announced to the Government of India his wish to visit the Amir of the
Wahhabis in his capital Riyadh.40 On his return from Riyadh, Pelly confirmed to the
Government of Bombay that his visit had been satisfactorily concluded, and the
relations between the Wahhabis and the British Government were now quite
friendly.41
In August 1865, the Wahhabis had sent another mission to Muscat to collect
the annual tribute which was paid by the Sultan of Muscat on the advice of the British
Political Agent in Muscat, Colonel Disbrowe. The Wahhabis demanded an increased
tribute, which was rejected by the Sultan. The Wahhabis then took measures to cause
trouble to the Sultan by supporting a faction of part of the al-Sharqiyyah tribes to rise
against him using al-Buraimi as a headquarters for their campaign in Oman. In the
following dispute the Wahhabi Agent in al-Buraimi sent his brother on a military
mission to Sur, where the British Indian subjects had been heavily affected and their
losses was estimated at $MT 27,700. On the advice of the Political Resident the
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Sultan took action against the Wahhabi in al-Buraimi, which was clearly recognised to
be the key to Wahhabis activity in Oman. To aid him in this Sultan Thuwaini was
supplied with two guns and a large quantity of munitions to limit the Wahhabi
influence in the oasis.42 At the same time further hostility by the Wahhabis against the
Banian in Saham on the Batinah coast was initiated. The new aggression against the
Hindus led the British Political Resident in the Gulf to issue an ultimatum to the
Wahhabi Amir, which required a written apology and compensation for the hostilities
in Sur and Saham, as well as assurances that no similar violence should be committed
in future.43 No reply to the ultimation was received, and naval operations against the
Wahhabis followed at Qatif and Dammam, and on 11th February 1866, H.M.S.
Highflyer attacked Sur for its part in the affair of August 1865.44
In consequence of this operation the Viceroy and the Governor-General in
Council and the Government of Bombay were fully agreed and praised the good
conduct of the officers and men of H.M.S. Highflyer describing their action as
courageous.45 Following the correspondence between the Government of Bombay
and the Political Resident in this issue, the Resident had confirmed that all matters
were satisfactorily taken care of, and confirmed that all Arab tribes round the Gulf
were perfectly quiet and had complied with British desires.46
The Wahhabi representative was murdered in al-Buraimi in April 1868, shot
dead during a quarrel with the Shaikh of Sharjah. This ended the nineteenth century
Wahhabi occupation of al-Buraimi as the tribes of the oasis asked the Imam of Muscat
for help to expel the Wahhabi garrision from al-Buraimi's fort.47 Imam 'Azzan
marched to the Buraimi oasis in June 1869, and on the 18th of the same month the
Wahhabi garrison surrendered the town s authority to Sayyid 'Azzan b. Qais and the
Bani al-Na'im tribe.48
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The dispute over al-Buraimi brought the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi into the quarrel
when the Shaikh's property rights in the district were assured by the British. This fact
clearly demonstrated the considerable influence enjoyed by the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi in
the oasis. The British were also in support of the Abu Dhabi Shaikh's claim to
sovereignty over the oasis, and they confirmed his shared possession with the Sultan
of Muscat, when they were both involved in the defence of the oasis forts.49 Shaikh
Zaid b. Khalifah had become the most influential and powerful of the Trucial Shaikhs
after 1855. His rise to power had been helped by the death in 1866 of the great chief
of the Qawasim of Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah, Shaikh Sultan b. Saqr al-Qasimi,
who for fifty years previously had played a significant role in the Trucial Coast
Shaikhdom policy.50 In 1820 this policy was initiated by the British in the region
when they concluded a general treaty to abstain from acts of piracy, and secured peace
between them and the British Government. This treaty was followed by the signing of
the Perpetual Treaty of Peace in 1853, which was very important for the formalisation
of the British position on the Arabian Coast of the Persian Gulf.51 The British became
responsible for the actual handling of the affairs of these principalities. From the early
nineteenth century until the year 1858, all diplomatic and administrative problems in
this region were channelled through the East India Company, and by the Government
of Bombay until 1873, and then to the Government of India to the year 1947, when all
these responsibilities were transferred to the Foriegn Office in London.52 The British
relations with Trucial Oman had become more workable and their influence was
greatly increased after the conclusion of the Exclusive Agreement in 1892. The British
influence increasingly penetrated the Trucial Coast, and became a factor of importance
in any dispute arising between the Shaikhs and the external powers.53
The relations between the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi and Sayyid Turki b. Sa'id
were not always friendly. Although Shaikh Zaid b. Khalifah had visited Sultan Turki
in 1871, the two leaders held opposing views on many issues. In particular, the
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remaining years of Sultan Turki s time in power generally revealed unfriendly
relations betweenMuscat and Abu Dhabi, especially in May 1887, when Sultan Turki
gave his support to the Dhawahir of al-Buraimi who were at war with Shaikh Zaid b.
Khalifah.54
1.6. The Hinawis and Ghafiris and the general situation in Oman
The political division of the Omani tribes emerged as a result of the Civil War in Oman
in the early eighteenth century on the death of the Imam Sultanb. Saif II in 1718 at al-
Hazm. The unity which Oman had known since 1624, the date of the election of the
first Ya'rabi Imam Nasir b. Murshid, came to an end and a period of civil war
followed. The Ya'aribah era was for the most part one of internal peace and
prosperity, during which the economy of Oman had improved and flourished, and
also it was the era of the extraordinary development of Oman as amaritime power.55
Oman under the Imam Sultan b. Saif II temporarily occupied Bahrain about 1717, and
extended its authority along the Arabian Coast and south to the Kuria Muria Islands.56
War had disturbed the Ya'aribah period, with a contest for the succession that
frustrated the power of the Imam inside and outside the country, and gave birth to the
Hinawi and the Ghafiri factions in Oman. The war had created two prominent leaders
named Mohammed b. Nasir al-Ghafiri and Khalaf b. Mubarak al-Hinaie. The two
leaders' supporters entered into amajor war to re-establish the unity of Oman, and to
reinstate a strong Imam in the country. In 1728 Muhammed b. Nasir was operating
against Sohar, which had defied his authority, and Khalaf b. Mubark who was in
Muscat marched towards Sohar to regain it from Muhammed. However, the final
catastrophe occurred when the two leaders were killed in that conflict.5 7 As a result of
these events the Ghafiris held Nizwa, most of central Oman, the Zahirah and the
Sharqiyyah district. The Hinawis held al-Rustaq, the Batinah coast and Jabrin fort.
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Immediately Saif b. Sultan took over the Hinawis' territories including Muscat, and
Bil'arab b. Himyar took the places held by the Ghafiris.58
In 1743, Imam Saif b. Sultan was struggling with the Persians who had
occupied Muscat and Matrah, to gain control over the forts of the Jalali and the
Mairani. He then left for al-Hazm fort where he died. At this stage no one in the
Ya'rabi dynasty succeeded him, with Ahmed b. Sa'id the Wali of Sohar instead taking
power. He too was fighting the Persians and had regained Sohar. His popularity
encouraged the people in Oman to elect him as a new Imam of Oman and establish the
A1 Bu Sa'id dynasty. Ahmed worked effectively to exert further pressure upon the
Persians and diverted the trade route from Muscat to Barka, and finally managed to
end their activity in Oman and drive them out ofMuscat and Matrah.5 9
Sultan Turki's reign, Muscat and Matrah were considered the most important
towns on the Omani coast. The British authorities agreed that stability in Oman and
the safety of their interests largely depended on the security of these towns.
Accordingly the British had never allowed any successful attack from the interior
against Muscat and Matrah, and provided naval support to the Sultan, which enabled
him to hold a strong position in the country.60 Matrah and Muscat remained the
Sultan's priority with respect to his strength in the country, and the British Political
Agents in Muscat always approved the Sultan's request for any such help to secure his
authority in Muscat and Matrah during times of danger. As Muscat was the capital
where the central Government was conducting affairs in the rest of the Sultanate, the
Sultan realised that without it, he could not exert his authority effectively in the
country as a whole.
It known that Sultan Turki had extended his authority after 1875, to most of
the towns in the interior and on the Batinah coast. The Sultan's position became more
established after 1882, when his son Sayyid Faisal was appointed as his Wali at
27
Nizwa and its surrounding area with the help of the Hinawi faction there. Sohar was
under the governorship of his son Sayyid Muhammed b. Turki, who ensured the
Sultan's authority on the Batinah coast, despite the activity of Sayyid Ibrahim b. Qais
in the region. The rest of the Batinah towns were also under the Sultan's authority
which was administrated by his Walis. Al-Buraimi had been indirectly under the
Sultan's Government, when he agreed after the defeat of the Wahhabis to give the
town and the Zahirah district to the Bani al-Na'tm tribe,who remained loyal to the
Government of Muscat. In al-Sharqiyyah the Sultan's influence was affected in
Samad by the activity of Shaikh Salih b. 'Ali al-Harthi, who remained the Sultan's
most powerful challenger in the province, and then became Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz's
principal supporter. Salih had attacked Muscat and Matrah three times with the aim of
overthrowing the Sultan in favour of Sayyid Ibrahim b. Qais, but none of these attacks
were successful as the Sultan enjoyed British support in protecting Muscat and
Matrah. At this time the Sultan had only a Baluchi and Hadrami garrison, and had no
strong military forces under his direct control. On the other hand the Sultan's naval
force contained his steamer al-Rahmani, which he sold in Bombay at the end of 1877
for Rs. 10,000. In May 1878, Sayyid Barghash presented him with the Dar al-
Salaam steamer which became the only ship in the Sultan's service.61
Sultan Turki basically established his authority with the Ghafiri tribes'
assistance, which enabled him to maintain his position in the country. They were a
reliable ally in the period when he attempted to regain Oman and during the troubles of
his first ten years in power. The Sultan had switched to the Hinawi faction when he
saw them as not only powerful enough to confirm his authority in the interior and to
administer his position in Nizwa and Samail, but also able to secure his possessions
on the Batinah coast as well. These areas where the Hinawi had a fundamental
influence were of particular strategic importance to the Sultan's Government.62 The
Sultan used loyal tribes as his reliable forces on land and tried to organise them to
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support his position in times of danger by using the Zanzibar subsidy and the trade
with EastAfrica as a financial guarantee for their service.
1.7. Trade and Finance of the Sultan
The eventual dominance of the trade betweenMuscat and Zanzibar offered the Omanis
towns on the coast, like Sohar, Barka, Sur, Matrah and Muscat appropriate benefits.
Consequentlymany Omani traders joined the Indian Ocean community of merchants.
The trade took advantage of the monsoon winds that regularly blew from the northeast
during the winter time, and then blew equally steadily from the southwest during the
summer. Trade with East Africa had increased Omani wealth in previous centuries,
and the rise of Zanzibar in the nineteenth century was largely attributed to the activity
of the Omani merchant community. This came about as a result of challenges to their
traditional Indianmarkets from wealthy British traders.63
The campaign against the East African slave trade led to changes in traditional
commercial activities with products such as ivory, textiles, oil and coffee gaining in
importance. In fact Britain's intensified activities against slavery succeeded in
challenging the Arab traders' domination of the market, as British policy was
completely in favour of the suppression of the slave trade in the Indian Ocean. After
the signature of the 1873 agreement with the Sultan of Muscat, the subsidy of
Zanzibar was paid by the British without any real interruption.64 The British slave
trade policy had affected Muscat, and native shipping of all types clearing the port
dropped steadily. The disappearance of the large sailing vessels between Zanzibar and
Muscat was also influenced by the commercial dominance of steamers in the region
and the Indian Ocean.65 The economic state of the country faced great difficulties
similar to those of the other Persian Gulf states in the following period because of the
economic activity stimulated by the arrival of the steamers. Local ships did not have
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the strength to deal with the new competition, and so the Omani economy was hard
hit.66
As a result of this situation the Sultan of Muscat's financial position was badly
damaged and his income depleted, since he was dependent on the trade levies and the
customs revenue. In fact the most important amount that the Sultan received was the
Zanzibar subsidy, which forced him to remain loyal to the British policy towards
Oman, and the revenue of Gwader of about £6000. The Sultan usually paid the
money to the shaikhs of the tribes to keep them faithful to his government and to buy
off his challengers, either those who were inside the country like Salih b. 1 Ali, Sayyid
Ibrahim b. Qais, and Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz, or those beyond his borders such as the
Wahhabis.
Sultan Turki's financial difficulties had been one of the obstacles which had
sometimes damaged his ability to rule the country. He faced a great challenge to his
authority from various contenders, i.e. Sayyid Ibrahim b. Qais, Sayyid Salim b.
Thuwaini and his brother Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz. Ibrahim was the main figure on the
Batinah coast who never stopped his activities against the Sultan, and he regularly
occupied main towns there like al-Masana'ah al-Khabourah and Sohar. The Sultan
had always hoped that by wise concession he might be able to come to some
favourable arrangement with Sayyid Ibrahim and those who supported him, but this
never happened. Early in 1872, Ibrahim managed to conclude an alliance with Sayyid
Salim b. Thuwaini to overthrow Turki. This attempt was thwarted, however, as the
British Political Agent supported ail of Sultan s Turki allegations against them as they
were disrupting the peace in the country. Salim was operating in Ja'alan, then left for
Gwader where he joined Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz in establishing a strong opposition to
cross over to Oman in an attempt to remove the Sultan from power. In fact, because
of British support for his government all of the Sultan opponents' activities were
unsuccessful. His was the only central government in the region, and the people of
Oman were mostly in favour of his rule. Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz had been considered as
arebel to the official government in Oman, while Salim was still regarded as the killer
of his father.67
However, the British authorities declared their opposition to all these attempts
against the Sultan, as they realised that a settled situation in Oman would undoubtedly
encourage British influence in Oman in the future. Salim lost hope of obtaining
British support when he was eventually sent to reside in India until his death from
small-pox in 1876.
After 1875, 'Abd al-'Aziz and Ibrahim b. Qais remained active against the
Sultan, Ibrahim in al-Batinah and 'Abd al-'Aziz between al-Sharqiyyah and the
interior. Ibrahim's operations were always considered by the British to be hostile
activities against their strategic interests and the safety of British Indian subjects. The
two men were both powerful leaders and they had the ability to rule the country, but
Sultan Turki was more able to control the situation in the Sultanate with British
assistance which had always been provided where necessary.
The Sultan's troubles also came from the conservative tribes in the interior.
After the election of Sayyid'Azzanb. Qais by the 'ulemain 1868, as an Imam for his
political ability, he emerged in lbadi eyes as the only legitimate ruler in the nineteenth
century. In fact, despite the election of the Imam, some Ghafiri tribes were opposed
to his legitimacy, as they were influenced by theWahhabis in this direction.6 8 During
the period of 'Azzan's Imamate the Ibadi Hinawi tribes had been seen able to support
Sayyid 'Azzan's government, and these tribes fought with the Imam to neutralise any
threat to his power. The Imamate of ' Azzan increasingly appeared to be the way of
assuiing the supremacy of certain powerful Hinawi conservative tribes rather than a
way of achieving the goal of Qmani unity.69 When Sayyid Turki came to power in
Oman the power of the conservative Ibadi tribes had not been seen as a threat to his
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position, although they had sometimes gathered against him under the leadership of
Shaikh Saiih b. 'Ali al-Harthi, or Sayyid Ibrahim b. Qais at the time of their attack on
Muscat and the Batinah coast. The rallying of the conservative tribes in the interior
against the Sultan came about because of his open policy and his delicate situation
towards the British authorities in the region. They also were in disagreement with him
on the signing of the treaty of 1873 for the suppression of the slave trade, the
expulsion of Sayyid Ibrahim from political life in Oman and his disregard towards the
agreement between him and Shaikh al-Khalili after the occupation of Muscat in
January 1871. In 1875 the Sultan1 s difficulties with the Ibadi Ghafiri, who had been
replaced by the Hinawi tribes in some of the interior forts, re-emerged.70
Generally the conservative tribes had seen that Sultan Turki's methods of
governing the country did not concur with the way of the Imamate. They considered
the 'ulema to be the only ones who had the right to appoint the governor of the
country, and they believed that their duty was to abandon the central government in
Muscat if they could, and to fight against the Sultan if necessary. Despite these
considerations, the idea of aMuscat-elected government never advanced beyond the
speculative stage. As the conservatives were always in financial trouble, they were
not able to collect and organise a large number of fighting troops, and because the
British did not consult the conservative tribes about any change in Muscat1 s
sovereignty, the conservative tribes were not likely to respect British designs on
Muscat. On the whole, the Sultan remained beyond their influence, and as the Sultan
was of the A1 Bu Sa id house and of good character, the conservative tribes eventually
relaxed and accepted him.
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CHAPTER TWO
Sayyid Ttmwaini's Rule in Oman 1856 1868
Any account of Sayyid Thuwaini bin Said's reign necessitates reference to the year of
1856 which began anew era in Omani political history with the death of Sayyid Sa'id
bin Sultan.1 On his death Sayyid Sa'id left a large number of surviving sons, many of
them heavily interested in governing a part of the country, either in Oman or in
Zanzibar. Among those who were very active figures in political developments were
Sayyid Thuwaini, the eldest son of Sa'id bin Sultan, Sayyid Turki b. Sa'id and
Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz b. Sa id and Sayyid Majid and Sayyid Barghash in Zanzibar.
Apart from Sayyid Turki and Barghash, they were not full brothers. The relationship
between these brothers was based on jealousy, duplicity and animosity, which
generally marked the communications between them. However, their birth affinity
produced cordial understanding and intimacy from time to time, and this was notable
between Turki and Thuwaini, especially during the time of the Wahhabi conflict with
Sayyid Thuwaini. An amicable understanding was also sometimes apparent between
Turki and Baighash during their reign.
On 23rd July, 1844, Sayyid Sa'id bin Sultan had written a letter to Lord
Aberdeen, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, informing him of his
desire and decision to disinherit Hilal his eldest son, who died during Sayyid Sa'id s
lifetime, and expressing his wish that another of his sons, Khalid, should succeed to
the throne of Zanzibar; however, Sayyid Khalid also died during his father s life. In
the same letter he pointed out to Lord Aberdeen that Sayyid Khalid would be in the
line of succession to his African Dominions, while Sayyid Thuwaini bin Said would
be the Sultan and Governor over all his Dominions and Possessions not only in
Oman, but in Arabia and the Persian Coast as well, without any hint or mention of
Turki's position.2
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When the news of Sayyid Sa'id's death arrived in Muscat, Sayyid Thuwaini
kept it secret from Sayyid Turki and his other brothers, until he had confirmed his
position as successor to his father on the throne of Oman, by securing the certainty of
allegiance from the leaders in the main towns in Oman. When this news reached
Oman officially by the Zanzibar messenger to Muscat through Sur, Sayyid Turki bin
Sa'id at that time had the position of Wali of Sohar, 230 kilometres north of Muscat.
He left the town for Muscat with many of his people from Sohar for three days'
mourning. He considered himself as ruler of Sohar in his own right, as his two
brothers had done with regard to their possessions in Zanzibar and Muscat. 3
Not long afterwards, Sayyid Thuwaini sent his messenger Mohammad bin
Salim to Zanzibar seeking financial help from his brother Sayyid Majid, who was
financially in a better situation than his brother in Oman. Thuwaini was facing great
difficulties which were caused byWahhabi demands for itawa money, or tribute to the
Amir of the Wahhabis. Thuwaini had been asked for the sum of 20,000 Maria
Theresa Dollars instead of the usual payment of $MT 10,000.4 He was unable to
afford this amount in addition to all his other commitments. Majid understood the
matter, and he decided to send him $MT 40,000, of which 10,000 would go to cover
that annual payment. In doing this Majid was on the one hand trying to reach a
satisfactory settlement of the dispute between Muscat and Zanzibar, and on the other
hand trying to induce his brother Thuwaini to give him his share of the horses left by
their father Sayyid Sa'id bin Sultan. 5 Majid, on agreeing to pay Thuwaini that sum,
had stipulated that $MT 10,000 be paid to their brother Turki of Sohar. However,
Majid realised that if Sayyid Thuwaini were ever to challenge Sayyid Majid's position
in Zanzibar, a successful move would bring him not only increase in power and
prestige, but more importantly, considerably more in terms of wealth. In 1860, the
revenue of Zanzibar was $MT 206,000, while that of Muscat was only $MT 129,000,
so it was important for Majid to buy off Thuwaini s hostility and to prevent him from
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wishing to place the whole Empire under his own control. Promising him an annual
payment of MT$ 40,000 was a sensible decision.6
In consideration of this fact Brigadier W. M. Coghlan, the Political Resident at
Aden, enclosed a letter in his report of 4 July 1860 to L.N. Anderson, the acting Chief
Secretary to the Government of Bombay, in which he conveyed the British Political
Agent in Zanzibar, Colonel Rigby's account of this transaction as follows:
" I am informed soon after the death of the late Imam... Sayyid Majid
agreed to remit Sayyid Thuwaini the sum of 40,000 German crowns
annually, of which sum 10,000 crowns were for the payment to the
Wahhabees, 10,000 to their mutual brother Sayyid Toorki, who had
been put in possession by their father, of the territories of Sohar, and
the remaining sum 20,000 crowns were for Sayyid Thuwaini himself;
but it was stipulated (conditional) on Sayyid Thuwaini refraining
from hostilities with his brother Sayyid Toorki; and as Sayyid
Thuwaini has broken this agreement, and undertaken hostilities
against Sayyid Toorki, the money for the past year has not been
remitted toMuscat."7
Although there were no official references to Sayyid Turki's claim on Sohar,
which would have given Sayyid Thuwaini the full right to suppress the claim, any
attempt to do so might have encouraged Sayyid Turki to establish an independent
territory in the Batinah area. A discussion of this dispute will be given in a separate
part of this chapter.
2.1. Thuwaini-Majid Dispute 1856-61
While Sayyid Thuwaini was engaged in preparing himself for military action against
Zanzibar in order to unify it with Oman, Barghash b. Sa id sought to turn the situation
to his own advantage: he wished to rule Zanzibar by leading a group of Omanis
against his brotherMajid.8
The British action in regard to the succession dispute consisted of the military
intervention by Rigby, when the Royal Navy succeeded in threatening the ambitions
of Sayyid Barghash and as well as there of Sayyid Thuwaini who had plans to invade
39
Zanzibar. Fortunately for Majid, a British frigate was anchored off the East African
coast very close to the Zanzibar isles to oppose any attack by the Omani rebels led by
Sayyid Barghash and succeeded in crushing the rebellion on 16 October, 1859.9 Thus
to oppose the ambitions of Sayyid Thuwaini and Sayyid Barghash it appeared clearly
from the beginning of 1859 that the British authorities were generally in favour of
upholding the late Sayyid's decision on the division of his dominions between his
sons in Muscat and Zanzibar. Nevertheless, as late as 1861 when the Resident in
Aden Coghlan was first appointed to his arbitration mission, the British were acting
carefully in regard to the maintenance of the status quo, but it was clear nevertheless
that the traditional unity between Oman and Zanzibar was now over, whether or not
Sayyid Thuwaini was the best qualified son among the survivors of Sa'id's sons to
assume authority over all the territories ofOman and Zanzibar.
In fact, General Rigby, the British Agent at Zanzibar did intervene, and given
the reliance of the British authorities on his often biased view of the tide of local
opinion in both Oman and Zanzibar, persuaded even officials like Coghlan who had
been totally against this suggestion, to accept the idea of separating Muscat and
Zanzibar. In regard to the succession to Sayyid Sa id in Zanzibar, since the threat to
Majid from his brother Barghash no longer existed, the way was more open for the
British to settle the squabble betweenMuscat and East Africa on their terms.10
The claim of Sayyid Thuwaini to Zanzibar was encouraged by the recognition
of him by shaikhs of the main Omani tribes who considered him as their Sultan. This,
in his own and in their view, justified his claim to rule over all of Oman, including the
territory which had long been a dependency of Oman i.e. Zanzibar.11 Although the
Zanzibar subsidy payment was agreed to be paid by Sayyid Majid difficulties appear to
have arisen as to whether it was a tribute from a dependent part of Sayyid Sa'id bin
Sultan's heritage to the main part of his dominions or a friendly contribution from a
rich brother to a poor one. In fact the situation could have been interpreted either way,
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the first from Sayyid Thuwaini s side, while the second one had been adopted by
Sayyid Majid, as he held power in the richest part of the Empire.
2.2. Thuwaini's attempt to re-unite Zanzibar with Muscat
The seriousness of the trouble between Majid and Thuwaini became clear when the
latter decided to invade Zanzibar and to re-join it to his possessions in Asia by force.
In January 1859 the news had reached Zanzibar that a powerful fleet from Muscat was
being prepared by Sayyid Thuwaini, and that the Sultan of Muscat was planning an
invasion of Zanzibar. This was a cause for great alarm, and even apparently to have
interrupted trade to and from East Africa. Many thousands of people gathered from
various ports of Africa to resist the military campaign organised by Sultan
Thuwaini.12 The streets of Zanzibar were crowded with excited and enthusiastic
armed men firing their old rifles in different directions to demonstrate their ability to
stand against the force of the Arabs from Muscat. When the British Political Agent
learned about the expedition, it became clear to him that Sayyid Thuwaini's plans to
invade Zanzibar were actually being acted out, for Sayyid Thuwaini had many
supporters in East Africa.13
On Friday, 11th February, 1859, Thuwaini set sail from Muscat with a force
composed of the frigate Caroline, the large corvette Curlew, the brig Rahmani, and a
troop ship. He had added to that nine Baghlahs carrying about 2,500 fighters from
different tribes of Oman.14 On January 28th, 1859, Rigby wrote a letter to Captain
Berkely, the Commander of the H.M. S. Lynx asking him to come to Zanzibar for the
protection of British Indian subjects. On the 24th February, 1859, the Sultan of
Zanzibar's warship Shah Alum with several hundred men, and 44 guns in very good
condition and served by Turkish gunners, set sail.15 The rest of his fleet,
Piedmontese , Africa, and Artemis, had on board 150 men drilled in the French
style, which made them quite capable of confronting the Arabs of Muscat. In March
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1859 one of the hostile Muscati dhows arrived in Zanzibar, where all of its men were
at once imprisoned.16 The British authorities in India had been anxiously considering
this situation and they sent urgent orders to Sayyid Thuwaini to dissuade him from
carrying out his threat against Zanzibar.17 At the same time the marine cruiser Assaye
was dispatched post-haste from Bombay to Zanzibar in answer to an urgent request of
February 1859 in order to support Sayyid Majid and to protect the British Agent and
subjects there. The steam-frigate had also brought information that the Muscat fleet
for the invasion had been watched out at sea by a squadron from Bombay and had
been invited under threat to return to Muscat.18 In fact the order to Sayyid Thuwaini
to prevent him from carrying out these hostilities had not reached him in time.
Lord Elphinstone, the Governor of Bombay, acted quickly to catch the
Muscati fleet proceeding to Zanzibar. On 11th February he sent his Military Secretary,
Lieutenant-ColonelRussell, from Bombay on board the British steam frigate Punjab
to catch up with Thuwaini to give him a letter. This requested him to return to Muscat,
and to submit his differences with Majid to the mediation of the Indian Governor-
General. Russell caught up with Sayyid Thuwaini and his main fleet off Ras al-Hadd
near Sur about 368 kilometres south east of Muscat. On reading the letter he
immediately agreed to return back to Muscat with his fleet, and to submit the
differences with Sayyid Majid to arbitration. In addition, he sent a vessel after the
Baghlahs which had already left for Zanzibar to re-call them.19 Sayyid Thuwaini had
considered the internal situation in Oman unpromising for him to continue on that
mission, and he desperately needed to be in Oman.
Sayyid Turki had received guns, ammunition and money from Majid to arise
against Thuwaini. Sayyid Turki himself wrote to the Resident in the Persian Gulf,
clearly admitting that he intended to work against his brother Thuwaini, and
afterwards, he left Oman on a visit to Zanzibar to see Majid for the same purposes. At
the same time the Wahhabis were creating serious trouble for Sayyid Thuwaini on his
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northern borders. The dispute between Sayyid Turki and Sayyid Thuwaini will be
discussed later in this chapter. Another point of trouble was the Persian demand for
the renewal of the Bandar Abbas lease with the threat of revoking it. This meant that
Sayyid Thuwaini was in a desperate financial situation and depended very much upon
the money from Zanzibar, and his hopes rested on Majid1 s approval to pay him that
subsidy.20
With reference to this quarrel, France seems to have been slightly involved,
and was accused by the British of giving secret support to Sayyid Thuwaini and also
to Sayyid Barghash in his claim to the Zanzibar throne. The British authorities there
had been naturally troubled by the French involvement, and they were obliged to act in
their own interests, by not allowing any European power like France to work freely to
impose her influence upon Majid or tiy to aggravate the existing situation between
Oman and Zanzibar.
Indeed it was not long before French warships arrived at Zanzibar, and soon
after that their Commander and the French Consul there met Sayyid Majid and
discussed the situation with him. At that meeting they confirmed to him that Sayyid
Barghash was under French protection, and should be treated respectfully. They also
made clear toMajid the French objection to the British intervention and activities in the
dispute between Muscat and Zanzibar.21
In April 1859 C.P. Rigby, Political Agent and Consul in Zanzibar, wrote a
letter to Commander R. N. Jenkins, regarding his suspicion of French support for
Sayyid Thuwaini proceeding to Zanzibar. He stated in his letter that the English and
the American Governments had recognised Sayyid Majid as Sultan of Zanzibar soon
after the death of Sayyid Said bin Sultan but that the French Government had never
taken any positive steps towards this.22 In fact, the French attitude and behaviour in
both Oman and Zanzibar showed their uncertainty in this matter. This appeared clear
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with the arrival of a French merchant vessel off the coast of Sohar, sent from Sayyid
Majid with gunpowder and shot together with a sum of money to Sayyid Turki to
encourage him to rebel against Thuwaini. However, on the arrival of the news of
Sayyid Thuwaini's military expedition setting sail, the French Consul had not
concealed his satisfaction and had openly abused Sayyid Majid in the foulest way. He
said that not a shot would be fired in his favour, and that Sayyid Thuwaini would
quietly land and assume the Government. He asked General Rigby about what his
would be reaction on the arrival of Thuwaini in Zanzibar. The reply to that question
entirely confirmed to him that the British attitude was in favour of supporting Majid s
position over his own possessions in East Africa, and considered him as a properly
constituted authority.23 Not only that, but the British authorities at Zanzibar would
call upon Sayyid Thuwaini and warn him that, if any British Indian subjects suffered
injury to person or property, he would face the retribution of the British Government.
The British authorities had also accused Sayyid Thuwaini of acting totally in response
to the French desire to advance their aggressive intentions on the Zanzibar dominions,
scheming to provoke a revolt and sending secret letters to the Arab chiefs at Zanzibar
to induce them to do so.24
2.3. The Arbitration of 1861
As we have already seen, the seriousness of the difficulties betweenMajid and
Thuwaini had been closely fallowed by the British authorities, and both men were
pressured by the Government of India to accept its settlement. However, the good
relationship between Muscat and Zanzibar had deteriorated to the extent that its
survival would not be accomplished without British mediation. Accordingly, during
the years 1859-1860, the British became highly involved in that quarrel, and decided
that a resolution of this problem was necessary and that it should be managed by them
alone. The British influence over the ruling dynasties in Oman and Zanzibar, forced
the two parties to accept the settlement the Indian Government was proposing.
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Although Sayyid Thuwaini had accepted in principle the suggestion of
arbitration by the Viceroy-General of India Lord Canning, he was extremely reluctant
to commit himself to the Viceroy's decision. Nevertheless, he was eventually
persuaded to accept the offer. In May 1860 a written statement was made by the
British government of India appointing Brigadier-General W. M. Coghlan, the
Resident at Aden, to investigate the claims of the dispute.25 He was assisted by the
Reverend George Percy Badger, a medical officer, Chaplain at Aden, and an
accomplished Arabic scholar and historian, and Mr. Hormuzd Rassam, acting British
Agent atMuscat.2 6 The proceedings of the commission began their task by securing
from each of the parties a formal bond for their agreement to the Viceroy's decision.2 7
In fact the British authorities in Bombay had first gained a bond from Thuwaini, and
they deputed to him inMuscat a Naval Officer, with political experience, Commander
C.J. Cruttenden, Indian Navy, in September 1859. However, Cruttenden was not
instructed to obtain identical written consent from Majid, which was obtained at the
end of September, 1860, on the arrival of the Commission in Zanzibar to resume its
official work which had started at Muscat.28
The investigation began officially at Muscat on 12th June 1860. It spent nine
days with Thuwaini enquiring into the situation ,29 At the end of his discussions in
Muscat Coghlan submitted his first report dated 4th July I860, written directly after
his visit to Muscat and before visiting Zanzibar. In that report he pointed out that
Sayyid Thuwaini had a good case, based on a strong claim as ruler of Oman as well
as its dependencies in East Africa.30 Thuwaini's opinion was strongly supported by
Coghlan's colleague G.P. Badger who had made his own investigation into Omani
history. He had been presented with a copy of Ibn Ruzayq s manuscript al-Fath al-
Mubin by Sayyid Thuwaini in order to augment his knowledge of the history of Oman
which might support the claim. He submitted all the information collected from his
research to Coghlan. Coghlan concluded that, whatever the situation after the death of
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Sa'id bin Sultan, the father's decision on the division of his dominions between his
two sons should be acknowledged in full distinct and individual sovereignty for
Muscat and Zanzibar.31 In July 1860, the commission headed by Brigadier-General
Coghlan sailed from India to Zanzibar to continue the next episode of its
investigations of the case, and arrived at Zanzibar at the close of September 1860,
where it soon started its work questioning Majid on his claim to the sovereignty of
Zanzibar.32 Majid based his demands to the sovereignty of Zanzibar on the following
four facts:33
1. Sayyid Said had divided the empire before his death into two separate powers, as
he mentioned in his letter to Aberdeen, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
2. Majid had been elected ruler of Zanzibar and its territories by the A1 Bu Sa'id
residents and the rest of the inhabitants of the isle.
3. He had been recognised as ruler of Zanzibar by the foreign powers in particular
Britain and America.
4. Thuwaini himself recognised Majid1 s authority over this province by authorising
Muhammad binSalim's visit to Zanzibar to request financial support.
Although at first Coghlan found it hard to understand these reasons, he later came to
support Rigby's encouragement of the division of the Sultanate. After reaching a
conclusion on his views on this dispute between the two rulers in Muscat and
Zanzibar, Coghlan issued the following edict:
" To sum up: considering the fact that the people of Zanzibar and its
African dependencies did on the death of the late Syed Seed, elect his
son Majid, to be their ruler in his stead; considering that the altered
condition of these dependencies during the last half century fully
entitled them to that privilege; considering that, if Syed Thoweynee
elected Sovereign of the parent State, was justified in coercing them
into submission, the people of the African dependencies, on the other
hand were equally justified in resisting him; considering that it was
very doubtful whether any such attempt on his part would have been
successful, and considering the possibility that, if persisted by Syed
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Thoweynee, the projected invasion of Zanzibar would have led to
forfeiture of his supremacy over Oman, I arrived at the conclusion,
on these grounds exclusively, that Syed Majid's claim to the
sovereignty of Zanzibar and its African dependencies are superior to
any which have been adduced in favour of Syed Thoweynee".34
On the evidence of the Report, Lord Canning came to the decision in April
1861, to separate the African possessions of Sa'id b. Sultan from the Asian territories
and to create anew and independent State of Zanzibar.35 The result of this settlement
was communicated to Sayyid Thuwaini in the letter sent to him from Canning on 2nd
April 1861. Canning gave a very clear message to Sayyid Thuwaini that full
consideration had been given to the issues, and the conclusion he had come to was as
follows:36
1. That Sayyid Majid had been declared the ruler of Zanzibar and the East African
dominions of Sayyid Sa'id b. Sultan.
2. That the ruler of Zanzibar should pay the ruler of Muscat a subsidy of 40,000
Crowns annually .
3. That Sayyid Majid pay to Sayyid Thuwaini the arrears of the subsidy for two years,
totalling 80,000 Crowns.
The continued annual payment of $MT 40,000 to Muscat was not to be
considered as implying the dependence of Zanzibar on Muscat, it was rather to be
considered only because Zanzibarwas eminently richer than Muscat. In the meantime,
both parties had been asked for their written consent, to express their satisfaction at
this award.37 This annual subsidy was to continue from Zanzibar until 1871, when
the British would make the payment themselves. It was paid from Bombay until
1947, when it became the responsibility of the Foreign Office in London until the year
1956.38
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Although Oman was never a British Colony or Protectorate, the British
authorities decided to accommodate this permanent payment to Oman for nearly 85
years. By means of this financial assistance, the British were openly asserting their
influence upon the Sultans of Oman and Zanzibar.
In confirmation of this fact, the Foreign Office in London wrote a letter to the
British Ambassador in Berlin on January 14th 1885. This concerned the German
intention to increase her appearance in Zanzibari waters by sending a German vessel of
war to Zanzibar with the German Consul-General on board. In this letter the Foreign
Office indicated as follows:
"For the greater part of the century the Sultans of Muscat and
Zanzibar have been under the direct influence of this country and of
the Government of India. Muscat and Zanzibarwere divided into two
Kingdoms under separate Sultans, an arrangement which still
continues".39
The British authorities clearly did not welcome any possible interference into
the internal affairs of Oman and Zanzibar on the part of any foreign state.
2.4. "Azzan's trouble with Sayyid Thuwaini
When Sayyid Thuwaini bin Sa'id became the ruler of Oman in April 1861 after Lord
Canning s arbitration, he faced many challenges, one of which was prompted by
Sayyid Qais bin ' Azzan and his son 'Azzan bin Qais of al-Rustaq.
Meanwhile, Sayyid Thuwaini's position in the interior of Oman had been
weakened after the inhabitants of Nakhal, who were antagonistic to his rule,
overwhelmed and killed his Wali, Suwailim b. Salmeen.40 At the same time another
revolt took place when the tribe of 'Yal Sa'd of Batinah, in a challenge to Thuwaini's
authority, occupied the fort of al-Suwaiq. The Sultan gathered his troops and marched
towards al-Maladdah, where the opposition was gathering. The fighting lasted for a
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short time, after which 'Yal Sa'd agreed to hand over the fort to the Sultan, and
submitted to his authority.4 1
Sayyid Qais bin 1 Azzan had appeared a strong contestant to Sayyid Thuwaini's
authority even inMuscat itself. Sayyid Qais b. 'Azzan remained disloyal to him until
the latter s murder by Hilal bin Muhammad, Thuwaini's cousin from al-Suwaiq.42
About two years before the murder of Sultan Thuwaini, Sayyid Qais bin 'Azzan had
been preparing to launch an attack against him in the capital to destroy his authority
and to seize the government.43 He communicated his plan to Hilal bin Muhammad,
who was a prominent and influential person, and asked him to join him in that revolt
but he strongly refused to do so and denounced this plot, showing his loyalty to his
cousin Thuwaini. 44
After the death of Qais bin 'Azzan, his son 'Azzan continued the resistance
against Sayyid Thuwaini's rule. By the end of 1864, 'Azzan had raised a revolt in
Oman against the Sultan, who was at this time in possession of al-Rustaq castle.
Sayyid 'Azzan managed to win the support of Ahmad al-Sudairi, who was in actual
fact planning to establish a strong Wahhabi entitlement over the al-Buraimi oases and
elsewhere in Oman.45 Sultan Thuwaini was determined to crush him as he had earlier
with his father Qais but he did not succeed in doing so. The Wahhabis stood behind
'Azzan, and theirNaib at al- Buraimi sent a warning to Sayyid Thuwaini that 'Azzan
enjoyed their protection, and that any attempt to destroy him, or even to cause him
some harm, would bring a Wahhabi force down to Muscat.46 Sayyid Thuwaini
immediately sought Britishmediation to intervene in this trouble with them, and asked
for assistance. Col. Lewis Pelly, the British Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,
was instructed to investigate the situation and to submit a report on thismatter.41
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2.5. Hostility and Harmony between Thuwaini and Turki
2.5.1. Turki's challenge to Thuwaini
The main cause of trouble at this time was the Sultan's brother Sayyid Turki bin Sa'id
of Sohar. Sayyid Turki had been his father's wali at Sohar, as Thuwaini had been the
Governor of Muscat, and Majid the Governor of Zanzibar. However, the situation
afterApril 1861 had changed completely in Oman in favour of Sultan Thuwaini as he
became the ruler of the whole country and its dependencies in Arabia. Nevertheless,
Sayyid Turki had insisted on his claim to succession in Sohar, and he asserted the
same independence as had many of the previous walis in Sohar at various times in the
past.
In the summer of 1861, Sayyid Turki determined to set himself free from his
brother's rule, and prepared himself to reject the Sultan's authority over Sohar. He
declared the independence of Sohar and the district around the town.48 The
declaration was short-lived: the threat by Sultan Thuwaini to take action and to proceed
personally forced Sayyid Turki to abandon his demands.
Indeed, Sayyid Turki's attempt were regarded as an extension to his activities
during the dispute between Sayyid Thuwaini and Sayyid Majid. Sultan Thuwaini on
his part did what he could to express his dissatisfaction with his youngest brother's
behaviour in this regard. He asked his youngest brother to consider very carefully the
difficulties which would arise from this state of affairs, but Sayyid Turki completely
ignored the Sultan's suggestion.
Sayyid Turki carried his rejection so far, that he threatened Sultan Thuwaini
that he would place Sohar and its dependencies under the Wahhabis1 authority. Of
course, he had no right to do so or even to create Sohar independently of Muscat.49
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No documentary evidence existed to support Sayyid Turki's claim. Colonel
Hamerton, the British Political Consul in his letter to the Foreign Secretary, the Earl of
Clarendon, G. William Frederick, on 10th November 1856, stated the following:
"I am fully aware that His Highness s (Syud Sa'id) intentions
regarding the succession were, that Syud Thoweynee at Muscat
should succeed to the Government of his Arabian possessions and
that the prince Majid, who His Highness considered in the place of
his deceased son Khalid, should succeed to the Government of his
African possessions, provision being made for other of his sons as
governors of various places in his African possessions".50
So with regard to this quarrel, the above meant that Sayyid Turki was nothing
more than a deputy with restricted powers from the sovereign Wali.51 In fact, Sayyid
Turki had shown no interest in separating Sohar from Muscat at the beginning of
Sultan Thuwaini's reign, but now he felt his pretension so justified that he was
determined to free Sohar from Muscat's authority, even though such a outcome could
not be legallymaintained.
To this effect he disregarded the advice which had been given to him by the
British authorities that he should consider himself thoroughly under his brother's
sovereign power and join him in the interests of a united Oman.52 He felt that the
maintenance of the status quo was no more than a continuation of the previous
situation under his father's reign, when he had been paid only $MT 120 per month.
Sayyid Turki s attempts to form a coalition against Sayyid Thuwaini had more than
once led to the suspension of the amount paid, and it had lately been withdrawn in
consequence of the more direct action taken by Sayyid Turki which had damaged
Sultan Thuwaini's influence.53 Sayyid Thuwaini still remembered his brother s
earlier bond, when in October 1858 Turki had written to Sayyid Thuwaini confirming
his agreement to cooperate with him in the course of a series of disputes in Oman, and
asking him for advice to deal with troubles at that time on the Batinah Coast and
Zanzibar.54
The foregoing considerations taken together provided, in the British
Government s opinion, evidence which was decidedly adverse to Sayyid Turki's
claim. Granting independence to Sohar could not satisfy these demands, and would
also encourage Turki's resistance to Sayyid Thuwaini.55
The British Government used their influence, confirming the Sultan's authority
over the town and its district, and strengthening his power to secure it from foreign
occupation. Moreover they insisted on opposing any other dispute which might
alienate any part of Sayyid Thuwaini s dominions from his legitimate sovereignty.
They totally rejected the separation of Sohar from Muscat under any circumstances,
and Turki was only considered as a wali of the Sultan based at Sohar. The principal
danger Thuwaini was concerned about was the temptation of Turki to follow Majid's
lead and maintain his independence.
On May 13th 1861, the Indian Government wrote a letter to Sayyid Turki
relating to this issue. It conveyed to him the British Government's decision not to
accept this claim, and they sincerely hoped that he would act in accordance with the
friendly advice provided to him by the Government of India. They advised him that
his duty as well as his special interest was to obey his brother. They added that his
involvement in this dispute would not help him, since persistence from his side in this
claim was officially unsupported and they confirmed this information to his brother
Thuwaini.56
It was possible that on learning the decision of the Government of India,
Sayyid Turki would submit himself to Sultan Thuwaini, but what worried him most
was the uncertainty of his situation in spite of Thuwaini's promises to treat him
kindly. Sayyid Turki's reaction to these assurances was to slow down the process,
and to delay the transfer of authority to Sultan Thuwaini, probably because of the
strength of feeling the the people of Sohar who were in favour of him.
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2.5.2. The British Agent's position in the dispute
In May 1861, the Government of India had appointed their permanent representative in
Muscat to contain the crisis, the Lieutenant W.M. Pengelley of the Royal Indian
Navy.57 Soon after his arrival he learnt that Sultan Thuwaini's preparations to attack
Sohar were actively in progress in the harbour of Muscat on board his men-of-war.
The Political Agent atMuscat entreated him before taking extreme measures to use all
the means in his power to persuade his brother Turki to give up the governorship of
Sohar in order to avoid conflict and public disunity. He stated that launching this
attackwould be a matter of concern to the Government of India, which rejected civil
war or disorder in the Omani dominions.58 In his reply to the Agency at Muscat,
Thuwaini stated that all peaceful endeavours on his part had been useless, and fresh
complaints of his brother1 s misgovernment were being made daily. He had at last
come to the decision that he could no longer endure it but would, by using force of
arms, compel Sayyid Turki to relinquish his claim to Sohar and swear allegiance to
Thuwaini as sovereign of Oman.59
Subsequently, in June 1861, Thuwaini decided to send five men-of-war, the
CorvetteRahmani of 24 guns, the Caroline of 40 guns, the brig Curlew of 4 guns
and two dhows, each with one gun.60
The British authorities at Muscatwere opposed to any attempt to detach Sohar
from the Sultanate. Seeing that Sayyid Turki was showing inflexibility, the British
Agent immediatelywrote to the British Indian subjects at Sohar informing them of the
situation and advising them to be ready to evacuate the town at a moment s notice.61
On 5th of June, 1861, Sayyid Turki wrote a letter to the British Political Agent at
Muscat, W.M. Pengelley, in which he complained about the Agency's action in
having advised the British subjects to leave the place, and asking for more time to be
given before the Sultan marched towards Sohar.62 Although Sayyid Turki stated in
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his letter that he felt happy at being placed under the dominion of Muscat and he would
favour a visit to his brother at Muscat, Sayyid Thuwaini declined to accept this offer.
Instead he remarked that any further delay on this question would be extremely
dangerous and finally affect Sayyid Thuwaini power in the country.63 The British
authorities accused Sayyid Turki of not keeping his promises since he was repudiating
their solution of replacing Sohar under Muscat sovereignty. The British Agent also
warned him against launching any attack, which would cause trouble in Oman.
Simultaneously, the British Agent agreed that Thuwaini should go ahead with his
plan.64
2.5.3. The British mediation in the dispute
In the meantime Lt. Pengelley offered to be a mediator between Thuwaini and Turki
in this hostility. Sayyid Turki, in correspondence with the British Political Agent,
finally accepted a request to meet Sultan Thuwaini on condition that the meeeting be
held outside Muscat. Pengelley then reported this development to Sultan Thuwaini,
who declined to show any willingness to have any personal communication with
Sayyid Turki or to hold any conference with him outside the capital, Muscat.6 5
The British Agent atMuscat was disappointed by Sayyid Thuwaini's response
as he had hoped that the brothers would meet and settle their differences peacefully.
For this purpose Pengelley left Muscat for al-Seeb on the Omani coast 52 kilometres
north of Muscat to make progress in encouraging the contesting parties to negotiate.
He communicated directly with Sayyid Turki in Sohar asking him to visit al-Seeb
where he was to discuss with him the present situation. Sayyid Turki in his reply
regarding the invitation stated that he would willingly come to see him in Muscat as
long as security could be provided. The Political Agent immediately promised to
guarantee his safety while he was with him as well as for his return to Sohar.66
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However, when he met with Sayyid Turki the Agent declined to confirm his
pledge of safety, and told him that it went quite beyond his authority. He also
informed him that to keep this guarantee of safety intact , Sayyid Thuwaini should be
informed about it. When Pengelley informed the Sultan about what he had already
done, Thuwaini without hesitation said that any assurance that had been given by him
should be considered as official, and would be treated in the same way as if coming
from the Sultan himself.6 7
Soon after the arrival of Sayyid Turki at al-Seeb on 4th July 1861, the British
Political Agent contacted Sultan Thuwaini in the hope of his coming to al-Seeb. The
Government of India were certainly very keen that this meeting should take place and
should influence the outcome which would be made public in Oman, and to Turki
himself however, to preserve the country from civil dissension. They would certainly
be affected by Sayyid Turki's revolt in Sohar but there would be more difficulties if
' Azzan bin Qais of al-Rustaq pursued his demands. Despite this however, the British
authorities in India were not completely in accordance with their Agent's activities in
Muscat.
Sayyid Turki arrived on board a baghlah accompanied by about thirty armed
followers. He had asked the British mediator to appeal on his behalf to the Sultan for
forgiveness, and to convey his wish to resume friendly relations with Sultan
Thuwaini. Pengelley, however, had not initiated this. On 5th July 1861, Sultan
Thuwaini at last arrived at al-Seeb escorted by 200 cavalry to attend the meeting
arranged with Sayyid Turki.68 Lt. Pengelley, to avoid any misunderstanding between
the two brothers, prepared to submit a written note to both parties with the aim of
achieving a satisfactory result. His first note was sent to Turki, in which he warned
him that, if he would not accept his view on this matter peacefully and refused to
comply and try to resolve the situation, he should at once go back to Sohar. Sayyid
Turki, feeling that his position was vulnerable, did not take offence at the tone of
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Pengelley's note but agreed to his suggestions, and seemed ready to accept Sayyid
Thuwaini's authority.69 These assurances showed that Sayyid Turki was no longer
interested in being in disagreement with his brother Thuwaini, and was in favour of
the settlement, which he realised would certainly help stability in his country. On the
other hand Sultan Thuwaini was now also ready to accept anything that his brother
might wish to discuss with him without delay. He feared that as long as Sayyid Turki
remained at Sohar he would never be a loyal subject and Sultan Thuwaini would
suffer as long as he remained active.
2.5.4. Thuwaini's action against Sohar
While the arrangements for this conference were being made, Sayyid Turki suddenly
changed his mind , and sent a message to the British mediator that he could not attend
and prepared to sail off to Sohar during the night. Pengelley instantly informed him
that as a consequence, the British efforts would cease, and Sultan Thuwaini was given
the right to arrest him.70 The British Political Agent considered Turki's behaviour to
be against all his promises to him, and that he was no longer responsible for Sayyid
Turki's protection. He also pointed out that from now onwards he would be treated
no differently from any one of the Sultan1 s subjects. Sayyid Thuwaini took this
opportunity to capture Sayyid Turki's Baghlah , and it was escorted to Muscat by two
of the Sultan1 s armed dhows.71
With hindsight Lieutenant Pengelley's decision to withdraw his bond of
protection for Sayyid Turki was probably a mistaken one. In response to Sayyid
Turki's arrest and imprisonment in the fort of al-Jalali in Muscat, the people of Sohar
revolted against the Sultan.72
On July 9th 1861, Sultan Thuwaini despatched a fleet from Muscat consisting
of Rahmani, Curlew, and two other armed dhows, which had been made ready for
this purpose previously with instructions to anchor off the Barka coast, 84 kilometres
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north of Muscat waiting for him. He arrived at Barka on 12th July . The British
Political Agent s attitude was clearly in favour of the Sultan's move. Instead of trying
to resolve the situation, Pengelley immediately despatched a letter to the soldiers and
inhabitants of Sohar, instructing them in the name of the British Government to refrain
from becoming involved in this conflict or taking part in this rebellion. Furthermore
he instructed them to submit to the authority represented by Sultan Thuwaini. 73
On 15th July 1861, Sultan Thuwaini boarded the corvette Rahmani with his
Squadron and sailed towards Sohar in the afternoon. The naval expedition was
heavily supported by a large number of armed men from Barka. On the arrival of
these forces in Sohar, the town was absolutely deserted, for the inhabitants had fled
into the interior of Oman.74 Sultan Thuwaini soon gained possession of Sohar, and
took command of the town without any notable resistance. The British Agent
congratulated Sultan Thuwaini when he called at Barka on his way back to Muscat.
Sultan Thuwaini informed Pengelley that he had appointed his eldest son Sayyid Salim
b. Thuwaini, about 22 years of age, the Wali of Sohar and its district.75 He also
informed him that he would be assisted by four experienced people: Saif bin Suliman,
Sayyid Hamad bin Ahmad, Sayyid Ya'arub bin Khahtan, and Sayyid 'Ali bin Salih in
the performance of his duties at Sohar.76 In a letter dated 17th July 1861 to the Acting
Secretary to the Government of Bombay, A. Kinloch, Pengelley mentioned that the
Indian Government would have no objection to the letter despatched by him to Sultan
Thuwaini, asking him to pay amonthly allowance to Sayyid Turki during his lifetime
as long as he remained loyal to the administration. This was to be subsistence money
ranging from $MT 400 to 500.7 7
Pengelley did not pass up the good opportunity of visiting Sohar after these
developments so that he could make himself known to the new Wali Sayyid Salim,
and his advisors and give them his advice.78 By doing so he was openly involved in
the internal affairs of Oman and in a position to influence the course of events in
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favour of Sayyid Thuwaini. However, he did not realise that this was beyond his
official duties. He declared frankly that the authority of the newly appointed Wali was
conditional on his conducting himself satisfactorily and remaining loyal to his father's
administration, inwhich case all possible support would be afforded to him. On the
other hand any attempt at any time to provoke conflicts or create alliances among the
chiefs of the Omani tribes for the purpose of detaching Sohar or its district from
Muscat would certainly give rise to the disapproval of the Government of India, which
would without doubt stand behind the legal authority. 79
On 26th August, the Agent at Muscat gave a full description of the situation in
Sohar after the installation of Sayyid Salim. There were scarcely 500 inhabitants
remaining in the whole town, but as confidence was growing among the people they
were returning to the town from various places and former daily life was being
resumed.80 Houses had been destroyed and many of the date palms damaged by fire.
The British Political Agent spent some time in ascertaining the legality of certain claims
amounting to $MT 2,706 against Sayyid Turki by the Banians who resided in Sohar.
These claims had been admitted by Sayyid Turki, who sent a draft for the requested
amount to his brother in Zanzibar through the British Agency, which despatched it
immediately to the British Consul and Agent at Zanzibar to hand it over to Sultan
Majid.81
2.6. The Government of Bombay's reaction to Pengelley's actions
At this stage Lt. Pengelley had gone beyond the interests of the Government of
Bombay. First of all, the involvement of Pengelley in the capture of Sayyid Turki
presented them with real anxiety, as he had exceeded his duties as British Agent. They
accepted his involvement as a mediator in the crisis but asked him not to misuse his
authority in favour of one side and against the other. He was told sharply that:
"While we recognise the advantages resulting from a termination
having been put for the present to the rebellious conduct of the chief
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of Sohar without war, which would have involved several tribes on
either side in hostilities, we cannot altogether approve of the part
taken by him in those preliminaries which led to the capture of Syud
Toorkee".82
If Sayyid Turki's refusal to attend the meeting had been a rejection of the
Sultan s authority, Lt. Pengelley should then have left the Sultan to settle the dispute
by himself at Sohar with his own troops. The Government of Bombay also told
Pengelley that it was not his duty to allow his personal desire to influence the outcome
of the dispute by escorting the Sultan's ships to Sohar in the British warship
Elphinstone.83 He had been accused of being too impatient in dealing with such a
serious issue, when Sayyid Turki had asked him to postpone the meeting to the
following day, and he had immediately withdrawn his protection. It was felt this
action would jeopardise British status among the Arab tribes of Oman, and British
promises would in the future be taken lightly.84 The British Government in India
expected that this matter would be brought effectively to conciliation, with the
assistance of the British representative's friendly mediation to delay the meeting by a
day, but they were surprised at Sayyid Turki being captured at the appointed place of
meeting, and being taken to the al-Jalali Prison at Muscat. Subsequently, the
Government of Bombaymade it clear that any removal of Sayyid Turki to Zanzibar at
the desire of Sultan Thuwaini would not be approved unless Turki and Sayyid Majid
agreed to this request.85
The British Political Agent's reputation at Muscat had been severely damaged,
and the Bombay authorities finally reached the decision to relieve him of his duties by
terminating his employment as Political Agent at Muscat, this was to take effect as
soon as they could find the right person to occupy the position.86
On 5th October 1861, A. Kinloch Forbes, the Acting Secretary to the
Government of Bombay, was instructed to address a letter to Pengelley, with remarks
on his mishandling of his duties as British Agent at Muscat.8 7 He requested him to
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inform the Sultan that the Government of Bombay were unable to congratulate him on
the means which he had employed to obtain peace, and the Governor in Council
desired that he should make it clear to the Sultan that any such misuse of British
friendship would probably lead to the withdrawal of the British Agency from
Muscat.88 Sultan Thuwaini was ordered to set Sayyid Turki free and to abandon any
idea he had to deport him from Oman, and was instructed to pay him an allowance.
Sultan Thuwaini found himself in a position where he had no choice but to follow this
order. Sayyid Turki was freed in February 1862, the month in which the new British
Political Agent Major Malcolm Green, who replaced Senior Lt. Pengeliey, took up his
post at Muscat.89 Relations between Sultan Thuwaini and Sayyid Turki improved and
they were perfectly reconciled after the arrival of the new Political Agent at Muscat,
who granted amonthly allowance to Sayyid Turki. He remained loyal and close to his
brother for the rest of his life, and very helpful in his plans to conciliate his position in
the country. In early 1866, he planned to accompany Sultan Thuwaini on his
expedition to Sohar against the Wahhabis, but this was aborted at the outset because of
the murder of Sultan Thuwaini by his son Salim.90 Sayyid Turki might well have
shared the same fate,had the decision not been taken to place him in leg irons in the
fort of Sohar.
2.7. The principal British interests in Thnwaini's Reign
Sayyid Turki's reconciliation with Sultan Thuwaini created a great opportunity for the
latter to the settle the internal and the external problems facing Oman. The Bombay
Government were encouraged to establish a more permanent presence in Muscat
taking advantage of communication facilities there. In January 1861, Lt. Colonel
Herbert Frederick Disbrowe was appointed Consul, initiating a new era in Anglo-
Omani relations. The British hoped to achieve great authority in their position in
Muscat.91 During 1859, Britain had installed a cable line from Aden to Karachi,
about 1685 miles, and the Omani territories served as relay stations for the work,
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notably at the Kuria Muria group of islands and at Muscat itself.92 This significant
step forward in Anglo-Omani relations proved to be mutually beneficial. This was
especially the case during the period of the dispute which followed the death of the
Imam, Sayyid Sa'id bin Sultan. The British instituted their mail service from India to
Muscat at this time.9 3
After 1861, the British position in Oman improved rapidly, since Sultan
Thuwaini desired to keep the links between the two nations very close. Certainly he
realised during his troubles with Sayyid Turki that peaceful government could not be
achieved in Oman without British support or at the very least British approval. On
November 17th 1864, Lt. Col. Lewis Pelly, the British Political Resident in the
Persian Gulf, and his colleague Lt. Col. Disbrowe, Her Britannic Majesty's Political
Agent at Muscat, had signed on behalf of the British Government the agreement to lay
down a cable system with Sultan Thuwaini at Barka, in the presence of Minister Hajee
Ahmad.94 The treaty gave the British authorities the liberty to construct additional
lines of telegraphic communication in the future anywhere on Omani lands and
territories. On 19th January 1865, the previous treaty was extended by another one,
which contained six more explanatory articles, confirming British rights and adding
more telegraphic lines on the territories subject to the Sultan's authority. It also
stipulated that Sultan Thuwaini should be responsible for affording protection to these
lines to the best of his ability, while the British authorities should pay the cost for the
labour requirements and the materials.95 At this point British political interest in Oman
appeared clear, and the arrangement demonstrated British intentions to control Omani
affairs during the following decades.
2.8. The Salim-Turki dispute during Salim's Reign
As described above Sayyid Salim had detained his uncle in Sohar at the time of
Thuwaini's murder. Salim then left Sohar for Muscat, while keeping Sayyid Turki in
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custody at the fort in the town. He arrived in Muscat the next day, where he declared
himself the new Sultan to the Omani shaikhs who were gathering from various places
in Oman, and informed them that his father had died from illness, promising justice
and prosperity which he claimed had not existed during his father's reign.96 He
intended by this announcement to ensure good relations between him and the Omani
tribal shaikhs who at this stage had unrestricted influence upon the interior affairs of
Oman which were not yet under central control. His financial difficulties also played a
role in this move as Sayyid Majid had protested against Salim's claim to the Zanzibar
subsidy, arguing that the previous agreement for this payment was nothing more than
a personal understanding between him and his brother Sultan Thuwaini, and Salim as
the killer of his father could not legally succeed him.9 7 In fact Majid s protests were
was not kept up for long, as soon after the British recognition of Sayyid Salim as
Sultan of MuscatMajid was forced to continue his payment to Muscat, but through the
medium of the British representative at Muscat.
Lt. Colonel Lewis Pelly, the British Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, had
just left the country before this change had taken place, heading for Bushire. He was
in Khor-Sham in the north of Oman when he received the news of the death of Sayyid
Thuwaini. He immediately left for Muscat on board his steamer Berenice, the
Bombay Government having instructed him to abstain from recognition of Sayyid
Salim for the time being. On his way down to Muscat, he called at Sohar where he
secured the release of Sayyid Turki and set him free.98 At Muscat, Lt. Col. Pelly had
communicated with Salim and informed him that the British Government would not
recognise him as Sultan of Muscat, and that they regarded him as a parricide. The
Resident then received intimation that Sayyid Salim, with the support of his followers,
would attack his ship and intended to kill all on board. The Berenice was unarmed, so
Pelly decided to leave the harbour during the night when Salim intended to attack.99
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In connection with this matter the Secretary of the Government of India had
written to the Secretary of the Government of Bombay submitting the Government of
Bombay's views on the position to be taken towards Sayyid Salim at Muscat. He also
confirmed to him that Lt. Col. Pelly had rescued Sayyid Turki and set him free, and
removed the British subjects with their property from Muscat, and all these actions had
already been approved by the Government of India.100
Subsequently, the British authorities in the Persian Gulf found themselves in
the untenable position of not offering recognition to any legal Government in Oman,
since otherwise they would find themselves embroiled in an endless conflict between
the pretenders to the throne. Sayyid Salim himself had sent his envoys Nasir bin 'Ali,
and Hamad bin Sa'id bin Khalfan, to the Government of India to complain about the
British Resident's attitude towards the events in Oman and to gain their
recognition.101
Four months later, Colonel Pelly arrived in Muscat, having been asked by
Sayyid Salim to pay him a visit of condolence on the death of his father. In fact Pelly
did not accept this invitation at once, explaining that he had been instructed not to do
so but, if Salim desired to refer to the question of his recognition, his duty was to do
so. Salim recognised that the Political Resident had prepared himself to announce his
recognition. On 10th September 1866, Colonel Pelly satisfied him when he stated that
Sayyid Salim was the Sultan of Oman, and the British flag was soon hoisted at the
consulate inMuscat.102 He stayed for one week at Muscat, before he left for Bushire,
where he sent a letter to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay declaring that all
matters in Muscat were satisfactorily settled, and that all the Arab tribes in the Gulf
were perfectly peaceful and showing a conciliatory disposition, and saying that force
could possibly be used in the event of trouble there.103
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By this time Sayyid Turki had been expelled to Bushire. From there he moved
to Bandar Abbas, where he sailed off to the Trucial Coast, seeking the Arab Shaikhs'
assistance on the Arabian side of the Gulf to overthrow Salim. They showed their
desire to afford him the support he deserved but these efforts failed when the British
authorities in the Gulf cautioned the Shaikhs against giving any aid to Sayyid Turki's
plan, especially by sea, as it would contravene the Maritime Peace Treaty of 1853.104
Sayyid Turki then left the Trucial Coast and proceeded towards Oman itself with the
aim of inciting a revolt against his nephew from inside the country. When he arrived
there his first task was to set up his headquarters at Yanqul, 324 kilometres north west
of Muscat, in al-Zahirah district. He obtained support there from the Shaikhs of the
tribes, especially the Shaikh of the 'Alawi tribe, and marched down to regain Sohar,
where he achieved a quick victory by taking the town from the Sultan's wali. He was
however, unable to hold it after his main supporter, the 'Alawi Shaikh, was killed,
and his men then retreated to al-Zahirah leaving the battlefield to Sayyid Turki and a
small number of his followers.105
Sayyid Salim's position in Oman had been seriously challenged by Sayyid
Turki during the year 1867, and his authority was not secured even after the British
consented to his taking power. There was only one way for Sayyid Salim to keep
Sayyid Turki's activities permanently under control, which was to turn to the British
for support and request them to punish him for violating the Maritime Peace Treaty.
Sayyid Turki strongly believed that he had the right to claim the throne of Oman
instead of Sayyid Salim, who was only the grandson of Sayyid Sa'id the founder of
the nation.
After the defeat of Sayyid Salim at Sohar, Sayyid Turki proceeded to al-
Sharqiyyah district, where he joined with the tribes of Bani Bu Hasan, al-Hajriyyin,
al-Hirth, and al-Wahibah, who encouraged him to mount an immediate attack on
Muscat, headed by Shaikh Sa'id bin 'Ali bin Mas'ud al-Barwani, and Hamad bin
64
Musallam the Shaikh of Bani Bu Hasan.106 On this occasion Sayyid Salim bin
Thuwaini had managed to collect about 2500 followers from the al-Batina coast tribes
to stand with him against Sayyid Turki's coalition of al-Sharqiyyia tribes; however,
about half of them soon deserted him, as a result of disrespectful treatment on his
part.107 When this matter had reached its peak Shaikh Salih bin 'Ali al- Harthi, the
tamimah of ali the al-Harthi tribes, decided to interfere in this dispute as a mediator,
asking Shaikh Hamad bin Musallam, the paramount leader of Turki's troops, to
refrain from continuing the expedition to attack Muscat. He requested Sayyid Turki
too, to wait at Bediyyah 266 kilometres south west of Muscat, while he went to
Muscat intending to bring these hostilities to an end by a settlement with Sayyid
Salim.108 When he arrived there, he was told through the British Agent that any
change in the recent situation, or support to Sayyid Turki, would be contrary to the
interests of the British authorities. He could have achieved this settlement, if Sayyid
Turki had not carried out his attack on the capital. Muscat at that time was full of
alarm about the news of Sayyid Turki's intention to attack.109 The British Agent at
Muscat, Captain George Atkinson, was so worried, that he sent a telegram to the
Bombay Government recommending them to warn Sayyid Turki officially not to
attack Muscat, or any of the sea towns on the Omani coast; this suggestion was
accepted by the Government of India.110
Sayyid Turki's party did not listen to Salih bin 'Ali's advice to wait, and
resumed their advance towards Muscat in the middle ofAugust 1867.111 On the 27th
of that month, Turki's troops arrived at Bidbid only 56 kilometres from Muscat.
Although Sayyid Salim had rejected the request of Salih bin 'Ali to concede the Sohar
principality to Sayyid Turki, he assured him that in order to compromise on thismatter
he would allow Sayyid Turki a monthly salary of $MT 200 and a residence at Muscat.
The envoy seemed to be satisfied with Sayyid Salim's proposal, and managed to
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convert some to his side, but temporarily at least alienated others from Sayyid Turki's
cause.112
The British officials at Muscat were uncertain about whether to take action
against Sayyid Turki, but they were prepared to accept some kind of negotiated
settlement between the two sides over the Sultanate of Oman. Despite this, however,
they made it clear to Sayyid Turki that, even if he succeeded in his long standing
campaignthe British authorities would not be able to recognise his achievement, and
that any place he might obtain possession of would come under naval
bombardment.113 On the night of 30th August 1867, Sayyid Turki, encouraged by
growing support, attacked Matrah and took it by surprise, shortly after the envoy of
Salih b. 'Ali had reached an agreement with Sayyid Salim who had been accepted as
the country's rightful leader. On 4th September Turki captured all roads to Muscat,
but Salim was soon able to force him to retreat to Matrah on the sixth of the same
month with about 500 of his fighters.114
On 9th September 1867, Lt. Col. Lewis Pelly arrived at Matrah harbour from
Bushire onboard the mail steamerMay Frere followed by H. M. S. Octavia from
Bombay. Soon afterwards Pelly sent a note to Sayyid Turki threatening him with
bombardment of Matrah, if he refused to comply with British requests and give up his
demands.115 Shortly after receiving that caution, Sayyid Turki's envoys boarded the
steamer May Frere acknowledging that their Sayyid had fully abandoned his
demands for territory and would be satisfied with a pension equivalent to the revenues
of Matrah and Sohar.116 The agreement on this matter was completed, and it was
stipulated that Salim should make amonthly payment to Sayyid Turki, while the latter
should leave the country to India under British supervision. Sayyid Salim agreed to
the agreement entered into by Lewis Pelly and Captain Atkinson, the British Political
Agent at Muscat at the time (whose reputation was enhanced by conflicts in Oman) of
amonthly payment to his uncle of $MT 600, while the latter agreed to reside in British
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India.117 This settlement had been confirmed in writing in the letter by the
Government of Bombay to the Governor in Council, Bombay, from the Secretary to
the Government of India Political Department number 94, of 23rd November 1867.
In this they stated that Sayyid Turki had no option but to submit to the settlement or
face the threat of force of arms and bombardment in the event of his expelling Sayyid
Salim from Muscat or occupying any town on the coast.118 This threat appears to
have been made under a direct instruction from the Government of India. On 11th
September 1867, Sayyid Turki left Oman for India on board the British frigate
Octavia.119
Sayyid Turki had no doubt realised that establishing good relations with
British officials would reap its benefit in the future. At the time he could not deny that
but for their recent help, if the situation had been left under Sayyid Salim1 s jurisdiction
he might still be in detention following the death of his brother Sultan Thuwaini.
Equally he had remained very popular with the Omani tribal Shaikhs like Hamad bin
Musallam, which created a solid ground for him in Oman which he thought might be
ready to accept him as the head of state one day in the future.
During the following period of Omani history, Sayyid Salim faced a much
more complicated situation and strong opposition from Sayyid 'Azzan bin Qais,
whose demands were concentrated on the establishment of the Imamate in Oman. He
was supported mainly by the "ulema of Oman who had a strong influence upon a large
part of the Omani population. Salim1 s struggle with 'Azzan did not last long, for he
became unable to hold his position as ruler for more than one year after the exile of
Sayyid Turki. Sayyid Salim was faced by the same fate that Sayyid Turki had faced
before, when Sayyid 'Azzan bin Qais managed to expel him to Bandar Abbas, where
he sought asylum on board H.M.S. Vigilant on October 12th 1868. Sayyid Salim
had been the Sultan of Oman for approximately two years, when Sayyid 'Azzan
unexpectedly emerged from al-Rustaq with a great number of troops. He took the
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main towns such as Barka, then Matrah and finally Muscat on 1st October, 1868, into
his possession opening a new phase of conflict in Omani political history, a phase
which would bring Sayyid Turki back into the theatre of events.
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CHAPTER THREE
The Reign of Sayyid 'Azzan (1868 1871) and Sayyid
Turki's Challenge
3.1. General Situation in Oman 1868-1869
Sayyid 'Azzan bin Qais b. 'Azzan was one of the great-grandsons of the Imam Ahmad
bin Sa'id, the founder of the A1 Bu Sa'idi dynasty in Oman. He was descended from
his second son Sayyid Qais bin Ahmad. Sayyid 'Azzan bin Qais came to power at a
very crucial period in Oman's modern history. He presented himself as the most
qualified member of the dynasty, and he had to fight against many enemies from
inside and outside the country. Sayyid Salim bin Thuwaini was the obvious
challenger against whom Sayyid 'Azzan bin Qais had to fight at an early stage, but in
fact the affirmation of Sayyid Turki bin Sa'id (who was on pension in India by that
time) as having priority in ruling the country, made Sayyid 'Azzan more active than
Sayyid Salim in trying to gain power in Oman. Under these circumstances, Sayyid
'Azzan b. Qais, with the substantial support of the 'ulema, was determined to build a
State with a religious basis, or Imamah.1 Furthermore, he felt that large scale support
from the tribes of Oman against the then Sultan Sayyid Salim offered more security
than British support as well as encouraging him to play an effective role throughout
the country in order to become the elected Imam. He soon achieved a major victory
over Salim at Muscat, and in consequence the latter was exiled to Bandar Abbas.
'Azzan's father-in-law and the most powerful leader of the 'ulema Shaikh Sa'id b.
Khalfan al-Khalili, became the Wali of Muscat and his adviser. The white flag on
Muscat fort replaced the traditional red flag of Oman, and everything considered
against Islamic law was forbidden, such as tobacco, alcohol, and music.2
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3.2. British attitudes towards 'Azzan's government
3.2.1. 'Azzan's capture ofMuscat and Salim 's reaction
As a result of these changes, and with regard to Sayyid ' Azzaris capture of power in
the country, Sayyid Turki bin Sa'id followed developments from India, where he
remained in touch with some of the prominent Omani Shaikhs, like Shaikh Hamad bin
Musallam of Bani Bu Hasan, who provided him with news letters from Oman
covering the general situation after his departure for India. On 13th November 1868,
the British Political Agent in Muscat had sent to the Government of Bombay a
translation of one of these letters which Shaikh Hamed had addressed to Sayyid Turki,
in which he stated the following :
"I address you this letter from Muscat to inform you of all that has
transpired here. ..This has come to pass by God's will, and before
this we were your supporters, but God did not give us success as we
loved Syud Saeed and his descendants whose favour towards us have
always been great. You know what we suffered from Salim bin
Thoweynee till God expelled him. Now we are come at the bidding
of the Imam 'Azzan bin Ghes and that of chief of Salim. We now see
the whole country and all the forts in Oman in his possession. All the
tribes have acknowledged him, and they have demanded our
allegiance which we have tendered because it is impossible to go
against an Imam".3
This feeling among the tribes of Oman loyal to Sayyid Turki's right to rule the
country broke his silence, and revived his old desire to gain power in Oman. Although
the British favoured Sayyid Turki's aims over Sayyid 'Azzan's, it was their policy not
to became directly involved in his struggle. Throughout the coming years, Oman was
subjected to very serious trouble between Sayyid 'Azzan b. Qais and Sayyid Turki b.
Sa'id with the British authorities in India taking a neutral stance in the conflict, in spite
of their dissatisfaction with the authority of Sayyid 'Azzan.
When Sayyid 'Azzan had taken possession of Muscat in October 1868 and
Sayyid Salim had left the country, the British authorities in India had declined to
offered the latter armed support.4 Sayyid Salim b. Thuwaini had made his own
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unsuccessful efforts against Sayyid 'Azzan, while Sayyid Turki, who was not in a
better situation given the size of his task and the inadequate support against 'Azzan,
had to depend upon his own energy. Although real assistance from the British in his
cause was limited, the decision was taken to give him freedom to proceed in any action
which was seen as necessary to establish his authority in Oman. For the British,
'Azzan was an undesirable religious leader who had seized power from the parricide,
Salim b. Thuwaini, and his activities in Muscat brought some inconvenience.5
In the meantime, the events which had recently taken place in Oman were
enough to encourage the Government of Bombay to withdraw their prohibition against
Sayyid Turki's attempts to interfere in the affairs of Oman during Sayyid 1 Azzan's
reign. Sayyid Turki b. Sa'id was thinking of rallying to his side the tribes of al-
Shanqiyyah, especially the Bani Bu Hasan, Bani Jaber, al-Hishm, Bani Bu 'Ali, and
the Janabah. This was in order to attempt a coup in Oman. The plan had tacit support
from the British PoliticalResident Col. Lewis Pelly.
Primarily through the influence of ' Azzan's chief supporter Shaikh Sa'id b.
Khalfan al-Khalili and the other religious leaders, like Salih bin 'Ali al-Harthi, the
Government of India through her representative in the Persian Gulf and the Political
Agent at Muscat were anxiously scrutinising the new government in Muscat.6 The
Political Agent at Muscat was absolutely against 'Azzan b. Qais's policy. This had
two reasons: firstly, because his power base was in al-Rustaq, and secondly, because
of his alliance with al-Khalili and Salih b. 'Ali al-Harthi. These later two had proved
themselves to be good allies in Sayyid 'Azzan's movement against Sayyid Salim b.
Thuwaini, attacking from the interior towards the capital of Muscat, when one town
after another fell into their hands in very quick succession.7 At this stage, the Political
Agent atMuscat, Captain G. A. Atkinson, informed the Government of Bombay that
Sayyid Salim b. Thuwaini was unable to control the situation in the country and he
urged them to support Sayyid Turki b. Sa'id in his claim to gain power in Oman.8
79
Sayyid Turki was in exile in Bombay at this time. In fact the British authorities in
Muscat fully comprehended Sayyid 'Azzan's plan to take Muscat.
On 21st September 1868, Sayyid Salim had communicated to the British
Political Agent at Muscat, Captain Atkinson, before the fall of the capital into Sayyid
' Azzans hands, that Sayyid 'Azzan had captured the town of Barka, despite the fact
that the fort of the town was still under the control of Sayyid Salim1 s, men. He had
taken this step with the purpose of getting their military assistance, while his troops
would march from where they were in the Wadi al-Ma'awil towards Barka.
However, such assistance was never given ,9 Consequently 'Azzan s troops found
no difficulties in proceeding against Muscat, and the town was soon under their
control. At the same time, on 21st September 1868, Captain Atkinson had written to
the British Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Lt. Col. Lewis Pelly, informing him
of the new situation in Oman generally and in Muscat in particular. He had confirmed
to him that all the reports received hitherto from inside the country showed that some
of the Omani tribes, in some measure devoted to Sayyid Turki, had refused to take
part in the movement against Muscat, and that their present attitude had been forced
upon them because of a fear of compromising their own interests. All information
indicated that they would not like to see 'Azzan b. Qais on the throne, as this would
result in the country being controlled by the 'ulema.10
There was also reason to suppose that the Bani Bu 'Ali and the Janabah, two
of the most warlike among the Omani tribes, being in open war against each other at
this time, would not be able to come to the assistance of Sayyid Salim against Sayyid
'Azzan as he expected (they had done so on every previous occasion). The Hishim
and Bani Jaber were the only tribes on the side of Sayyid Salim who had ever shown
any fighting interest. Without the backing of the Bani Bu 'Ali and the Janabah tribes
Sayyid Salim was not in a position to challenge Sayyid ' Azzan1 s.11 Given all these
facts the British authorities at Muscat were enthusiastic to see Sayyid 'Azzan defeated
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and dismissed from Muscat, but only by the Sultan s own forces and the loyal tribes,
and the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf Lt. Col. Pelly had confirmed that the
Acting Political Agent at Muscat was not to be involved in this course.12 On the other
hand Atkinson believed with confidence that the support of some of the al-Sharqiyyah
tribes would be able to reinforce the Sultan s side, and that with a little courage and
energy from his troops Muscat and Matrah would be successfully defended.13
However, despite all these speculations, the role of the 'ulema was not expected to
reduce their ability in the event of Sayyid 'Azzan attacking Muscat and capturing it.
The Political Agent at Muscat had become convinced that the only way of
bringing relative peace to Omanwas by supporting Sayyid Turki, Sayyid Turki being
seen to be the only one of all the fighting parties who was the most fit in every respect
to reign in Oman.14 It was more likely, however, that the British Political Resident's
desire was to stand behind Sayyid Turki's ambitions to establish his rule, and to
support him during his struggle with Sayyid 'Azzan: the British eagerness in general
was significantly in favour of Sayyid Turki b. Sa'id even though they were unwilling
to be directly involved at that time. It was also their belief that without their firm
support, a successful outcome could not be guaranteed. Thus they gave Turki
confidence and encouragement plus financial support in his operations against his
opponent.15 On 22nd September 1868, the Acting Political Agent at Muscat reported
to the Secretary to the Government in the Political Department on the internal affairs of
Oman, in which he suggested that Sayyid Salim b. Thuwaini should abdicate in favour
of Sayyid Turki, and asked the Government of Bombay to seriously consider this. He
clearly stated that there was no braver man than Sayyid Turki, not only in the ruling
dynasty but in Arabia as whole at that time, and that the people of Oman should be free
to choose. Atkinson believed as a result of the evidence there that if Sayyid Turki
were in a position to be elected in the present situation, he would be elected
unanimously by all the tribes in Oman.16
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However, the Government of Bombay's policy was one of non-direct
intervention in the internal affairs of Oman. Accordingly Sir John Lawrence, the
Governor-General and Viceroy of India, instructed the Political Agent in Muscat and
the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf not to interfere directly in the troubles in
Oman. In the absence of British involvement in supporting Sayyid Turki, ' Azzan1 s
aspiration to establish his power as the Imam of Oman was soon realised. The result
of thatmovement had been achieved at the expense of Salim b. Thuwaini and Sayyid
Turki, and Sayyid 'Azzan was now to place in power a group of people instead of an
individual, the group which Sayyid 'Azzan from the beginning had largely depended
upon as his advisers and supporters.17 Among these the leading figures were Shaikh
Sa'id b. Khalfan al-Khalili, Salih b. 'Ali al- Harthi, and Shaikh Mohammed b.
Sulayyim al-Gharbi.18
The question now before the authorities of India was whether their interests in
Omanwould be secure if Sayyid 'Azzan b. Qais had the throne of Oman or whether
they should support Sayyid Turki, as he was the original pretender of the Sayyid Sa'id
b. Sultan line, although this claim had weakened considerably from the first day of
'Azzan's rise to power. British policy from now on could be interpreted as one of
opposition to Sayyid ' Azzan's government, even though it remained attached to the
doctrine of non-direct intervention in Omani internal affairs, as they never tried to use
their power to force Sayyid 'Azzan to abdicate.
For a short time, Sayyid Azzan's rule became popular, and the Political Agent
atMuscat had witnessed elements of relative stability. Sayyid 'Azzan's popularity in
power and the support of his people did not last long, as experience confirmed that a
monarchy was preferable to a hierarchy, and they realised that Sayyid Turki would
undoubtedly be back in Oman to take over power in the country in the coming years.19
Sayyid Turki remained popular with some influential shaikhs like Hamad b. Musallam
of the Bani Bu Hasan tribe, who discussed this issue with the Political Agent in
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Muscat on one of his, visits to the Agency. He informed him that they still loved
Sayyid Turki, but in the present situation, with the Government under Sayyid ' Azzan,
and the spiritual leaders controlling the country, the people of Oman including Sayyid
Turki himself had no option but to accept Sayyid 'Azzan.20 It was said there was no
hope whatsoever of Sayyid Turki coming to power at that time, and Shaikh Hamad
had requested the British Political Agent to convey his views to Sayyid Turki and to
inform him of the current state of Oman and its people.21
3.2.2 Salim'sfailure to recoverpower in Oman
In January 1869, the Government of Bombay continued its correspondence
concerning Omani affairs with regard to the British official attitude towards the
attempts of Sayyid Salim b. Thuwaini to regain power in Oman. They concluded that
it would be impossible for the Government of Bombay to interfere on behalf of Salim
against Sayyid 'Azzan.22 It was during this time that the Government of Bombay
forwarded a copy of a letter addressed to the Acting Political Agent at Muscat written
by the British Political Resident in the Persian Gulf dated 19th February 1869,
together with reports to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf and the Political
Agent in Muscat. In these they mentioned Sayyid Salim's appearance in Dubai for the
purpose of gathering support to invade Oman. However, they informed the British
authorities in the region that, although Sayyid Salim had been in Dubai for some time
and the news had reached Muscat from Bandar Abbas that he had left Dubai on 7th
February at the head of about 3,000 men to attack Muscat, no intelligence of the kind
had arrived by land; there was no reason whatever in the British Resident's opinion to
suppose that Sayyid Salim would get any effectual support from the Wahhabis in al-
Buraimi. In reaction to this news, the action taken by the Political Resident in the
Persian Gulf was to order the gun-boat Hugh Ross to proceed with or without Captain
Way the 1 st Assistant Resident, towards the Omani Coast to cooperate with the Acting
Political Agent at Muscat for the purpose of protecting British subjects and their
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interests there.2 3 The Governor-General in Council had been informed by the Political
Resident in the Persian Gulf that the First Assistant to the Political Agent at Muscat
should accept only British instructions fulfilling the direct orders of the Resident.24 In
fact Sayyid Salim achieved nothing from his attempt to regain power in Oman as the
British authorities offered nomaterial encouragement or help.
Sayyid ' Azzan himself was aware of the need to keep the British authorities in
Muscat and the Persian Gulf in touch with his position in Oman to encourage them to
be more friendly to his government. In Jumada al-Awwal, 1286 (February 1869) he
wrote to the British Political Resident, Colonel Pelly, informing him of his return to
Muscat after achieving his success against the Wahhabis in al-Buraimi.25 Having
started with this notable success by the middle of the year 1869, he had managed to
spread his authority over a large number of Omani cities, including al-Buraimi,
Dhank, Bahla, Mzwa, Manah, Izki, etc. He had also succeeded in bringing under his
authority the Ja'alan district and the city of Sur.26
He was obviously concerned about the British official acceptance of his
sovereignty, which was very important to him in order to confirm his rights to be in
the position of leading the country vis-a-vis his rivals Sayyid Turki and Sayyid Salim.
The British had a strong and effective influence in the areawhich under Colonel Lewis
Pelly had become more direct than previously. He also knew that without their
approval the Zanzibar subsidy would be out of his reach and he depended on this a
great deal.
3.2.3. Sayyid Nasir b. Thuwaini taking Gwader
It was Sayyid Turki1 s attempts to recover power in Oman which posed the principal
threat to Sayyid 'Azzan1 s rule in conjunction with the British disposition toward
Turki. In early 1869, the British authorities in India remained in the position of
regarding 'Azzan as a usurper of the throne of Oman, while they looked on Sayyid
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Turkis movement as undesirable.27 The second major obstacle to Azzan s authority
came from the Ghafiri tribes of the Jabal al-Akhdar, al-Zahirah and various other
districts which had remained neutral during the conflict between Sayyid 'Azzan and
Sayyid Salim.28 Accordingly, considerable influence upon events was extended by
the British authorities in India, who prohibited the competitors in Oman from
launching naval attacks against one another, even if some distance out of Oman. This
prohibition made it impossible for 'Azzan to recover Gwader from Nasir bin
Thuwaini, who made a successful crossing from Muscat in April 1869 and established
himself with the support of local residents as the master of the region.29 At the same
time they prevented Sayyid Nasir from making Gwader a base for sea operations
against Muscat, as he had intended to do. It was also made clear to Sayyid Salim b.
Thuwaini that the British authorities in India would not allow him to recover his
position in Oman by using Bandar Abbas as head-quarters for an invasion of Oman by
sea, and further, that he would remain under their control as long as he stayed there.30
The British authorities in Muscat and the Persian Gulf were fully informed of the
movement of Sayyid Nasir b. Thuwaini against Gwader. The confirmation of this
came when the British Political Agent at Muscat, H. Disbrowe, confirmed for the
British Political Resident in the Gulf, Colonel Lewis Pelly, Nasir's movement which
had obviously been made by sea. He mentioned that his expedition was by the
invitation of the Baluchis of Gwader, who were very hostile to 'Azzan and his
supporters among the 'ulema. Disbrowe also reminded the Political Resident in the
Persian Gulf of the British Government's desire that all sea operations by any party at
Muscat or anywhere else should be prevented by force if necessary, and that the
instruction should be thoroughly carried out. In conjunction with this, he asked him to
supply the Agency at Muscat with precise information of any movement by sea
whether to Zanzibar, Bandar Abbas, Mekran or anywhere else.31
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On 13th February 1869, the Acting Political Agent at Muscat, G. A. Atkinson,
received a letter from the Political Resident in the Gulf to confirm the British
responsibility for the maintenance of peace at sea, and the Hugh Ross was instructed
to go to the Omani coast for this purpose. Consequently, the Political Agent in Muscat
reported to the Political Department on this issue on 19th February 1869 regarding
Sayyid Salim's attempts to fight against Sayyid ' Azzan from the sea and the British
Representatives' thoughts on the matter.32 In fact, the enforcement of this British
policy temporarily affected Turki's attempt to wage war by sea against 'Azzan. But a
new episode in this matter began shortly after Sayyid Turki left Bombay with the
intention of recovering power over Oman from'Azzan b. Qais.
3.2.4. The question of recognition ofSayyid 'Azzan
During this time, Sayyid 'Azzan bin Qais had been working effectively among the
Omani tribes to gain reassurance of their loyalty. He spent the first two months of
1869 campaigning in the interior of Oman, fighting those who remained outside his
influence and bringing those who were already with him into a closer relationship. He
achieved this task with a degree of success, even though the Government of India had
not yet recognised him as the Head of State. Lewis Pelly was strongly opposed to
Sayyid 'Azzan and was in favour of Sayyid Turki.33 He did not favour the idea that
the Government of India should recognise 'Azzan as the Imam of the country and this
was also the view adopted by the Political Agent in Muscat, Lt. Col. Herbert
Disbrowe.
After Sayyid 'Azzan had returned to Muscat on 14th December 1869 from his
latest expedition inside Oman against the tribes hostile to his rule, the Political
Resident in the Persian Gulf sent a despatch on 22nd February 1870 to the Secretary
of State regarding the question of 'Azzan's recognition.34 On 14th March 1870 the
situation changed slightly in favour of Sayyid 'Azzan, with the arrival of the French
86
gun-boatLe Brunul at Muscat: The commander recognised 'Azzan's government. A
few weeks later, a Dutch corvette visited the Port of Muscat and saluted the white flag
of 'Azzan's Government.35
On29th March and again on 8th April 1870, Pelly informed the Government
of India about the attitude of the ruler of Abu Dhabi, Shaikh Zaid bin Khalifah, who,
since the Wahhabi defeat in al-Buraimi had supported Sayyid 'Azzan b. Qais1 cause.
Shaikh Zaid b. Khalifah received from Sayyid ' Azzan b. Qais a portion of the itawa or
tribute, which had been paid by previous sultans to the Wahhabi Amir. This had been
paid to secure the help of the ruler of Abu Dhabi in protecting Sayyid 'Azzan's
northern territories.36 Both from within and from outwith Oman, the British
authorities faced difficulties connected with 'Azzan's recognition. Colonel Pelly
accordingly felt that it would be very embarrassing for the British authorities in the
region to be excluded from recognising 'Azzan, and the question was whether it
would be possible for them to implement policy in the area without having to
recognise Sayyid 'Azzan formally, or whether to follow the French and the Dutch line.
Eventually he found a way for Sayyid 'Azzan's government to receive British
recognition, provided it was based upon the following points:
"1- by being recognised by us, the status of Muscat Government
would be improved, both abroad and at home, while the public mind
would cease to mis-apprehend our relations with other aspirants to
power.
2- Recognition would probably be considered to imply restoration of
Gwader, and the other outlying Muscat territories in Mekran; also
perhaps, our good offices in respect to release of the Bandar Abbas
district.
3- A recognised Ruler of Muscat would probably infer that the
arbitrarment of the late Earl Canning would secure to him the
Zanzibar subsidy; and this is a question in which the vassal chiefs of
Oman are interested, for this subsidy is a source whence those chiefs
are benefited by the Muscat Ruler".3 7
Accordingly the Bombay Government approved Colonel Pelly's previous
suggestion and no resolution to this difficult question was reached, and 'Azzan's
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position remained officially unrecognised by the British authorities in India until his
death on 30th January 1871.3 8
3.3. Sayyid Turki's attempts to recover Oman and the British reaction
3.3.1. The Sayyids First Attempt
Sayyid Turki was free to pursue his claim to the sultanate, but without British support
for his project. This support seemed to be crucial to his success, but he preferred to
stay in India for some time, pending the outcome of events in Oman and the British
reaction to them. He finally left India in March 1870, apparently for the Persian Gulf,
but in actual fact for Muscat, as a private passenger on board a British mail-steamer-
this without the express permission of the Government.39 On 14 March 1870 he
arrived in Muscat, but was prohibited from landing by the British authorities there,
and soon after left for Bandar Abbas, where he was welcomed by Haji Ahmed, the
formerwazirto the Sultan Sayyid Thuwaini b. Said, who was now the Governor of
the port under Persian authority.40 Accordingly the Government of India wrote to the
BombayGovernment that the arrival of Sayyid Turki on board a British mail-steamer
had apparently annoyed the Muscat authorities, who believed that he was supported by
the British in a move to establish himself as ruler of Oman. But whatever his
intentions, the British authorities in India clearly intimated to the Government of
Muscat that they had in no way connived in his manoeuvre, and they would certainly
not assist him in any effort to overthrow the government of Sayyid 'Azzan b. Qais.
With respect to Sayyid Turki's request for a loan from the British, the Political
Resident in the Persian Gulf was instructed to inform him that the Government of
India could neither help with money nor assist him in any way in his designs on the
throne of Muscat.41 The British authorities realised that disorder and instability in
Oman would follow and that governing the country would be the source of much
tension between the pretender Sayyid Turki and Sayyid 'Azzan. On 27th May 1870,
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the Government of India again submitted the question of the recognition of Sayyid
'Azzan, to the Secretary of State, with a special recommendation as to the terms and
stipulations under which it might be granted. The most effect! ve question on this issue
was their desire to know, in case of the recognition of Sayyid 'Azzan, whether the
Omani obligations to the British authorities, such as the previous treaties, would be
maintained or not. Accordingly the situation in Muscat was fully described in the
despatch sent to the Government of Bombay by Col. Lewis Pelly. Despite Pelly's
unfriendly manner to Sayyid 'Azzan, the despatch indicated that according to his
enquiries inMuscat during the time of his visit to the city, trade was recovering, and
that the authorities at Muscat were conciliatory in their behaviour towards the British
Agent, desirous even, of promoting British interests.42 In accordance with the views
of the Political Agent at Muscat, Major Cotton Way, 'Azzan b. Qais had managed to
bring most of the tribes of Oman under his authority, and for the present, his rivals did
not seem to have a real possibility of expelling him from power.4 3
Sayyid Turki's return to the Persian Gulf meant that there were now two
pretenders opposing 'Azzan b. Qais: Sayyid Turkib. Sa'id and his nephew the ex-
Sultan Salim b. Thuwaini. It was now that the necessity for an absolute ban on the
breach of maritime peace was recognised; the Government of India had already
declared its prohibition of any operation which would performed at sea by the
authorities ofMuscat or against them, and this opinion was based on the fact that the
Indian Government had not hesitated in the past, and would not do so in future, to
forbid hostilities at sea by persons or states.44
3.3.2. The Sayyid's Second Attempt
Following these events, the British Political Resident proceeded to Bandar Abbas with
the purpose of seeing Sayyid Turki there. On his arrival at Bandar Abbas in April
1870, Sayyid Turki had left the port heading for the Trucial Coast, landing at Dubai
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seeking the assistance for his movement from the Trucial Shaikhs, who showed their
willingness, with the exception of Zaid b. Khalifah of Abu Dhabi.45 In the course of
Sayyid Turkis movements, the Government of India were in communication with the
Government of Bombay, asking about the circumstances of the departure of Sayyid
Turki from Bombay; the same explanation always resulted, that Sayyid Turki had
received no express permission from the Bombay Government to return to the Persian
Gulf, and had obtained a personal passage in a mail-steamer on the 7th March,
1870.46
Undoubtedly, the arrival of Sayyid Turki in the region from Bombay, where
he had been detained by the British authorities onboard a British steamer, had clearly
given rise to the belief on the part of the Government of Muscat and even the people of
Oman as awhole, that he had made this crossing with the knowledge and the support
of the Bombay Government to overthrow 'Azzan and to seize power in Muscat.
Sayyid Turkis project was potentially supported by the Political Resident in the Gulf,
who had attached himself to his claim, and had constantly preferred him to any other
member of the A1 Bu Sa'id Dynasty to rule the country. The British Political Resident
had been an old friend to Sayyid Turki from the time of the reign of Sayyid Thuwaini,
and paid attention to his advice, on the subject of the previous troubles in Oman when
he last left Oman following Pelly's suggestion. Pelly remained very close to him even
when he was in communication with Bombay, and visited him regularly during his
time in Bombay.
In the meantime, Sayyid Salim moved from one place to another along the
Persian Gulf, without assistance. The Political Resident in the Gulf reported that
Sayyid Salim intended to rally some of the tribes from the Arabian coast in order to
recover Muscat, as Salim considered the tribes to the south still loyal to his cause.47
Pelly accordingly instructed Captain Way that Sayyid Salim was desirous of
embarking some men from the Arab Coast on board his men-of-war. But Salim
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would not be prevented from his action as long as no breach of the peace occurred in
the Persian Gulf.48 On the other hand, the British authorities in India and the Persian
Gulf were apparently not at all certain that, on his arrival on the Trucial Coast, and in
Dubai in particular, Sayyid Turki would be able to convince the local tribes there to
support him, even though they knew previously that the chiefs of those tribes had
declared themselves against the imamate of 'Azzan at Muscat. At the same time
Colonel Pelly admitted that neither Sayyid Salim nor Sayyid Turki had at the present
time any opportunity to stand firmly against Sayyid 'Azzan who by now had control
of Muscat and its territories, and was in a strong position and capable of extending his
power over the country.4 9
At all events, the British authorities in the Persian Gulf were carefully
watching developments in the Gulf in order to keep it under their control. On the 7th
May 1870, Col. Lewis Pelly had reported to the Government of India that, according
to unofficial communications between himself and the Persian Governor of Bandar
Abbas, Haji Ahmed, a vote was apparently cast in favour of Sayyid Turki's position.
On 31st May 1870 Pelly also telegraphed both the Government of Bombay and the
British authorities in India on the same issue. This time he confirmed that, according
to a report from a native Agent on the Arabian coast who had interviewed the shaikh of
Abu Dhabi, the littoral shaikhs and the shaikhs of al-Buraimi had demonstrated their
loyalty to the shaikh of Abu Dhabi who by now was allied with 'Azzan b. Qais.50 So
the Agent there saw no chance for Sayyid Turki at that time to fulfil his ambitions with
regard to Muscat or its territories.
As a result of the foregoing circumstances, Sayyid Turki admitted the failure of
his immediate attempt against Sayyid 'Azzan, and decided to withdraw to Bandar
Abbas for the second time in June 1870, after spending nearly two months in Dubai
trying to enlist assistance from the shaikhs of the Trucial Coast, and the tamimah of
the Bani al-Na'im tribe in al-Buraimi oasis. In advance of any attempt to operate again
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by sea against Oman, the Government of Bombay asked Col. Pelly to inform Sayyid
Turki that the restriction on the campaign by sea would be firmly enforced, and that
the maritime peace should continue.51
3.3.3. The Sayyid's Third Attempt
Despite the warning by Colonel Peily, Sayyid Turki made his third attempt against
Oman when, in July 1870, he left Bandar Abbas on board the British ship Muzaffar
with forty armed Baluchi followers, ostensibly for Bombay; it was suspected
however, that he intended to divert the ship towards Muscat.52 Soon after his
departure, Colonel Pelly, set sail in the hope of catching up with him. Pelly had
learned that Sayyid Turki was last seen with seven dhows off the Persian Coast
heading towards Jask. Sayyid Turki realised that his expedition under these
circumstances would be pointless, and he returned to Bandar Abbbas again before
Colonel Pelly could overtake him.53 On July 12th 1870, Pelly communicated to the
Secretary of State that Turki had been forced to return to Bandar Abbas. Although the
Government of India objected to the present campaign by Sayyid Turki and to Pelly's
activities in that direction, the Bombay Government sent a telegram to the Viceroy on
the 3rd July stating that Sayyid Turki had left Bombay with the authority of the
Government of India, and that the Bombay Government knew no reason why the
British authority in general had prevented him from launching his mission from
Bandar Abbas against the coast of Muscat. Accordingly, the Government of India
accused the Government of Bombay of providing inaccurate information about this
matter. They repeated this in a telegram dated 17th July 1870, in which they stated
that it would be impossible for the Government of India to admit the allegation, which
had been submitted by the Government of Bombay, that Sayyid's departure from
Bombay was not known to, nor admitted nor authorised by them.54 At this stage
Sayyid Turki's confidence in returning to Oman apparently vanished, and he believed
that ambitions concerning the Omani coast would only be accomplished with British
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approval. However, his aspirations were fired again when his brother in Zanzibar
Sayyid Majid became involved in this adventure. At the beginning of August 1870,
funds of Rs. 20,000 from Zanzibar were sent for Turki's use directly through a Hindu
firm at Bombay, Jiram Sewjee.55 Majid also promised him a further Rs. 3,000 if he
managed to capture Sur, on the coast of Oman, south east of Muscat, and another Rs.
100,000 if he could encourage the Amir of theWahhabis inNejd, 'Abdullah b. Faisal,
to assist him in taking Sohar.56
Simultaneously, the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Col. Pelly, had
been involved in this matter and was in continuous communication with the
Government of India regarding giving resources to Sayyid Turki's movement. On 1st
August 1870 he wrote from Bushire to the Secretary in the Political Department
concerning Sayyid s activities in connection with the territories of Muscat confirming
to what had been discussed in previous correspondence. He described his
embarkation from Muscat on 25th July, and voyage to Jask Station, a central point in
the Persian Gulf, where he could watch Sayyid Turki in whatever direction he might
proceed in preparation for a hostile landing on the Muscat coast.5 7 In fact the British
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf was directed to return to Bushire, on 28th July
1870, losing the opportunity of a good vantage point to watch the movements in the
Gulf as he had expected.58
While the Resident was at Jask, the Governor of the Port and two other chiefs
called upon him, and told to him that Sayyid Turki had written to them to collect men
from their territories to accompany him on his mission to attack Muscat. They added
that as yet they had taken no action in this matter.59 The Governor-General of India
was entirely aware of the need to know from the Political Resident the British official
position towards this question and the Sayyid's demands, and whether the recent
news which had spread were true that the Government of India desired to see Sayyid
Turki regain the throne of Oman and its territories and overthrow 'Azzan from his
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position. His reply to this allegation was framed within the language of very recent
instructions saying that the British authorities in the region had been instructed not to
be involved on behalf of either Sayyid ' Azzan or Sayyid Turki.60
One of the chiefs asked the British Resident if the news that Sayyid Turki and
his followers had returned to Muscat on board an English steamer were true. If this
move was by the order of the Indian Government, they would join Sayyid Turki in his
revolt against Muscat: they could send their men with him but that it was not their
intention to launch any naval attacks.61 Colonel Pelly reported to the Government of
India that the chiefs of the tribes of this part of the Persian Gulf had repeatedly
inquired about the British attitude towards the issue. The Indian Government came to
the point of changing their position, and discussed with the Political Resident Colonel
Pelly whether it would not be advisable to strengthen the position of Muscat territories
with British assistance, and then to divide Oman into two parts. One part for example
would consist of Sohar and the northern portion which would be given to Sayyid
'Azzan, with Sayyid Turki being allowed to establishing his sovereignty in the
southern portion, in a manner similar to the former arbitration when Sayyid Turki held
the Sohar portion while Sayyid Thuwaini remained in Muscat.62 Colonel Pelly's
comment on that discussion, was that the differences between Sayyid Thuwaini and
Sayyid Turki were completely different to the present situation and what the British
had accomplished in the past was for the purpose of the unity of Oman and its
territories.
The Political Resident instantly informed the Government of Bombay that,
while he had been at Bushire, he had had no opportunity to communicate with Sayyid
Turki at Bandar Abbas personally.63 In spite of this statement from Pelly, Bushire
was not that far from Bandar Abbas and Sayyid Turki, and Pelly would have been
absolutely able to watch him from there if he had really wanted to. Nevertheless, by
that time Sayyid Turki was in financial trouble and was seeking a loan from the
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Government of Bombay, and he used Peliy as his mechanism to gain this application.
Despite this, as he had already received some money to support his position from his
brother in Zanzibar, Sayyid Turki had revived his hopes of getting over his present
difficulties. He strengthened his position by encouraging more supporters to attach
themselves to his project, increasing his popularity which had been growing among
the tribes inside Oman. He had after all, demonstrated his ability to rule even among
those who were outside the country, as in Jask and Bandar Abbas. The chiefs of
these tribes were interested in his suitability for Muscat and considered themselves as
Muscat's subjects and were trying to persuade the British not to stand against Sayyid
Turki s aspirations.
Whatever the nature of Sayyid Turki's demands and the British attitude to him,
he was in a position to be informed about his task in the Persian Gulf and to follow up
the intended project. On 27th August 1870, the Government of Bombay had written to
the Principal Secretary of State for India informing him about their concern at the
movement of Sayyid Turki against the territories of Muscat.64 It was very important
for them that Sayyid Turki1 s movement against Oman's territories to recover the
throne of the country should be under their observation, and that the Government of
India should signify their intention of watching Sayyid Turki, even though they had
greater distaste for Sayyid "Azzan.
The Political Agent at Muscat, as well as the British authorities in the Persian
Gulf, reached agreement to the effect that Sayyid Turki was now and would be more
than ever regarded with favour by the majority of the people of Oman. Accordingly,
the correspondence between the Government of Bombay and the Governor-General of
India strongly advocated the claims of Sayyid Turki, and confirmed his power and
abilities to the British Government, its representatives in the region, and the people of
Oman, who were likely to be convinced of his accession to the Sultanate.
Undoubtedly the British authorities were under pressure as a result of their hesitant
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policy attitude towards the situation in Oman, and had accepted the alteration in the
conditions which had taken place since the departure of Sayyid Turki from Bombay.
However, whether the prohibition had been withdrawn or not, the issue for them was
that the British authorities should be aware that they should not allow Sayyid Turki to
leave anyplace whatsoever under their protection, or promise him military assistance
in respect of any attempt that he might undertake in the future to establish his power
over the territories of Muscat. Accordingly, Sayyid Turki realised that the British
authorities would not be the major obstacle in his way to becoming the head of State.
In addition to that, Turki had depended too much on the financial support from
his brother Majid, who was by that time prepared to offer him an armed force to help
him overthrow Sayyid 'Azzan. Majid had sent his warship Prince of Wales to Turki
in Bandar Abbas, and had warned the tribes of Oman that they would not be allowed
to trade with or to visit Zanzibar while 'Azzan b. Qais remained in power.65 This
warning was apparently directed in the first instance against the people of Sur and
Ja'alan. It was no coincidence that a number of Shaikhs from the Janabah and the
Bani Bu 'Ali of Sur visited Sayyid Turki in the port of Bandar Abbas in June, only
one month before he made his fruitless mission to Muscat on board the British vessel
Muzaffar. 66
Circumstances from now on would change direction regarding the realisation
of Sayyid Turki1 s claim to Omani territories. By this time the British authorities in the
Persian Gulf were very interested in the recent offer from Majid to support Sayyid
Turki s intention to make his landing on the coast of Oman. The realisation of this and
the success of his manoeuvre were dependent upon British sympathy and support for
him against the power of the Muscat Government and its supporters amongst the
opposition tribes of the interior.
96
On 3rd September 1870, Lt. Col. Lewis Pelly sent his report on the present
situation in Muscat. He stated that after leaving Henjam Station in the Persian Gulf for
Bandar Abbas, he had met with the Governor of the Port, Haji Ahmed, on his arrival
there. They had discussed the intervention in the interior affairs of Oman of the Sultan
of Zanzibar, Sayyid Majid b. Sa'id, who had sent the Zanzibar warship Prince of
Wales. This ship had arrived at Bandar Abbas and thereafter headed to Bushire. They
also discussed the movements of Sayyid Turki as a whole. In his report, Colonel Pelly
concentrated on Sayyid Turki's preparations for a sea operation, which he had already
started by ordering his baghlah to proceed to a point called Khor Mobarek near Jask
while he marched overland.67 Pelly then proceeded to Jask to gather confirmed
information about the recent move of Sayyid Turki from Bandar Abbas. Promptly,
after receiving reliable information about Turki, he sent a telegram to the Political
Department as follows:
" Arrived at Jask, Sayid Torkee credibly reported to be with Bughlah
and about forty followers at Khor-Mobarek thirty miles distance
preparing to follow five Craft gone on with party estimated from two
to three hundred men, who landed and await Torkee at Soor1. 68
Pelly was now in a position to prepare himself to receive instructions, and to
consider whether he should interfere in Turki's activities or not. For the time being,
Pelly was in direct communicationwith the Political Agent at Muscat to follow Sayyid
Turki's strategy to conquer Oman. On 23rd August, Pelly received a telegram from
the Acting Political Agent in Oman, Major Way, inwhich he stated the position of the
more powerful tribes in the northern territories of Muscat. For example, the Bani al-
Na'im tribe in al-Zahirah, who had risen against 'Azzan s authority, had taken some
areas which were now under their influence and had seized the passes of the district.
Sayyid ' Azzan was preparing to proceed against them to win back his position. At the
same time the Duru'a, Bani Kalban and ' Yal Sa'd were said to be dissatisfied with the
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regime of Muscat.69 The Government of Bombay had replied to Pelly on this matter
on 25th August 1870, stating that:
"unless maritime truce is broken and warlike operations are being
carried on by sea, no interference should take place. Colonel Pelly
should not prevent Toorki going to Soor alone or with a few
followers".70
On the other side Shaikh Salih b. 'Ali al-Harthi was in Bediyyah, where he
had been campaigning on the border of Sharqiyyah to bring the resident tribes there
into "Azzan's service. Nevertheless, that task had not been completely successful
because of 'Azzan's failure to keep up his payments to them and to redeem his
promise to remove Shaikh al-Khalili, and Shaikh Salih bin 'Ali himself, from his
government. Subsequently, Sayyid Turki s party at Sur managed to establish a strong
position and took control of the port thus preventing dhows leaving the town, keeping
them under control, and forcing them to enter his service.71
However, in a previous communication about keeping the peace at sea, which
was connected with the current situation in Oman, the Secretary to the Government, in
the Political Department, had told the Political Resident on 24th August that his task
and the present instructions to Sayyid Turki regarding the maritime truce in the Persian
Gulf were absolutely sufficient and effective.72 By this time Sayyid Turki had left
Bandar Abbas, and the Government of Bombay was enquiring of Lewis Pelly his
destination, who had accompanied him. Accordingly the Political Resident delayed
his departure from Jask, from where he sent his reply to this question, that Sayyid
Turki had proceeded towards the town of Sur, the centre of his support in the country,
with some 40 armed men on board a baghlah to join his advanced party who had
already '^nded there and were awaiting him in a position where they were able to deny
egress from Sur. 73
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Subsequent to this, Colonel Pelly left Jask very quickly on the evening of 16th
August. He headed for Muscat, with the intention of catching Sayyid Turki before he
could reach his destination. On 17th August, when about 40 kilometres from Qatar
port, Pelly caught up with Sayyid Turki's baghla after he had been at sea for eight
days. Sayyid Turki visited the Resident on board his ship, and told to him that he was
not heading for Sur, contradicting his previous statement on this matter. He
complained to him that the conditions of his stay in Bombay in exile were
unsatisfactory, that his pension in India had been stopped, and that his family was
without means of support. He said that he was now about to make another attempt to
realise his claim with the men he had on board, which could be considered an attack in
force on Oman ,74 Pelly responded to him with caution, and tried to dissuade Sayyid
Turki from joining his armed forces which had already taken possession of Sur,
saying that if Sayyid Turki were to continue with his move towards the town of Sur,
Pelly would be under an obligation to watch him and his activities. Consequently,
Pelly then proceeded to Muscat. Shortly afterward he learned that Sayyid Turki's
baghlah had continued on her journey to Sur. So the British Political Resident in the
Gulf communicated with Sayyid Turki again, who reaffirmed his statement to the
PoliticalResident that he would not proceed to Sur, but that he would stay for some
time at a point on the Omani coast between Barka and Qurayyat, 94 kilometres south
east ofMuscat.75 Afterwards, Turki's baghlah had been seen for some time standing
off a point near Muscat harbour.
Colonel Pelly knew, on his arrival in Muscat, that all the members of Sayyid
'Azzan s Government were there except Sayyid 'Azzan himself who was at this time
out of Muscat, engaging the Wahhabis in the northern part of Oman. He soon
communicated with the Imam's Government, reminding them of their failure to liaise
with the British authorities in the Gulf with regard to the maritime truce in the recent
situation at Muscat. In addition to that Colonel Pelly assured the Imam that he
99
preferred to put into effect the Government of India's instruction concerning the
maritime truce, but no reply was received from the Imam relating to this matter, and
although Shaikh al-Khalili was at Muscat no instruction had been given to him.
Despite this, the Imam communicated with the Shaikh without referring to this
question.7 6 On 30th August, Pelly left Muscat for Sur, while the Muscat Government
remained suspicious of the British manoeuvring in the area and their real attitude to
Sayyid Turki's claims. The Resident had invited Shaikh Nasir bin Rashid al-Harthi,
the Agent of 'Azzan's Government, on board his ship before his departure. Skaikh
Nasir accompanied him accordingly.7 7
Shaikh Nasir b. Rashid had been the representative of 'Azzan's Government to
the British authorities since Sayyid Turki's first attempt to attack Oman. In April
1869, he had communicated with Lt. Colonel Herbert Disbrowe, the Political Agent at
Muscat, regarding the maritime truce in connection with Sayyid Turki's attempt to
make his landing on the coast of Oman by sea. On the day of that meeting with the
Agent at Muscat, Nasir b. Rashid had conveyed to al-Khalili the Agent's confirmation
of the prohibition on the transport of forces by seawhether by their own vessels or not
to coastal territories such as Sur.78 The Government of Muscat had accused the
British Agent of taking a decision which they thought would hold up their access by
sea to the main ports on the Muscat littoral territories, and might help give rise to
disturbances in their possessions.79 Accordingly, Herbert Disbrowe, as well as the
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, clearly explained to both parties that the
prohibition on naval armed movements extended to all, no matter whether the
supporters of Sayyid 'Azzan or their opponents, whether to proceed by sea against
one another or otherwise. Neither party would be allowed by the British Government
to undertake such action.8 0
When Pelly was near the port of Sur, he met with a baghlah carrying Sayyid
Turki's senior naval officer, who visited him on board his ship. He informed Pelly
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that several boats had already arrived at Sur from Bandar Abbas carrying Sayyid
Turkis supporters and that the parties had landed accompanied by 'Ali b. Khalfan al-
'Alawi of the Bani Bu 'Ali, who had played a major part in gathering Sayyid Turki s
supporters in Sur. He had occupied the portion of the town which lies southward and
eastward of Sur, in a place called al-'Aijah, on behalf of Sayyid Turki. The senior
officer of Sayyid Turki1 s naval forces also informed Pelly that Shaikh 'Ali bin Khalfan
had now been waiting for Sayyid Turki s arrival for nearly two months, and he was
in a position where with a few of his men he could easily contact Sayyid Turki to
obtain new instructions. The political Resident learned that the Master of the dhow
was a native of Bushire, who had been involved in carrying the Sayyid's followers
and provisions to Sur.81 As it happens, for the moment, Pelly had no intention of
interfering. On Sayyid Turki s arrival at Sur, he had been visited by all the parties.
The supporters of 'Ali bin Khalfan had publicly revealed their allegiance to Sayyid
Turki. The rest of the Janabah tribes of Sur, apparently a large number, had continued
to acknowledge Sayyid 'Azzan's authority.82 However, the circumstances at the town
were unclear, and it was easy to find those who could be ready within a very short
time either to assist the official authority of ' Azzan, or to behave in a friendly manner
to Sayyid Turki'smovement and his supporters.
Sayyid Turki was indebted to Shaikh 'Ali b. Khalfan's al-'Alawi activities at
Sur where 'Ali b. Khalfan had managed to convert most of the Janabah tribes to
declare their support for hismovement, and had accumulated a large force in favour of
the Sayyid. He and his party had succeeded in declaring an embargo on all dhows
proceeding to sea, under the pretence that the embargo was approved by the British
Government. However, the real object of this embargo appeared to be, the prevention
uf all seafaring men on shore from opposing Sayyid Turki's arrival, in order to make
them available for his plans.8 3
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Actually, Peliy had been reprimanded by the Governor-General in Council for
leaving Bushire for Muscat. On 19th August 1870, the Secretary to the Government
informed him that the Government of India was of the opinion that he was not
absolved from leaving his position in Bushire in order to watch Sayyid Turki s
movements.84 The Governor in Council had not approved his action, which was
appropriate for a naval officer but not for the Political Resident. He added that it was
better for him to stay in a position to direct the necessary operation in the Gulf instead
of taking part in it, except when urgent political matters required his advice and
presence.85
It appeared that whatever the personal feeling of the parties towards Sayyid
'Azzan's sovereignty over Oman, the main question was that of the centralisation of
power, which had previously been imposed on every chief under the great Sayyid
Sa'id b. Sultan. The authority of the warlike chiefs of the interior and the south was
respected, and was little interfered with.86 Moreover, Pelly remarked on the present
Government of Muscat, and its adviser Shaikh Sa'id b. Khalfan al-Khalili, that they
had been involved in efforts to restrict the independent power of the tribal leaders and
replace them by the local wali, or the representative of the central power. In carrying
out this policy, al-Khalili had used his religious influence, while the political leader of
the country, the Imam, and his most influential follower Shaikh Salih bin 'Ali had
visited in person the majority of the tribes, and whether by using force or conciliation,
had brought them under their central power.8 7
In any case, Sayyid 'Azzan's government had apparently given rise to much
discontent amongst the chiefs as a result of putting a number of members of tribes into
prison, while the Wahhabis, who had been eager to occupy the al-Buraimi oasis for
some time, now appeared to be influencing the Bani al-Na'im tribe on the north west
of Muscat territories against the government of Sayyid 'Azzan. It seemed that when
the Sultan of Zanzibar, Sayyid Majid, had offered the sum of money to the Wahhabi
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Amir to oppose 'Azzan's power and encourage his people to occupy al-Buraimi and
other northern parts of the territories of Muscat, this act was generally considered as a
way of inciting hostility against the authority of 'Azzan.88
At this time, Sayyid 'Azzan was proceeding towards the north. Meanwhile,
his brother Sayyid Ibrahim bin Qais, his cousin the military commander, Faisal b.
Hamood b. 'Azzan, and the Shaikh Salih b. 'Ali ai-Harthi, and a large number of
people from al-Sharqiyyah district followed him and met with 'Azzan b. Qais at al-
Buraimi. When the Imam was there the Amir Sa'ud b. Faisal joined him in support of
his adventure, having been forced to leave Nejd by his brother 'Abdullah b. Faisal the
Amir of Nejd.89 It is remarkable that although action from Sayyid Turki in the
southern part of Oman had been expected for some time, Sayyid 'Azzan, instead of
concentrating his forces in that part of the country, had preferred to face the difficulties
which had been caused for the time being by the Wahhabis. This is because Sayyid
'Azzan he considered them more dangerous than Sayyid Turki, and so ignored the
threat to his sovereignty from the tribes of the south under Sayyid Turki.
As far as Sayyid Turki was concerned the prospects for his move, if he were
prompt and active, were more favourable than they had been. The orders of the
Government of India, which had to some degree been relaxed in his favour, and the
financial support from the Sultan of Zanzibar had strengthened his claim.90
Undoubtedly the Zanzibar funds must have been the greatest factor which gave Sayyid
Turki the enthusiasm and sufficient influence over the chiefs of the Omani tribes, as
well as the Wahhabi Government, who were willing to cooperate with him against
'Azzan in return for the money promised to them from Zanzibar. The tribal shaikhs
certainly thought that under the government to be established by Sayyid Turki, they
might regain their independent position and influence.
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The Political Resident had mentioned to the Government of Bombay that he
expected that difficulties would probably face Sayyid Turki during his landing in
Oman from apart of the Bani Bu 'Ali of Ja'alan and the Bam Bu Hasan, his old allies,
who normally would not oppose him but might adopt a different position.91 He added
that evidently the Bani Bu 'Ali would join Sayyid Turki soon, while there was a
possibility that at all events a faction of Bani Bu Hasan would be drawn to his
support. The major question however, would be that of the great division of the
Omani tribes into two parties, the Hinawi and the Ghafiri, and that the old animosity
between them might easily arise again.92 Accordingly the Ghafiri tribes were
considered the main supporters of Sayyid Turki, while the Hinawi faction was
supposed to be in favour of the present Imam. However, matters were not so clear
cut, since many of the Hinawi party had joined Sayyid Turki's cause, especially those
of al-Sharqiyyah district, during his march towards Muscat in his final attempt.
Sayyid Turki was confident that if he could find the time and money to
accumulate the necessary force, the present Government of Oman would resign
without strong resistance. However, Sayyid Turki knew that enthusiasm for his cause
might wane as a result of any delay in his attempt to conquer Oman.93 Despite the
British dissatisfaction, and the potential opposition to Sayyid 'Azzan's authority, the
British were treading cautiously, not wishing to be seen as supporting Sayyid Turki's
side.
Accordingly, the British Political Resident in the Persian Gulf concentrated his
efforts on Sayyid Turki's movements at sea. On 11th September 1870, he reported to
the Government of Bombay from Muscat that he had no reliable information regarding
the movements of Sayyid Turki since the date of his last sighting near the Muscat
coast, but he stated that it had been confirmed that Sayyid Turki was purchasing
foodstuffs at a point between Muscat and Sur, and that he had landed either at Khor-
Kalba or Khor-Fakkan on the Trucial Coast.94 The Political Resident admitted that
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there would be a keenly-contested struggle between the two parties, but that Turki
appeared to be confident of a conclusive victory over Sayyid 'Azzan. Pelly had also
been informed that Sayyid Turki was confident and that he would be able to achieve
superiority over 'Azzan at the first engagement against him.95 In his communication
with Major A. Cotton Way at Muscat on the policy of 'Azzan's, he mentioned that,
under the old dynasty, the sultans were not in a position of strength to be able to bring
those tribes under their influence, but the policy of Sayyid 'Azzan was from the
beginning to subjugate all the tribes of Oman to the central authority.96
In the meantime Pelly had received another piece of information from the
Muscat authorities, shortly before his departure from the port of Muscat, stating that
they had learned that Sayyid Turki had landed at Khor-Fakkan. His comment on this
fact was that when Turki was choosing this point, Sayyid had acted judiciously, since
although Khor-Fakkan was surrounded by Muscat territories, it was conveniently
situated in Qasimi territory, whose tribes were now joining Sayyid Turki in his revolt
against the north western Omani frontier.97 When Pelly had embarked from Muscat
for Bushire in September 1870, he left behind the steamer Kwangtung and requested
her Commander to consider the ship to be at his service if required. He also
requested, as soon as he no longer needed the service of that vessel, that he should
permit it to leave Muscat for another point on the Arabian Coast in the Persian Gulf
where its servicemight prove necessary.98
The British Political Resident's action was a clear indication that he predicted
that Sayyid Turki was determined to take Muscat from Sayyid 'Azzan and that he was
thinking of the British subjects in Muscat who during his absence would be left
without the protection of aman-of-war on the day of Sayyid Turki's arrival. Despite
this preparation on the part of the Resident, he did not yet know the exact location of
Sayyid Turki b. Sa'id, but what he was sure about was that he had made his landing
somewhere on the Arabian Coast. He believed that in the event of Sayyid Turki
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landing anywhere in Arabia, he would expect British support. At this time all the
British representatives in the region had already been instructed not to be involved in
any such dynastic troubles and not to tolerate any breach of the maritime truce. Pelly
accordingly had warned the Government of Muscat that the British Government would
bear the responsibility for the personal safety of her subjects and their property in
Muscat, and that both parties should also act responsibly in this matter.9 9
The Muscat authorities had indicated more than once that they were uncertain
of British neutrality in the conflict between them and Turki, and had accused them of
being poised to support Sayyid Turki1 s position and to protect his interests.
However, the British authorities in Bombay and in India instructed their officials to
avoid all risk of strengthening this apprehension at that time .
On 16th September 1870, Colonel Pelly reported to the Government of
Bombay that the Governor of Bandar Abbas had confirmed to him that Sayyid Turki
had arrived at Khor Fakkan and was preparing to proceed towards al-Buraimi. This
was probably with the intention of joining the tribes who were in revolt against Sayyid
'Azzan on the north west frontier of Muscat's dominions.100 The Government of
Bombay thought that Colonel Pelly was right not to prevent Turki from fulfilling his
intentions at the next stage. The Government of Bombay's order, with the
concurrence of the Government of India, to keep the maritime peace enforced had been
relaxed in Sayyid Turki's favour. 101
3.3.4. Sayyid Turki and the Road to Success
When Colonel Pelly prevented him from advancing towards Sur, Sayyid Turki landed
at Khor-Fakkan at the close of the month of August 1870. At Khor-Fakkan he met
with a group of the Bani al-Na'im, who joined him on his way to the oasis through al-
Fujairah on the Trucial Coast, and passing Wadi Ham. On their arrival at al-Buraimi,
he was joined by the chiefs of the Bani Qatab and the Bani al-Na'im, who possessed
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all the principal forts of the oasis except for one. This was under the control of the
shaikh of Abu Dhabi, Zaid bin Khalifah, who held it in the interests of Sayyid 'Azzan
b. Qais.102
The chiefs of Dubai, Ajman, and Ras al-Khaimah had also agreed to support
Sayyid Turki and they were rewarded with funds from Sayyid Majid. Sayyid 'Azzan
meanwhile had succeeded in bringing back under his control a large part of the
interior, and had established a strong position in al-Zahirah district, northwest of
Muscat.103 However, Sayyid Turki1 s effort to rally support against Sayyid 'Azzan
was more successful than previously. This was as a result of the growth in his
popularity among the chiefs in the region, and because of his strong determination
which had led to the revival of the group of Sayyid Sa'id's hopes of regaining control
of the country. Sayyid Turki s campaign to change the political situation in his favour
was conducted in a peaceful way which suited British policy in the country and
encouraged most of the people in Oman to welcome his re-appearance at this stage.
However, Sayyid Turki had been well aware that this objective would not be easily
achieved, as there were many enemies still opposed to his aims, and that inevitably he
would have to fight for his new destiny. The British authorities had powerful
sympathies with Sayyid Turki's motives, even if they had tried to keep it concealed
from public knowledge for some time, and they quietly encouraged Sayyid Turki to
unify his party, and then his country, through his own efforts.
Furthermore the Political Resident Col. Pelly had absolutely no interest in
Azzan's Government and he was not on good terms either with him or with his
advisers. The Government of Bombay was not in favour of his rule either; they
refused to recognise him officially as the Imam of Muscat and its territories on many
different occasions, and they stopped the payment of the Canning Award of 1861.104
Subsequently, it was necessary to note that Sayyid Turki had raised the necessary
funds and support, and had been allowed by the Government of India, to pursue his
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aims in Oman.105 The Government of Bombay now held a similar position to Pelly,
who favoured Sayyid Turki taking over Oman. The Government of Bombay
observed that their struggle had been aimed at preserving the stability of the peace ai
sea, but they did not want the maritime truce extended so that it came under their direct
operations.106
3.4. Sayyid Turki's Operations in Oman
3.4.1. The Battle ofDhank
As soon as the news reached Sayyid ' Azzan about the course of Sayyid Turki's attack
against al-Buraimi, he and his brother Ibrahim proceeded northwards for the purpose
of saving their men there and preventing Sayyid Turki from taking the district.
Shortly before his arrival there 'Azzan was told that his ally Shaikh Zaid bin Khalifah
of Abu Dhabi had offered to support' Azzan's military forces there. These succeeded
in forcing Sayyid Turki, who wanted to attack Sayyid 'Azzan in al-Zahirah, to change
direction from al-Zahirah and to attack Dhank, 295 kilometres north west of Muscat,
which was controlled by the Bani al-Na'im tribe.107 As Sayyid 'Azzan was
approaching Dhank he was deserted by a large number of his supporters. They had
heard that Sayyid Turki had left al-Buraimi and was heading to Mahadah, 322
Kilometres north of Muscat, which was under the Bani al-Na'im control, to collect
more men before heading to Dhank. Sayyid 'Azzan's troops were still quite
numerous: he had managed to keep under his control some 4,000 men.108 On
learning of this fact Sayyid Turki preferred to meet Sayyid 'Azzan at Dhank rather than
at al-Buraimi. On 5th October 1870, the two parties were involved in fighting at Wadi
Dhank. Sayyid Turki's forces were numerically fewer than those of Sayyid 'Azzan,
but his strength and determination coupled with an unusually bitter hatred and desire
for revenge which had been provoked and fuelled by the actions of 'Azzan1 s adviser
Shaikh al-Khalili and the military commander Shaikh Salih bin 'Ali, who had
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administered many brutalities to their opponents enabled him to triumph.109 In this
fighting Sayyid Turki was more merciful, but on the other hand he was a wise and
patient man and knew how to control his troops skilfully. Sayyid 'Azzan's troops
were better equipped to win the conflict, as they possessed many different kinds of
armament, includingeven a gun battery which had created pride and confidence among
'Azzan's men.110 However, with the determination of Sayyid Turki s troops to
succeed the results of this battle turned out to be completely in his favour, and the
battle ended in the somewhat unexpected defeat for Sayyid ' Azzan and his forces. In
this battle, Sayyid 'Azzan s side had lost between three and four hundred men, among
them members of the tamimah of al-Hajriyyin, al-Habus, and the 'Yal Sa'd tribes,
and the rest of 'Azzan1 s force had retreated in disarray. Sayyid 'Azzan and his brother
went down to Sohar on their way to Muscat for the coming battle.111 Sayyid 'Azzan
from this point on never regained the respect he had lost in this combat with Sayyid
Turki.
3.4.2. Sayyid Turki's Campaigns in Oman
Subsequently, Sayyid Turki marched south to the centre of Oman on his way towards
Sur. When he arrived at al-Sharqiyyah, he was joined by the al-Wahibah, whose
chief, Shaikh Sa'id b. Nasir, acted effectively in persuading the Bani Bu 'Ali to join
Sayyid Turki's party, while the chief of al-Habus, Shaikh Nasir b. 'Amir al-Habsi,
had become one of the Sayyid's numerous supporters in gathering most of al-Habus
to his side. However, the principal success for Sayyid Turki was the allegiance of the
former wali ofMatrah during the period of Sayyid Salimb. Thuwaini, Saifb. Suliman
A1 Bu Sa'idi, to his cause.112 Saif prepared alarge number of his forces, about 5,000
armed men, to blockade Nizwa, 174 kilometres from Muscat in the interior of Oman,
and the Wadi Samail, 92 kilometres west of Muscat. Sayyid himself was leading
about 6,000 men from the Bani Bu 'Ali, Bani Bu Hasan of Ja'alan, al-Hajriyyin of
Bediyyah, al-Habus of al-Qabel, al-Dhoru'a of al-Zahirah, al-Wahibah of al-
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Sharqiyyah, and the Janabah of Sur. He later camped there and collected a large force
in his next move with 200 camels against Sur, which he took on 25th October
1870.113 In the meantime, Sayyid Turki had received additional funds from the
Sultan of Zanzibar, which gave him, further courage and energy to pursue his
operations.114
Meanwhile, Sayyid 'Azzanremained at Sohar for some time, but he was able
to return to his capital on 10th November, 1870.115 Despite the inferiority of his
forces in Muscat, which were small in number and lacked reinforcements, Sayyid
'Azzan felt his ambitions to be admirable, which together with al-Khalili boosted his
hopes of winning the next battle with Sayyid Turki. He depended too much on the
hope that the tribes which had distanced themselves from him on the ground of the
former conflict would not remain enemies for ever.116 Sayyid 'Azzan's forces in
Muscat and Matrah did not exceed 800 fighting men. They were certainly an
unreliable element in terms of his hope and ambitions of regaining his former position
in the country, which by this time was to a large extent occupied by Sayyid Turki, but
his main cause for hope was based on the news which had reached him from al-
Buraimi, that the oasis still remained under the possession of the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi
who was in Sayyid 'Azzan's favour. Furthermore it was said that the tribe of the Bani
al-Na'im, as well as part of al-Duru'a tribe, had switched sides to support the Imam,
and that they were even ready to surrender Dhank, one of the main towns in the
district to his authority.117 There was another point to be added to his hopes, which
was that the Shaikhs of the Bani Bu 'Ali and al-Hajriyyin regretted breaking off their
loyalty to the Imam's authority, and they started communicating with him and asked
him to forgive them, and to accept their allegiance and apology. Additionally, Sultan
Majid b. Sa'id of Zanzibar had died on 7th October 1870, so Sayyid Turki would lose
the funds which were coming to him from there, at least for the time being.118
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3.4.3. The attack on Muscat and the British involvement
On 29th October 1870, Major A.C. Way visited Sur, and warned Sayyid Turki
against any operation by sea. Sayyid Turki replied to him that he had no intention of
doing so, or of violating orders of the British Government on this issue. In addition
to these assurances, he asked the Political Agent for an interview, but the latter
declined to comply to this request. Accordingly, Major Way instructed the
Commander of the Hugh Ross to stand against any move of armed force by sea upon
Muscat.119 The Government of India, on the other hand, instructed MajorWay not to
permit Sayyid ' Azzan's government to send an expedition against Sayyid Turki in Sur
by sea.120
They confirmed to him that the British objectwas to maintain a neutral position
between the contestants, and to prevent all warlike operations by sea. The Agent was
permitted to change this policy and to give the Government of Muscat permission to
use force by sea, only if it needed to undertake a defensive, not an offensive
operation. Also, the British Government would not permit Sayyid Turki to undertake
aggression.121 Sayyid Turki was very well aware of the British maritime policy in
Oman, but was unable to halt his operations against Muscat. He started his
preparations for the next stage in the conflict without any more delay. Sayyid Turki
seemed not to be troubled too much by the British prohibition on sea operations, and
knew how to exploit the difficulties of Sayyid 'Azzan to his advantage, especially
those which were related to the shaikhs of the Omani tribes. By the end of the year
1870, Sayyid Turki had reached the position where he felt quite confident of the
success of any future attack against the authority in Muscat.
Good results were achieved in the operation against Muscat at the beginning of
January 1871. This involved two divisions, one of which proceeded by sea and was
led by his commander Saif bin Sulayman A1 Bu Sa'idi, and the second one by land
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headed by himself. On the 13th of the same month he was in al-Muzabi, 177
kilometres south east of Muscat, with a force of between 3,000 and 4,000 men who
were about to attack the main force of ' Azzan in al-Sharqiyyah district at Samad.
However, his troops were halted by Shaikh Salih b. 'Ali al-Harthi with support from
part of the al-Habus tribe.122 The great success of this campaign came from the sea
operation led by Sulayman, who on 12th January had managed to capture Qurayyat,
94 kilometres south of Muscat on the coast of Oman, while Sayyid 'Azzan and his
brother Sayyid Ibrahim were preparing themselves for the next big military
confrontation for the defence of Muscat and Matrah.123
Saif bin Sulayman left his position in Qurayyat, heading northward to Matrah,
passing by Muscat on 17th January 1871, but Sayyid 'Azzan was able to drive him off
at the firstattack on Matrah. 'Azzan's hopes were transferred to the forces on which
he depended to fortify the towns of Muscat and Matrah, and the orders were issued to
those who were outside the walls of Muscat to come to the support of the troops
inside. Levies were imposed on the inhabitants, and additional taxation was also
imposed to cover the cost of reinforcements. The British subjects in the town had
been instructed by the British Political Agent at Muscat to leave the town
temporarily.124 In the second attack on Matrah Saif b. Sulayman succeeded in
surrounding the town, and on 27th January 1871, the authorities in Muscat
communicated toWay, the British Agent, their intention of sending a force by sea to
provide additional support to Matrah against the attack from Saif b. Sulayman.
However, Way avoided giving a direct response to this request, butmentioned that he
had already been instructed by the Government of Bombay in early January 1871 to
prevent any kind of hostilities at sea, and to inform the Imam that the previous
permission which had been given to him to move some force by sea was now
cancelled.125
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Sayyid 'Azzan ignored the warning of the British authorities, and on 23rd
January, sent a dhow from Muscat with supplies for the Matrah garrison. This dhow
was forced by the British gun-boat Kwangtung to return to Muscat and when it made
its second attempt to set off for Matrah it was fired on and sunk.126 At that time
Sayyid 'Azzan was defending the town with his garrison. On 30th January, Saif b.
Sulayman made his final attack on 'Azzan s force at Matrah, where both leaders,
'Azzan and Saif, lost their lives in the fighting. Matrah hereby became the crucial
achievement in Sayyid Turki1 s attempt to gain power in Oman after nearly 20 years1 of
conflict. 127
As a result of these events, Colonel Pelly proceeded towards Muscat, where he
was needed immediately. On 3rd February theHugh Ross had arrived at Muscat, and
Pelly found the town in the hands of Sayyid Turki's men. He promptly
communicated to the Government of Bombay, through Gwader, that Shaikh al-Khalili
was still holding the Jalali fort in Muscat, and the al-Mairani fort in Matrah, but the
towns themselves were under Sayyid Turki1 s control.128 In this connection Shaikh
Salih bin 'Ali now occupied the fort of Samail, where he could watch Sayyid Turki's
advance to Muscat very closely. Sayyid Ibrahim bin Qais fled to Sohar, while Shaikh
al-Khalili intended to hand over to Ibrahim the authority of the country.129 At this
stage of the conflict the British authorities in both India and the Gulf had come to the
conclusion that they would have to withdraw from direct intervention in Omani
waters, and to confine British jurisdiction over the maritime truce to the Persian Gulf
alon.
3.4.4. The fall ofSayyid 'Azzan's government
At Muscat the British Political Resident in the Gulf was trying to maintain British
neutrality in the present conflicts bymediating in the dispute between Shaikh al-Khalili
and Sayyid Turki, who by this time was in Muscat. In some way he succeeded in
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inducing al-Khalili to accept this offer and to surrender himself to Sayyid Turki at
Muscat. On 13th February 1871, he communicated with the Government of India,
explaining to them about his mediation in the conflict between Turki and al-Khalili,
which had ended with the declaration of peace between the two parties, without the
involvement of the British authorities in any transaction.130 Al-Khalili believed in
Pelly s assurances for his safety in this settlement, since otherwise it would have been
impossible for him to give himself up. The signature of the Wakeels of Sayyid Turki
and the Shaikh al-Khalili were attached to all provisions of the agreement and
witnessed by the British authorities. Immediately after this settlement some of the
Batinah coast tribes submitted to Sayyid Turki while he was on the point of moving
out of Muscat to take over all the forts and territory in person.131
On 17th February, the British Political Agent at Muscat, A. C. Way, reported
to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Colonel Pelly, that Shaikh al-Khalili had
died of fright and diarrhoea, and the next day al-Khalili's son died of the same illness.
In the same report he tried to give a brief explanation about the position in Muscat
before the death of al-Khalili. He stated to him that Sayyid Turki had found out that
Shaikh al-Khalili had been sending funds to Ibrahm b. Qais in Sohar, to raise a force
against Sayyid Turki. In addition, Shaikh Nasir bin Rashid al-Harthi was
encouraging the people of Muscat to revolt against Sayyid Turki. Accordingly,
Sayyid Turki had imprisoned al-Khalili, his son, and Nasir bin Rashid al-Harthi in al-
Mairanifort.132 The Political Agent at Muscat ordered an investigation of this affair
and reported to the Government of Bombay the following:
On the 16th February, about 7 p.m. His Highness Syud Toorkee
sent sheikh Hashool al-Amree (Hashil al-Amri) and two others to
Khulelee with his compliments, and to say he wished to see him.
Khulelee at first declined the invitation, but afterwards his son and
Sheikh Nasir accompanied the messenger. On landing they were set
upon by the populace and severely beaten and ill-used. They were
then conveyed to the Merani Fort. Later in the evening, His
Highness Syud Toorkee had an interview with Khulelee, who was
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brought down from the Fort, for he could not walk and appeared
quite paralysed. The next day Khulelee died, and I received an
intimation from His Highness that he had been like a mad man from
the time he was seized and had died from fright and diarrhoea. The
next morning, Khulelee's son died from, I am informed, diarrhoea,
from which he had been suffering for some time past".133
3.5. Sayyid Turki's Success and British Recognition
Sayyid Turki b. Said had until this time depended very heavily on British assistance
for his cause, especially the implicit support of Pelly, and so he managed to gain their
recognition in a very short time. He based his claim on this, and Pelly depended upon
the popularity of Sayyid Turki and the support of the Omani tribes for his position.
Sayyid Turki started his reign with difficulties, similar to those faced by those who
preceded him on the throne of Oman. He had proved his skilful ability to control the
country, and the British authorities in the Gulf were confident that his strength and
wisdom would help him to rule the country and its large number of tribes with
conflicting interests. It is our belief that when the British Political Resident in the Gulf
was sympathetic to Sayyid Turki, the latter commanded considerable support within
the country. This is demonstrated by the conclusion of the events in Oman with the
extension of his control to the majority of the tribal shaikhs in Oman, who considered
him the future Sultan of Oman. Consequently, the Political Resident in the Persian
Gulf had played an effective part in the downfall of Turki's opponent, which was due
largely to his dissatisfaction with his exercise of power in the country. In addition to
this, the British Government in general had not been well disposed to Sayyid ' Azzan's
government and was looking for a replacement. The most important factor in this
matterwas their objection to recognising the government of Sayyid 'Azzan, which
was only announced unofficially in February 1870, one year before his death and the
fail of his government. The British officials in India had never recognised his position
as the Imam.
115
The recent success of Sayyid Turki depended without doubt on the British
policy towards Muscat, which had induced their representative in the area to remain in
a position that could maintain the status quo in Muscat affairs. This had proved
difficult with regard to the Imam s Government, which was extremely unfriendly to
the British presence in the country. On the very day that Pelly arrived in Muscat, and
before the end of the conflict between Sayyid Turki s force and Sayyid 'Azzaris in
Muscat and its territories, he wrote to the Government of Bombay urging them to give
immediate recognition to Sayyid Turki's position, which would now be successful in
the long term because of the death of Sayyid 'Azzan b. Qais as well as his own
prestige as a successful military leader.134 By that time, the Government of Bombay
was ready to congratulate the new government at Muscat, and to acknowledge Sayyid
Turki s authority in Muscat and its territory, in order to make their formal relationship
with the country stronger than previously. However, this decision was not fully
adopted by all officials at Bombay, where Mr. Tucker, a member of the Bombay
Council, was opposed to Pelly's policy towards Muscat affairs. The matter which
troubled him was the attitude of Pelly and Major Way towards the position of al-
Khalili; the two officials had witnessed and signed a bilateral agreement for the safety
of Shaikh al-Khalili, while Sayyid Turki had as already mentioned, refused to respect
this when he imprisoned the shaikh and his son. Accordingly Tucker requested the
Government of Bombay to delay this recognition, until the matter could be sorted out.
Tucker doubted the explanations given for the death of al-Khalili and his son. He also
considered the events which had taken place in Oman and the mediation of Colonel
Pelly in the dispute between Sayyid Turki and Shaikh al-Khalili, to be prejudiced in
favour of Sayyid Turki, and asked that his role in this matter should cease instead of
giving it his approval.135
However, the opinion of Mr. Tucker was not given precedence, and the
Government of Bombay approved Colonel Pelly1 s policy, and even described his
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achievement as prompt but cautious and prudent. The Governor of Bombay, Sir
William Fitzgerald, had himself received the news of Sayyid Azzan's overthrow with
great satisfaction, and agreed that Sayyid Turki should be quickly recognised as the
Sultan of Oman.136 As for the views which had been expressed by the Foreign
Secretary, C. U. Aitchison, and the Government of Bombay as a whole when the
news of 'Azzans overthrow had reached him, he pointed out that the British
protectorate in the Persian Gulf could not be applied to the Gulf of Oman and that the
war in that sea was no longer of any concern to the British, and no more affected
British trade or the interests of their people than the war in the Pacific Ocean. He also
mentioned that a war which had forced the British inhabitants at Muscat to leave the
town was far more painful. Furthermore, the Government of Bombay had no
intention at this point of interfering in the affairs of Muscat, and that the situation in the
Gulf of Oman for the time being, was disadvantageous and absolutely hazardous, and
the best thing for them was to evacuate.13 7
In this connection some members of the Viceroy's Council, like B. H. Ellis
and Sir Richard Temple, did not agree to any distinction between British policy in the
Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman.138 On 3 April 1871, B. H. Ellis made it clear in
his minute to the Secretary of State that the British policy in respect of Muscat and its
position in the sea of Oman required very careful consideration. In fact British
interests in keeping the maritime peace intact had led the British to exceed their
legitimate duty, by going beyond these waters, not because the British had a direct
interest in the dynastic affairs of Muscat but because it was in their interest for it to be
considered as a separate issue from Muscat affairs, and they hesitated to recognise any
one who had taken the power in the country. Accordingly the British authorities had
to maintain their position and be obliged to prevent the maritime peace from being
breached in any way. The separation between the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman
was impossible since the interests of Muscat were closely attached to those of the
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British Indian Ports, as well as with those of the Persian Gulf.139 Sir Richard Temple
also wrote a minute on the same issue, which was entirely in accordance with all the
points made by Mr. Ellis, and stated that in addition any requirement for British
intervention in Muscat's affairs for keeping peace in these waters should apply to
protect British interests in the region.140
If Sayyid Turki were able to establish his position as Sultan of Muscat, and he
were to demonstrate a desire for the official recognition of the British Government, he
should show his determination to recover by force of arms the rest of the Muscat
territories. Accordingly, the Government of Bombay by now was ready to inform
Sayyid Turki that he was entirely at liberty to act in this regard and that they were
prepared for the fact that if he managed to do so, there would be no longer any
necessity for maintaining the prohibition of naval operations either inside or outside
the Persian Gulf. At the same time, he had to accept that the British Government
should not become involved further in Muscat affairs in regard to supporting his
attempts to recover the rest of the country by force. The recommended interference in
the Sayyid's affairs should be only by friendly offers to help him to settle such
disputes peacefully.141 This way means the British responsibility for the preservation
of maritime peacewould be on a line of coast extending from Karachi to the northern
limits of the Mozambique channel.142
At this point Sayyid Turki was faced with a very urgent issue, the Sohar
inhabitants who opposed his rule and supported Sayyid Ibrahim b. Qais, who was
now in Sohar. Sayyid Turki was urged by Major Way to take prompt action against
the resistance of Sohar, and permitted him to send a deputy and fifty armed men by
sea, because the submission of Sohar to Sayyid's authority would bring an early
settlement in the country which was so desirable for the State and for trade. This
action was approved by the Government of India, which had confirmed the liberty of
the Sayyid to send reinforcements and ammunitions to fortify the town.143 On 3rd
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May 1871, Colonel Pelly reported from Bushire on the death of Major Way, which
had occurred accidentally due to the discharge of a gun which he had picked up in the
morning of the 1st May. His death caused deep sorrow to Sayyid Turki. Sayyid
Turki's government was represented at the funeral by the Wali of Muscat, and a
general mourning was ordered in Muscat itself.144 This enhanced Sayyid Turki's
standing with the Government of India. His action was sufficient to persuade the
British to hasten their recognition of him as Sultan of Oman. On 8th May 1871, Major
(later Colonel) Edward Ross occupied the vacant position as the new Political Agent at
Muscat, and remained in this post till 14 December 1872.145
As the result of the recent troubles in Oman the news reports of 22nd April
1871 gave a clear indication of the general situation in the country, which suited
British interests.146
1. Muscat was under the rule of Sayyid Turki b. Sa'id, and seemed to be very
quiet.
2. Sohar was still beyond his reach and under the power of Sayyid Ibrahim b.
Qais, and al-Rustaq was in the control of Sayyid Faisal b. Hamud, Ibrahim's cousin,
who had lately handed over the authority over the town to Sayyid Ibrahim.
3. Shaikh Salih b. 'Ali al-Harthi was at Samad preparing for an alliance with
Ibrahim against Sayyid Turki .
4. All properties which Sayyid 'Azzan's Government had taken had been
returned to their proper owners.
5. Trade was booming in the port, while small-pox had spread in Muscat.
6. Sayyid Turki was planning to march against Sohar, and the Ghafiri tribes
were planning to meet him to emphasise their allegiance to his authority.
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7. The merchants of Muscat had approved of Sayyid Turki s presence, and
expressed their feeling by supplying funds of about $MT 5,000 to his Government.
Given these circumstances, the situation in Muscat was bound to be in favour
of Sayyid Turkis recognition by the British. The Governor-General in Council,
Mayo Richard, wrote to the Secretary of State for India, George D. Argyll, informing
him of his intention to recognise Sayyid Turki as the Sultan of Muscat, and confirming
Sayyid Turki s ability to be the Sultan, as he had already started strengthening his
position at Muscat.147 Captain E. C. Ross, the new Political Agent at Muscat, had
reported from Muscat two weeks after his arrival there that the whole country was
now on the verge of accepting Sayyid Turki as Sultan, this even though Sayyid
Ibrahim held Sohar and some parts of the Batinah coast, and was ready to revolt
against Sayyid Turki, and the tribes of Oman were now divided into two parties for a
fight, while the troops of Wahhabis, who had come from the northern Nejd led by
Mahboob bin Jauher, had seized the Buraimi oasis in favour of the Amir Sa'ud b.
Faisal.148
By the end of May 1871, Ross telegraphed the Bombay Government, asking
them for urgent recognition of Sayyid Turki as Sultan of Muscat. The
recommendation was promptly accepted by the Governor of Bombay, Sir William
Fitzgerald, who passed his endorsement to the Viceroy, Richard Mayo, who soon
communicated the situation to London, asking for permission to acknowledge the
status of Sayyid Turki.149 On 4th June 1871, the Viceroy also telegraphed to the
Secretary of State that he intended to recognise Sayyid Turki as the Sultan of Muscat,
and enquiring about his attitude towards this issue.150
As we have already seen, the Secretary of State entirely concurred with the
Political Resident Lewis Pelly's view on the issue of the British recognition of Sayyid
Turki b. Said. However, Colonel Pelly had unofficially already recognised him as the
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Sultan of the State. In answer to Pelly's communication with the Government of
Bombay the Secretary of State sent the Resident a demi-official note regarding the
matter of the request of the Governor of Bombay, which reached him through the
Political Agent at Muscat, Major Ross, on 11th May 1871. Ross also supplied him
with the latest news of Muscat, in which he mentioned that Muscat seemed to be well
under the authority of Sayyid Turki, and there were no more troubles or rivalries to be
reported from there as yet. If the Government of Bombay were to recognise Sayyid
Turki, this move would lead to stability in Muscat and strengthen his position against
any disturbances throughout the country. However, the non-recognition of Sayyid by
the British was invested with considerable meaning by the tribes of Oman.
Accordingly, Sayyid Turki himself was encouraged to send his deputation to the
Government of Bombay to request his recognition, but he was advised by the Political
Agent at Muscat not to do so, and to wait for the solution of this matter, which
fortunately was progressing in his favour.151 The Secretary of State agreed with the
suggestion of recognition, and he sent his consent to the Government of India in a
telegram dated 9th June 1871.152 In news reports forwarded by the Government of
Bombay on 6th June 1871, it was confirmed that Sayyid Turki had marched against
Sohar to free the town from Ibrahim's domination although in fact Sayyid had attacked
Sohar by sea. However, resistance from Ibrahim had driven him out and the town
remained beyond his reach. In fact while he headed to the north for the purpose of
possessing the Batinah coast, but his operation was postponed and he returned to
Muscat on 22nd May 1871.153 Major Ross believed that on receipt of recognition of
Sayyid Turki by the British authorities the tribes of Oman would immediately grant
him both moral and armed support.
On 6th June 1871, Edward Ross was instructed by the Political Resident in the
Persian Gulf, Colonel Pelly, to inform Sayyid Turki that the Viceroy and the
Governor-General of India had recognised him as the Sultan of the country. The
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British requested the continuation of the same friendly relationship which had existed
in the days of his father Sayyid Sa'id bin Sultan, and the Government of India had
come to the conclusion that the old amicable relations with Oman would certainly
develop favourably under his lordship, and peace and prosperity should be restored to
the country. His Excellency the Viceroy had ordered the Lynx to go to Muscat, and
instructed herCommander to arrange with the Political Agent in Muscat for a salute to
be fired in honour of Sayyid Turki.154 Sayyid Turki did not received that recognition
at that time, as he was on anothermission on the Batinah coast.
Sayyid Turki was now recognised by the British Government as Sultan of
Muscat and its dominions.155 During the following years, his power was challenged
by various conflicts, which required strong and effective action to bring the whole
situation under his control. The main challenges to his power had come from his
nephew, the ex-Sultan Sayyid Salim b. Thuwaini, Shaikh Salih b. 'Ali al-Harthi and
his cousin Sayyid Ibrahim b. Qais. However, the most serious challenge to his future
sovereignty was to be from his younger brother Sayyid ' Abd al-'Aziz bin Sa'id, who
came to be considered an on-going problem to him throughout his own time in power,
and most of his son Sayyid Faisal's reign.
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Sayyid Turki's successes and British support
4.1. Sultan Turki's Character
Sayyid Turki b. Sa'id b Sultan, b. Ahmed Ai Bu Sa'idi is considered one of the
paramount figures in the modern history of Oman. Sayyid Turki was the person who
restored the true line of Sayyid Sa'id bin Sultan in the Al Bu Sa'id Dynasty, after it
was lost for nearly three years during the period of Sayyid ' Azzan b. Qais. Sayyid
Turki was the first one to confine the dynasty's marriage to the Ad Bu Sa id family.
Accordingly, on 6th August 1881, Sayyid Faisal b. Turki, the second son of the
Sultan Turki, married his cousin Sayyidah Aleyyah, the daughter of Sayyid Thuwaini
b. Sa'id.1
Sayyid Turki, was in prison many times during his lifetime, during which he
was encouraged to capture power in Oman after the death of his father Sayyid Sa'id
bin Sultan the Great. As a result of his activities Sayyid Turki suffered a great deal
and experienced much hardship in his early political life. He was imprisoned three
times as a result of his attempts to rule the country. The first time was during his
brother Sayyid Thuwaini b. Sa'id s reign when he was his Wali for Sohar; this
position gave him strong support among the surrounding tribes, which persuaded him
to claim the independence of Sohar and its dominions on the Batinah coast. However,
Sultan Sayyid Thuwaini, as we have already seen in the earlier discussion, considered
this a revolt against his authority, if not an attempt to overthrow him and seize the
country from him.
The second time was later during Sayyid Thuwaini1 s reign when the Sultan
was preparing to invade Zanzibar; Sayyid Turki took this as a favourable opportunity
to move with the support of the Sohar people against Muscat and to replace his brother
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in power while the latter was away from Muscat. This move ended in failure almost
immediately and led him to being imprisoned. The third time was when his nephew
Sayyid Salim b. Thuwaini murdered his father in Sohar. Sayyid Turki, who had had
amicable relations with his older brother, had been prepared in Sohar for an operation
for him against the Wahhabis. He was sent to jail for the third time, followed by an
exile to Bombay.
However, after all this long period of struggle for the possession of power in
Oman, Sayyid Turki eventually succeeded, when in June 1871, the British authorities
in both London and India officially recognised him as Sultan of Oman, and admitted
his sovereignty over the whole country and its people.
When Sayyid became the official ruler of the State, he was only 30 years of
age. He was amild and liberal character with a diplomatic manner. He was patient in
the face of difficulty, religious, serious, dignified, and unassuming.2 He showed
great respect to the people of the country, even those who opposed with him, hated
disturbances to the peace in Oman and worked hard to bring peace to his society
whatever the cost. All these qualifications earned him great popularity inside and
outside his country over the years.
The Sultan's impeccable manner and character were confirmed in many
descriptions submitted by travellers who visited the country during his rule. Geary,
the editor of the Times of India who visited Muscat in March 1878 and met the Sultan
in his palace, described him as the maintainer or the representative in his life of the
simplicity of the Sultans. He said:
"...When they entered the palace they met with six Arabs there, one
of the simplest of these was the Sultan Sayyid Turki b. Said, who
was unlike the rest, had no turban, wore a small white Skull-Cap and
was very plainly dressed. He communicated with his guests very
politely, and the Sultan was about 36 years old..." 3
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Denis de Rivoyer, who visited Muscat in 1880, also gave the impression in
Obock Mascate Bouchire (Paris, 1883) that Sultan Turki was a very respectful
person, who was interested in meeting people on an official level, but away from the
formality of his lifestyle. He tried to live a normal life, and at the same time he did not
ignore or neglect his personal safety. He maintained the state in good order and it was
his ambition to establish peace all over the country.4 He reorganised his army and
made strengthened himself against all aggression. Under his authority the country
prospered and Muscat grew considerably as a trading city.5
The British Political Residents in the Persian Gulf, Lt. Colonel Pelly and later
Lt. Colonel Ross, were in agreement that Sultan Turki's reign embodied the central
element of stability which the country needed. Ross, in one of his letters to the British
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf when he was the Agent in Muscat, stated that the
country needed a very capable and strong sultan, with the command over considerable
revenues in order to consolidate the unity of the Sultanate and break the animosity of
the shaikhs.6 When Sultan Turki died in June 1888, Ross was the British Political
Resident in the Gulf. They had shared a long acquaintance and he describes the
Sultan1 s death in the following words:
"The death of Sayyid Turki is felt to be a misfortune to Oman; for
although his rule was by no means vigorous, he was well skilled in
managing Arabs, and usually mild and liberal... His well-known
loyalty to the British Government was recognised by H. Majesty's
conferring on his Highness in 1856 the Grand Cross of the State of
India, and at the same time the British Government undertook to
afford him active support during his lifetime in case of insurrections
and attack on Muscat. This announcement ensured the maintenance
of peace at Muscat so long as Sayyid Turki should continue the reign
and makes his loss the more felt. During his later years Sayyid Turki
suffered much from ill-health and his sufferings, impairing his mind
and judgement, rendered him prone to superstition, and the painful
suspicions arising therefrom embittered his last days".7
Though Sayyid Turki did not have enough support to deal with the troubles at
the commencement of his reign, he was a mild and liberal-minded ruler, and he
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understood how to deal with the Arab tribal Shaikhs who were under his influence.8
He built a firm relationship throughout his reign with the British, who always
supported him against unprovoked aggression. His close relations with the British
helped them to be more effective and influential in the affairs of Oman, while the
Sultan considered their influence to be a step towards the protection of his position in
power, helped by their support for him in crucial times.
Whatever the British authority1 s attitude towards his sovereignty, Sultan Turki
remained in a position in which he served his own interests in the country's internal
affairs, without any actual British intervention. In fact the Sultan's health problems at
the beginning of his rule affected his attitude to his people and the country, and he
preferred temporary retirement and left the State under the control of his younger
brother, Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz bin Sa'id. In the period from 1871-1875, the Sultan's
weakness was reflected inmany areas of his life, especially the political side when he
became feeble and too weak to rule the country. Under the above circumstances he left
for Gwader, which was one of his provinces on the Persian Coast, but when he felt
that his brother was planning to overthrow him permanently he promptly left Gwader
for Oman to deal with the issue.
4.2. Sayyid Turki and the Zanzibar Subsidy
Although the British supported his authority and they approved of him as leader of the
country, he gained no effective support from them in his early moves against his
opponents. Sayyid Turki was continually troubled by the threats to his position,
especially during the first period of his rule. The general situation in the country was
precarious. Sayyid Ibrahim b. Qais was holding Sohar with a large part of the Batinah
coast, stretching from al-Masnaah north of Muscat to Shinas, 284 kilometres further
north, and he was awaiting a suitable opportunity to launch his attack against Muscat.
Consequently, Sultan Turki's first objective was to establish his control over the
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Batinah coast. It is clear that a shortage of funds played a major part in preventing the
Sultan from accomplishing this task at once. This situation was relieved somewhat
when in July 1872 he wrote to his brother in Zanzibar, Sayyid Barghash b. Sa'id,
claiming payment of the Zanzibar subsidy under threat of invasion: Sayyid Barghash
was induced by the British to pay the Sultan of Muscat a certain amount, but he sent
him only $MT. 5,000 9
Sayyid Turki considered that unification between Muscat and Zanzibar still
remained a possibility, but whatever the situation this project could not and would not
happen without British approval, which was by no means certain. The acquiescence
of Sayyid Barghash to the British demands on slave trading allowed Sayyid Barghash
to have their recognition of his power in Zanzibar as Sultan in August 1871, and
demolished Sultan Turki's hope of having Zanzibar under his authority.10
Accordingly, all succession threats from Muscat to Zanzibar were set aside
permanently from that point onwards. It was the British Government's determination
not to immediately accept Sultan Turki's attempts to simultaneously become the ruler
of Oman and to take steps for the unification between Muscat and Zanzibar.11 Despite
even his political position, Sultan Turki was unable, through lack of forces or funds,
to turn the fleet to Zanzibar's Isle from Oman into reality. Sayyid Barghash soon
realised that he must have a good understanding with the British, as his brother Sayyid
Majid had done before, to hold his own in East Africa.12 But since the payment of the
subsidy to Muscat had been approved by Barghash, relations between the two
brothers had improved enormously, even though the Zanzibar subsidy, from April
1873, was paid by the Government of India and then later paid from London.
During the time of Sir Bartle Frere's visit to Muscat for the discussion of the
Slave Trade Treatywith Oman the British authorities refused to pay the subsidy unless
Sayyid Turki signed the Treaty with the British Government prohibiting the traffic in
slaves. The Treaty was submitted and the award of the subsidy was confirmed by the
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British Government, by authorising the Muscat Government to draw $MT 40,000
immediately and $MT 20,000 three months later from the Treasury of the British
MuscatAgency.13 As the great obstacle to the consolidation of Sultan Turki's power
and the building of a peaceful administration in Oman was his need of money, the
Government of India was determined to guarantee him the payment of the subsidy
with arrears from the date he took power in Muscat, and they confirmed to him that, as
long as he remained on good terms and respected all the agreements with them, the
subsidy of $MT 40,000 would be paid to him every year during his time in power.14
The payment of this subsidy was made regularly and after the Sultan1 s death in June
1888, it continued to be paid to his son and successor Sayyid Faisal without any real
delay on the bases of understanding and the former friendship with which it was paid
to Sultan Turki.15 It is worth noting that, the financial difficulties which held Sayyid
Turki in Muscat and prevented a major strike against his rivals in the country also
affected these rivals, preventing them from undertaking any large-scale operations
against Muscat for some time.
The continuation of the Zanzibar subsidy was really the major point which
helped the Sultan to impose stability and peace in the country, and sustained the
Government of Muscat. When Sir Bartle Frere had contacted the Viceroy and the
Governor-General of India with regard to this question, he confirmed that any delay or
interruption in the payment of this income would seriously damage the peace in Oman
on the one hand, and on the other hand, it would decrease British power to protect
Zanzibar and their trade against the effects of slavers and their illegal trade, a trade that
British Indian subjects were very involved in.16 In fact the British authorities in
Zanzibar had full power to prevent any illegal action being taken by traders or even the
Government of Zanzibar itself. But the main issue for the Government of India was to
influence Sultan Turki's power, and he saw no harm in accepting this policy as long
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as he enjoyed the control of his country s affairs without real British interference in the
day-to-day affairs of his Government.
Notwithstanding these considerations, Sultan Turki did not wait until the
solution of the financial affairs, but he started very soon to prepare for his move
against Sayyid Ibrahim b. Qais, in order to regain Muscat control over the Batinah
coast. In his subsequent campaign Sultan Turki was exposed to an invasion by the ex-
Sultan, Sayyid Salimb. Thuwaini.
4.3. The Sultan's Campaign against Ibrahim
4.3.1. Sayyid Turki's action against Sohar
When Sayyid Turki became the ruler of Oman, Muscat, Matrah and Sur fell under his
power at once, and many other places in the interior of Oman accepted his authority as
well. Sayyid Ibrahim b. Qais was in Sohar, where he had managed to impose his
authority upon the Batinah coast between Shinas and al-Masna'ah. Ai-Rustaq was
under the control of his cousin Sayyid Faisal b. Hamud; al-Buraimi Fort had been re-
occupied by aWahhabi force.17 But the most serious problem for the Sultan was the
appearance of his nephew the ex-Sultan Sayyid Salim b. Thuwaini, who had been
living in exile atQishm.18
On 10th July 1871, Lt. Colonel Ross, the British Political Resident in the
Persian Gulf, reported that the Sultan had resumed his operations against the Batinah
coast, and against Ibrahim in particular. At this time the British authorities in Muscat
had no gun-boat in the harbour to protect their subjects from any hostilities by the
Sultan's opponent. The Lynx had left Muscat on 30th July 1871, and the Bullfinch,
which had been instructed to take its place, had not yet arrived in Muscat.19
The recovery of Sohar seemed to be the first task for the Sultan. At this stage
the Sultan had already launched two unsuccessful attacks on Sohar, one in May and
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anothers in June 1871. On 6th August he sailed on board his steamer al-Rahmani for
the port of Sohar to take possession of this port, but this mission ended in failure as
well. The Sultan then extended his operations towards Shinas, and succeeded in
taking it from Sayyid Ibrahim and bringing it under his authority.20 Liwa was the
second target of this operation, where the Shaikh of Bani Yaas tribe and Dubai,
Maktum b. Rashid, landed with 70 of his men just outside the town, acting in concert
with the Sultan's troops.21 The fort of the town was held for Ibrahim b. Qais by the
Wali Mohammed b. Said al-Hinai who was at this time in Sohar with Ibrahim, but
when he heard about the Sultan1 s expedition against Liwa he soon sailed towards the
fort of Liwa accompanied by forty men from Sohar. As soon as he arrived there, he
found thatmost of the town had been captured by the Sultan's force, and entered into
a battle with them. He was killed in the operation and his men were defeated, and the
town became the Sultan's possession.22 The operation also succeeded against many
other towns on the coast, like al-Masan'ah, al-Suwaiq, and aLKhaburah which also
became the Sultan1 s possessions.23
Sultan Turki then decided to attack Sohar again, and this time managed to
seize it. A breach was made in the wall of the town and some of the Sultan's troops
quickly entered, and a compromise was proposed by the Sultan. Under this settlement
Sayyid Turki agreed to leave the town in the control of Sayyid Ibrahim for the time
being, and added to it the coastline from Shinas southward to al-Khaburah. The
remaining places on the coast, including al-Suwaiq and al-Masna'ah, would remain in
the possession of the Sultan.24 In accordance with this agreement, the Political Agent
at Muscat reported the matter to the British Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,
ColonelPelly, who on 8th August 1871 informed the Government of Bombay about
the new situation in Oman. However, Pelly felt that this agreement was not
completely in favour of the Sultan, and his comment on it was as follows:
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" If this a final arrangement, and Ibrahim holds that strong fortress as
an independent command, I cannot think the Sultanate advantageous
for His Highness1 interests as ruler of Oman" 25
The Sultan was unhappy with the provisions of the settlement as well, when
he admitted Ibrahim's right to rule some part of Oman, and also agreed to partition
Oman with his rival. In fact this settlement did not last long, and the Sultan took it as
a transitional stage before the next struggle. He also accepted this agreement because
he was looking for peace and stability for his dominions. Another factor which
caused the Sultan to enter into this contract was that he had not yet been told about his
official recognition by the British Government, which he discovered only on 8th
August 1871, after his return from the Batinah coast. However, the Sultan could see
that the situation would never be settled by this understanding, as long as Sayyid
Ibrahim ruled Sohar independently.
4.3.2. Ibrahim's and Salim's alliance against Sayyid Turki
The disturbances between the two men continued, and the compromise out
lined above failed to bring the disorder in the country to an end. Sohar was the most
important issue in the Sultan's policy for the next period. His next most important
concern was to give the British his loyal cooperation. This benefited Sayyid Turki by
providing a suitable and convenient way for him to prevent hostilities on the one hand,
benefited the British who were looking for peace in Oman in order to protect their
subjects and interests in a country which had many conflicting parties seeking control.
The British felt that securing trade in the region would benefit the British Indian
traders in Muscat, as well as those who resided in other ports on Omani soil.
In fact the idea of the partition of Muscat's territories between two rivals was
not new; but when the British interfered through Lord Canning's Arbitration, the
separation of Sohar from Muscat was not considered advisable. At this time the
Sultan communicated with the British Political Resident in the Persian Gulf with
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regard to his position in the Musandam district, saying that he intended to send a
vessel to Khasab to confirm his authority there.26 Pelly accordingly discussed the
issue with the Government of Bombay by sending them a telegram on 15th September
1871.2 7 The Government of India sent their reply on 22nd of the same month with
their approval, allowing Musandam to be Muscat territory, so long as the maritime
boundary was accepted as five kilometres from shore, for the purposes of maritime
peace.28 By now hostilities between Sultan Turki and Ibrahim b. Qais were
threatening, and the Political Agent, MajorRoss, informed the Political Resident about
the new situation in Oman. The Resident was soon instructed by the Government of
Bombay to proceed to Muscat, with an authorisation to use his authority to prevent the
renewal of hostilities.29 The gun-boat Lynx was also instructed to move towards
Muscat to support Pelly's appearance there.3 0 The reason for the British activities was
that they felt that their interests would be threatened if they did not respond promptly.
Sayyid Turki knew exactly what the intention of Sayyid Ibrahim was, namely
that as soon as he was in a position to attack Muscat and overthrow him, he would not
hesitate to do so. Sayyid Turki himself was preparing for this
In December 1871, Sultan Turki proceeded on board his steamer ai-Rahmani
to al-Khaburah, which had been returned to the Sultan s authority by the al-
Hawasinah tribe there.31 On December 31st 1871 the Sultan moved troops against
Sohar under the command of Badr b. Saif (the son of Saif b. Sulayman, who had
captured Muscat in February 1871 for him during the war against Sayyid 'Azzan b.
Qais) who now surprised Sayyid Ibrahim near Sohar. But his force was defeated with
a loss of 30 lives and 200 prisoners. The Sultan recaptured al-Khaburah fort again on
2nd January 1872, and a new garrison was installed for the security of the town.32
The Sultan despatched a force under the Wali Thuwaini b. Mohammed to reinforce his
position on the Batinah coast in general, and in this town in particular. With regard to
this events, the British Political Resident in the Persian Gulf and the Agent in Muscat,
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Major Ross, were agreed that this action was an internal affair entirely and they should
not interfere unless British subjects or interests were exposed to major danger. On 5th
January the Political Agent wrote to the Resident in the Gulf about the new attempt
which had been made by Sayyid Ibrahim to re-establish himself in al-Khaburah's
affairs.33 Immediately, Ibrahim retreated to Sohar where he stayed watching for the
possibility of launching a new attack against the Sultan's territories on the coast.
Clearly the previous agreement between Sayyid Turki and Ibrahim was insufficient to
prevent the two men from fighting, and the differences between them remained active
and strong enough to cause further hostilities.
The Sultan of Muscat's troubles caused him anxiety and insecurity. While he
was concentrating his activities against Sayyid Ibrahim b. Qais, the ex-Sultan Salim b.
Thuwaini suddenly appeared in Sohar with the intention of establishing an alliance
with Ibrahim to rise in opposition to Sultan Turki. On this occasion Major Ross
communicated with the British Political Resident in the Persian Gulf at Bushire by
telegram on 21st February 1872, informing him of the arrival of Sayyid Salim and his
plot with Ibrahim. Salim was thinking of making a start from Sur, and while the
Sultanwas expected to sail to Sur, Sultan Turki left for Gwader but did not stay for
long.34 On 24th of the same month, the Agent sent a telegram to Bushire again,
confirming that Salim had already landed at Sur, saying that the Muscat Government
was disturbed by this movement and appealing for action against him by the British
authorities in the Gulf.35
Lieutenant Colonel Pelly, in his correspondence with the Government of
Bombay, had spoken of the embarrassing condition of the Sultan's finances, the
intrigues of Sayyid Salim, and the movements of Sayyid Ibrahim b. Qais to the al-
Batinah coast in order to confirm his authority in Sohar and its district.36 He
expressed his opinion that it was the British authorities' responsibility to offer all
lawful protection to the British Indian subjects in Oman. He also mentioned that, as
142
the Sultan was recognised as the ruler of Muscat and its dominions, the British
Government of India would ultimately expect from him that their subjects within
Muscat territories should be treated in conformity with the law, and if any damage to
their right or property took place, reparation would be required.3 7
As soon as the news of Salim s attempt reached the Sultan, he proceeded
towards Sur on 19th February 1872, on board his vessel al-Rahmanl After heading
along the coast southward to Muscat he landed at Sur on the 23rd February.38 The
Sultan's objective was to prevent cooperation between Salim and Ibrahim establishing
a base in this town and gathering the support of the Janabah against him. Sayyid
Salim, who had already landed in Sohar, and had held ameeting with Ibrahim relative
to this question, also managed to make a landing in Qalhat, 20 km north of Sur,
accompanied by his brother Sayyid Hareb b. Thuwaini and a few followers.39
The Political Agent confirmed in a telegram from Muscat to Lt. Colonel Pelly
the arrival of Sayyid Salim at Sur, and that the Sultan was now in Sur to watch his
nephew's actions. Sayyid Salim had escaped to Ja'alan on the Sultan's arrival there,
but no uprising had yet been reported from Ja'alan.40 The Sultan remained in Sur for
nearly a week, and then returned to Muscat on 29th February, leaving the situation
there pacified, while Sayyid Salim was still in Ja'alan.41 The Political Resident in the
Gulf, in his communication with the Government of Bombay, confirmed that the
Sultan had received reliable information that when Sayyid Salim arrived in Sur he was
accompanied by about 100 men, and said that Sayyid Turki was asking for a steamer
in his support. Salim's intention to re-capture power in Oman was associated with an
invitation from the Hinawi tribes, who persuaded him to leave Qishm for Oman as
soon as he could.42 The Government of India, however, were only interested in
seeing the British subjects in those areas safe and protected. Pelly was instructed as
usual not to interfere in the internal quarrels of Oman except in so far as British
interests were threatened. The Sultan's request for sea support from the British was
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not agreed to at this stage. The Sultan was in real difficulties, caused by the shortage
of money, Sayyid Ibrahim's activities on the north coast of Oman, and the dispute
with Shaikh Salih b. ' Ali in al-Sharqiyyah.
The Government of Bombay confirmed their opinion to the Resident with
regard to Sayyid Salim's move, which they thought to have no prospect of success
against Muscat under these circumstances. However, as the ongoing shortage of
money on the part of Sultan Turki continued, the Bombay Government feared there
would be no improvement in the present situation in Oman. The British Resident
Pelly strongly urged the Government of India to offer the necessary money to the
Sultan, as it was to the British Government's advantage to have a strong government
in Oman.43 The Government of India's response towards this matter confirmed for
the British Political Resident that the Governor-General in Council expressed his view
that the arrangement by which Muscat was to receive an annual subsidy of $MT
40,000 from Zanzibar should be continued, and would strongly urge an early decision
to confirm it.44
By now the situation in the Sultan's dominions was troubled by attempts by
Sayyid Salim b. Thuwaini, operating from his base in Ja'alan, to seize Sur, but this
endeavour ended without success.45 However, he remained in a position to take the
field against the Sultan on the south coast of Oman.46 The trouble in the north was
created by Sayyid Ibrahim as he was planning to regain Liwa. The Sultan had written
on this subject to the British Political Agent, Major Ross, that Sayyid Ibrahim would
attempt to attack Liwa by sea and had already sent a gun in one of his dhows from
Sohar to the town, which was considered to be the Sultan's possession. The Sultan
requested the Political Agent to preventhim from launching an attack against it by sea,
and mentioned to the Agent that this taskmust be regarded as going against the British
authorities1 desires in the region, which were concerned with protecting the maritime
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peace.47 Sayyid Turki gave the Agent a clear indication that he would not accept
British non-intervention under these circumstances
Notwithstanding, on 8th February 1872, an Official News Report by the
British Political Agent from Muscat stated that, during the last two weeks of February,
before these troubles began, calmness and tranquillity had existed in all provinces of
Oman.48 The Muscat Custom House had changed hands, and the Sultan was also
trying to establish a good understanding with his brother in Zanzibar, Sayyid
Barghash, by sending him an envoy with a present of horses, in order to urge him to
pay the subsidy since he was in financial trouble.4 9
4.3.3. The British involvement in the dispute
Sayyid Ibrahim's activities were interrupted by the actions of the Sultan, who
complained to the British Political Agent in Muscat about Ibrahim's behaviour in using
the sea to attack his possession in Liwa. Sayyid Ibrahim b. Qais communicated with
the Political Agent in Muscat regarding this issue, when he wrote to him on 30th April
1872, saying that his envoys, Shaikhs Khamis b. Sulayman and Rashid b. Humaid
interviewed the Political Resident, Colonel Pelly, regarding the resolution of the
situation by the interference of the Government of India. They expressed their feeling
that the prohibition of hostilities by sea and of the transmission of armaments by sea
should be applied equally to the Sultan's marine operations and that they would not
accept it being against them alone.50 In fact the British Government supported the
Sultan s claims upon the Batinah coast, as they considered him the recognised ruler of
the country while Ibrahim remained to them a dissident. The Sultan himself
considered the main objective for him was the control of the coast, and he had been
effective in achieving this goal. To achieve this task he was prepared to spend most of
his Zanzibar subsidy to purchase the loyalty of the tribal leaders on the one hand, and
on the other hand, to force his opponents to comply with his authority, using the
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fortifications of his possessions on the coast and strengthening the power of his
garrisons as well. As a result of his actions the Sultan would undoubtedly face a
united front from his enemies in future.
Pelly was now instructed by the Government of Bombay to proceed to
Muscat. Soon after his arrival he sent his report on 13th April giving a statement of
the various parties' attitude in the country. He indicated that Sayyid Salim was
operating in Bediyyah, Shaikh Salih b. 'Ali was planning and waiting for his
opportunity in Ibra 178 km. south west of Muscat, Sayyid Ibrahim operating near
Sohar, and the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi had seized al-Buraimi. The Sultan was holding
Muscat and its territories and Sur, with some part of the country around, with a force
of about 3,000 to 4,000 men, chiefly Ghafiris.51 Pelly wanted to proceed towards
Sohar in response to the violation of the rights of the British subjects in Sohar by
Ibrahim b. Qais, in accordance with the order of the Government of Bombay. By this
time Ibrahim was away from Sohar, but the Resident took evidence from the British
subjects as to their losses, then he warned the inhabitants to leave within 24 hours and
threatened bombardment if the demands for redress were not satisfied within that
time.52 Sultan Turki was now on an expedition in the interior of Oman against the
Bani Ruwahah tribe for the murder of Muhammed b. Sa'id, a chief of the A1 Bu Sa'id
there. This had been in revenge for the Sultan's action regarding the imprisonment
and death of Shaikh Sa'id b. Khalfan al-Khalili.53
Colonel Pelly was furious at Ibrahim's action in plundering a craft belonging
to British traders and imprisoning three of the traders. Sultan Turki was not yet able
to impose his power over Ibrahim, or to control the situation successfully, but these
claims, amounting to $MT 2,255, were subsequently paid by Sayyid Ibrahim b.
Qais.54 Sayyid Ibrahim was unable to pay the whole amount at once, but paid only
half, and promised to pay the remaining half. He accepted this solution in a written
reply, and promised good conduct for the future.55 Colonel Lewis Pelly had
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communicated with the Government of Bombay regarding the action he had taken in a
letter dated 6th May 1872. He stated that in the event of Sayyid Ibrahim s refusal to
surrender the town to the Sultan s power his intention immediately after receiving the
instructions of the Bombay Government had been to bombard Sohar.56 In the reply
of the Indian Government to the action of the Resident, there was total agreementwith
his proceeding to Sohar and his action in commanding redress for the violation of the
rights of the British subjects by Sayyid Ibrahim b. Qais.57
Sultan Turki by now had been seen to use an approach dependent on British
support for the settlement of his disputes. He was in a position to lean on the
assistance of the Government of India to cover some of his difficulties. The Sultan
was at this stage in favour of British assistance which would undoubtedly provide him
with a combination ofmilitary support against his enemies in a time of emergency, and
of course support the regular payment of the Zanzibar subsidy. The Sultan had come
to the conclusion that if the British were on his side, many of his difficulties would be
sorted out with only a warning from them.
When Sayyid Salim b. Thuwaini wrote to the Political Agent in Muscat, Major
Ross, about his intention of advancing either against Muscat or Sur, the Agent
instructed him to remain at Ja'alan, and that any attack against the Sultan s
possessions would not be approved. At this time the Sultan was in desperate need of
support from the British authorities in Muscat. Ibrahim b. Qais had taken Shinas and
was besieging Liwa, but the former action persuaded the Sultan to send his
commander Badr b. Saif, who defeated Ibrahim's troops and regained the towns of
Shinas and Majees.58 Ibrahim then escaped to Sohar.
Consequently, it became a feature of cooperation between the British and the
Sultan of Oman that the British authorities in the Gulf instructed the Royal Navy to
have a man-of-war continuously at anchor off the Muscat coast, to ensure that no
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attack againstMuscat would be permitted at any time under any circumstances. In fact
such proceedings would undoubtedly have involved them directly in the affairs of
Oman for the protection of their interests in Oman and the possible commercial
consequences. There was a large increase in the amount of British trade and the
development of the economic activities within the Gulf during the period 1862 to
1872. Most of the profits were accumulated by the British and certain other
Europeans as well as their agents, and resident Indian merchants. Estimated long¬
distance commerce in the Persian Gulf was worth roughly £5,000,000 during the year
1866, and there was a sharp increase in Gulf trade during the following years.59 For
instance, the period 1872 to 1876 witnessed a decided increase in the trade between
Muscat and India, and the total increase of exports in 1876 ran to $MT 281,050 with
imports reaching $MT 209,765.60 However, the fact remained that the British
authorities in the Gulf had been strictly instructed not to become involved in any action
inMuscat affairs and to keep the peace undisturbed. However, the protection of their
interests and the safety of their subjects had become their top priority in the country.
4.4. The British attempt to pacify the situation in Oman
Colonel Pelly's telegram to the Government of India on 10th June 1872 informed
them that the Sultan of Muscat earnestly desired some form of British mediation
between himself and Sayyid Salim b. Thuwaini, whose position had deteriorated
gradually because of the desertion of his followers.61 The Sultan recognised that if he
had the British authorities assistance in his claim, he would be in a position in which
he need not fear any threat by any coalition against his sovereignty. However, the
engagement of good understanding between the Sultan and the British Government
had nothing to do with his integrity and independence. This was confirmed for the
Government of India in August 1872 by the Secretary to the Government, who
referred them to the agreement entered into on 10th March 1862 between the British
Government and the French Republic, which bound both parties reciprocally to
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respecttheindependen.ee of the sultanates of Muscat and Zanzibar.62 On 21st August
1872 the British Resident in the Persian Gulf received a report from the British
Political Agent in Muscat in which he stated that, during the time of Sayyid Salim s
presence in Ja'alan, Shaikh Salih b. 'Ali al-Harthi was supporting Salim in his claims
and urging the Hinawi faction in al-Sharqiyyah to attach themselves to assist him,
using his religious influence upon them.63 Sayyid Salim had already been from in
alliance with Sayyid Ibrahim against the Sultan1 s authority in February 1872 when the
two had agreed to act in cooperation: Sayyid Ibrahim in the north, and Sayyid Salim in
the south.
At this time Shaikh Zaid b. Khalifah, who held the Buraimi oasis for the
Sultan, was in Muscat to renew friendly relations and to mediate in the dispute
between Salim and the Sultan. Shaikh Zaid was unsuccessful in his offer of mediation
in the dispute, which involved the Hinawi tribes of the region whose ambition was to
rise against the Sultan.64 The Sultan was looking for a positive settlement to his
troubles. The British Resident, Colonel Pelly, who was a regular visitor to Muscat,
was willing to help him overcome all his difficulties, as he believed in his ability to
provide permanent peace and strength in the country. The Sultan remained very
respectful to the Political Agent in Muscat and the Political Resident in the Persian
Gulf, who were both in close contact with him and had a strong relationship with him.
This was the basis for the Sultan feeling he could act with a certain degree of self-
assurance.
The trouble from Ibrahim's side arose again in the month of November 1872,
when he managed to re-occupy al-Khaburah, when the Sultan's position was impaired
by lack of funds. However, Ibrahim himself was in a very bad situation because of
the shortage of money and British support to his opponent, and was too weak to
extend his operation, or even to confirm his position in this town, in which he left a
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small garrison. The town was attacked by the Sultan's troops and was retaken into his
authority.65
The importance of Muscat and Gulf affairs had forced some changes in British
conduct due to the growth of the British interests in the region. On 30th December
1872, the Government of Bombay submitted a proposal to transfer political relations
with the Persian Gulf from the Government of Bombay to the Government of India,
and these was done. In fact the affairs of Muscat remained under the orders of the
Political Residency in the Gulf, but in case of emergency where delay would affect the
public interest, the Muscat Agency could forward correspondence directly to India.
Under these circumstances the Resident should have a copy of the same document
which had been sent to India, and the Agent was obliged to explain to him why he had
done so.66 On the same day, Captain Samuel B. Miles replaced Major Ross in the
position as Muscat Agent.67 Accordingly from now on the Muscat Agency became
the second most important British official position in the Gulf after the Residency at
Bushire. Captain (later Lt. Col.) Miles held the post of Agent longer than any other
representative, and was very effective in his post.68
However, some improvement for the Sultan's position was developing in
Oman before the arrival of Captain Miles at Muscat: Sayyid Salim had found himself
unable to rise against the Sultan1 s authority after his unsuccessful attack on Qurayyat
and Sur in September 1872. He proceeded to Bombay before the close of the year.69
On 4th February 1873 the Government of Bombay confirmed his arrival from Oman,
and reported that his intention was to stay there for only a short time and that the
reason for his visit was not clear. Sayyid Salim's brother Sayyid Hareb remained in
Bediyyah in Oman for some time, and then returned to Qishm.70
By now Sultan Turki had started his operations against Sayyid Ibrahim. In
early February 1873 he moved against Barka, al-Khaburah, and Sohar. This
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campaign ran on for approximately four months, and the Sultan managed by July of
the same year to recover his possessions on the coast.71 At this stage he had been
strengthened by the renewal of the Zanzibar subsidy, and the assistance of the Bani al-
Na'im tribe, who persuaded him to attack Sohar; this proved to be a successful
campaign. On this occasion Sayyid Ibrahim surrendered al- Rustaq a short time after
he had regained it.72 Negotiations between the Sultan and Ibrahim b. Qais were
entered into, which resulted in the surrender of Sohar and the other towns on the
Batinah coast. In this settlement Sayyid Ibrahim received a sum of $MT 5,000 and a
monthly pension of $MT 100 on condition not to move out of the Habbi fort in
Sohar.7 3 That was the most successful achievement for the Sultan in that year. So the
Sultan was now more settled, at least for the time being, and his troubles had abated;
Sayyid Salim was in India, Shaikh Salih b. ' Ali had not yet started his activity against
the Sultan, and Sayyid Ibrahim had become the Sultan's pensioner.
4.5. The Sultan's trouble in Gwader with 'Abd al- 'Aziz and Salim
Sayyid Ibrahim's cooperative attitude and the Sultan's successes were short-lived. On
June 1st 1873 the news reached Muscat that Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz b. Sa'id, the
Sultan1 s brother, and Sayyid Salim had left Bombay separately on Baghlahs for
Mekran in the Persian Gulf.74 In fact at the close of July 1873 Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz
almost succeeded in capturing Gwader.75 The Sultan tried to placate them by offering
an allowance of $MT 300 a month on condition that they refrain from interfering in
Omani affairs; unfortunately the suggestion was declined by both of them, and Sayyid
'Abd al-'Aziz strengthened his operation against Gwader instead. He attacked it
unsuccessfully, but a considerable amount of damage was caused to the property of a
number of the British subjects there.76 Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz, though, had managed to
gather support from some of the Baluchi tribes in the district, and collected a force of
about 500 men. A month later he had been deserted by most of his men, but he
remained for some time on the Mekran Coast preparing himself for an attempt to cross
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over to Muscat.77 At the same time Sayyid Ibrahim had revived his animosity towards
Sultan Turki, because he was enjoying a remarkable upsurge of support among some
of the Omani tribes to recover the Batinah coast main towns. In fact the return of the
tribes1 support for his claims would not be freely available, because the British
authorities in the Gulf and the Government of India were keen to support the Sultan,
as he was becoming a closer ally to them than any one else in the region. The Sultan
was now very important as an extremely sensitive factor to British interests in Oman
and the Persian Gulf, so the British representatives in the Gulf were authorised to take
any suitable action to prevent real hostilities arising against the Sultan's interests.
In the Sultan's communications with the British authorities in the region, he
confirmed that Sayyid Salim had no influence or prestige in Oman after his departure,
and undoubtedly he had difficulties in crossing over to Oman. However, the Sultan
was extremely anxious about his younger brother's activities, since he was more
powerful and dangerous than Salim, and he might cross into the country at any time.
The British Resident, Lt. Colonel Ross, and the Political Agent in Muscat, Captain
Miles, agreed with the Sultan's views.78 At this point the British Political Agent at
Muscat came to the conclusion that such a settlement by the Sultan could not be
accomplished without effective influence on the part of the British. Sayyid Salim and
Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz remained on the Persian Coast moving from one place to
another. Finally the Government of India instructed the Commissioner in Sind, on
14th August 1873, that if these two men were to continue disturbing and violating
Gwader with military attacks, and did not accept the Sultan's offer of a pension, he
was at liberty to imprison them.79 The Government of Bombay were on an alert
following news of the two men on the Persian Coast, and on 1st September 1873,
they sent a telegram to Sir W. Merewether, the Commissioner in Sind replying to his
request for instructions about their activities, as follows:
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"Inform "Abdul 'Aziz and Sayyid Salim of terms arranged with
Toorkee, invite them to accept and come in within ten days, if now
refused termswill not be renewed; if they forcibly threaten Gwader or
attempt to cross to Oman or Persian Gulf arrest them if possible.
Warn them distinctly of this".8 0
However, this threat was not taken seriously by Salim and 'Abd al-'Aziz, and
they refused the orders as they saw little chance in forwarding their activities against
Oman. 'Abd al-'Aziz started his activity against Oman shortly after receiving the
above-mentioned threat, and his actions continued during the month of September
1873, in the hope of getting effective help from inside the country; but his campaign
ended in failure. On 16th September 1873 the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,
Lt. Colonel Ross, confirmed to the Government of India that Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz,
accompanied by eleven armed men, had been captured at sea near Sur by the Political
Agent on board the Rifleman .8l Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz was then imprisoned in
Karachi, under the guard of the British Government. He was promised a payment of
$MT 300 through the British Government, on condition he stayed there and refrained
from interference in the affairs of Oman and did not leave Karachi without
permission.82 He was set at liberty and the allowance was paid to him.
Gwader was again under attack, but this time by Sayyid Salim b. Thuwaini,
who surprised and captured the town fort with about 17 supporters.83 He occupied
the place for about four days, when the Sultan s Wali and his troops managed to
recover their position in Gwader while Salim was suffering from a shortage of money
and a lack of forces. He escaped towards Sahu in the Persian lands, on the Mekran
coast. He stayed there for only few a days before going back to Qishm, where his
brother Hareb had returned to from Oman some time ago.84
His dispute with the Sultan had lasted for some months, and a settlement was
required by Sultan Turki to resolve the situation with him. The Sultan felt that his
own efforts must be concentrated on his problems inside the country, and therefore it
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was an urgent matter to resolve the matter with Sayyid Salim and Sayyid 'Abd al-
' A7i7. By the end of the year 1873, Sayyid Salim had been informed through the
Assistant Political Agent at Gwader that the Sultan intended to offer him the same
allowance that was being paid to Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz, $MT 300, as soon as he gave
up his activities against Oman. Sayyid Salim refused the offer, which he saw as the
frustration of his hope to regain the throne of Oman. Sayyid Salim made his next
attempt on the first day of 1874, crossing over to Oman, heading for either Sur or
Dubai on the Trucial Coast. He opted for Sur, because of the invitation which he had
received from the tribes of Ja'alan who had persuaded him to return to the country.85
Consequently, the refusal of Sayyid Salim of the Sultan's offer led to his capture by
H.M.S. Daphne during his crossing to Sur, and he was sent as a prisoner to
Hyderabad, where he was held until his death in December 1876.86
4.6. The continuation of the Sultan's troubles in 1874
4.6.1. Salih b. 'All's attack on Muscat
At this time the situation in Oman itself was no longer peaceful. Salih b. 'Ali al-
Harthi, the former ally of Sayyid Salim, had prepared to mount an operation to attack
Muscat, which took place in August 1873. The attempt was prevented by the
Nadabiyyin and the Rahbi tribes, who were a Ghafiri faction, near the wadi of al-Aqq
in favour of Sultan Sayyid Turki.87 Salih's b. 'Ali operation was hindered for only
few months, and it resumed on the rumour of the Sultan's death which had been
spread throughout the country in January 1874. Shaikh Salih took advantage of this
opportunity, and proceeded towards Muscat leading a small force, of about 300 men,
determined to occupy Muscat by means of a surprise night attack.8 8 As this operation
took place a long way from the sea, the British authorities in the Agency could do
nothing about this move, which reached Ruwi just a few kilometres from Matrah and
Muscat. Salih b. 'Ali s troops were a combination of al-Sharqiyyah Hinawi
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tribesmen, mainly al-Hirth, al-Habus, al-Hajreyyin, and al-Wahibah, with some of the
Bani Rawaha, who were also a Hinawi faction. He also brought with him Hamad b.
"Azzan, the 12-year-old son of the late Imam (Sayyid 'Azzan b. Qais), to establish him
as ruler of Oman if the move were successful.89
When the news of this raid reached Muscat, the Sultan marshalled his troops,
who were chiefly Wahhabi mercenaries and Baluchis. The Sultan s troops suffered a
serious defeat at the hands of the attackers on 17th January 1874; Salih1 s force took
possession of Matrah quickly, once British support for the Sultan disappeared.90 The
town market was plundered indiscriminately, with a large part of the damage was
inflicted on the British Indian subjects. The Sultan could not fight back for the time
being, and preferred to enter into negotiations with them. Some of the attackers'
leaders, such as Hamud b. Sa id al-Jahhafi and others, also preferred a peaceful
solution to the dispute. The Sultan soon agreed to negotiate the differences with them
through his wali of Sohar, Badr b. Saif A1 Bu Sa'idi.91 Salih b. 'Ali agreed
reluctantly to Badr's suggestion, which succeeded in bringing the rebels to a
settlement, and agreed to send 70 of their men with Badr headed by Hilal b. Sa'id al-
Hajri and Hamud b. Sa'id al-Jahhafi of the al-Wahibah tribe, to meet with Sultan
Turki in Muscat.92
In fact the rest of the rebels, whom they left with Salih b. 'Ali in Matrah, were
preparing for the next attack on Muscat, but this attempt ended with the appearance of
Hamud al-Jahhafi and a new settlement whereby he received $MT 600 and 100 bags
of rice, on condition that he left Muscat and Matrah instantly.93 Sultan Turki was
expecting direct British support against the rebels, which was guaranteed to him in the
event of Muscat being subject to any attack. H. M. S. Nimble eventually arrived in
Muscat on January 22nd 1874, two days after the retreat of the rebels.94 The two
parties both took the agreement as a temporary solution at this stage, and the
acceptance of its provisions appeared to be the origin of their future struggle. They
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considered it as a step towards the next conflict, especially Salih b. 'Ali, whose
objection to the Sultan1 s authority remained clear and public. On all occasions, Shaikh
Salih b. 'Ali considered the Sultan's rule as unsuitable for the country as he had not
been elected as Imam and he felt the religious community should be in power.
The Foreign Secretary for the Government of India, Sir. C. U. Aitchison, who
had previously been one of the defenders of the policy of non-intervention in Omani
internal affairs, had altered his attitude after British subjects suffered in Oman. He
urged the Government of India to assist the Sultan with naval forces on stand-by in the
Persian Gulf.95 The attitude of the British authorities in India towards the dispute in
Oman had gradually moved to a position of supporting a resolution of the crisis which
served the Sultan. Shaikh Salih b. 'Ali in his recent attack on Muscat had found
himself bound to accept the Jahhafi agreement with the Sultan, and to retreat on the
arrival of H. M. S. Nimble at Muscat. So he found himself in a weak position and the
British were ready to support the Sultan, (who had hoped for this support from the
beginning of the crisis). Unwillingly Shaikh Salih b. 'Ali retired to al-Sharqiyyah. He
then started planning a new campaign in cooperation with Sayyid Ibrahim b. Qais,
who had already moved against the Sultan's wishes. Shaikh Salih persuaded Sayyid
Ibrahim b. Qais to break off his understanding with the Sultan, who was now paying
himmonthly.
4.6.2. Ibrahim's attack, on al-Masna'ah and the 'Yal Sa'd involvement
On 18th September 1873, Major Miles reported that Sayyid Ibrahim b. Qais had
managed to reach an arrangement with Sayyid Faisal b. Hamud of al-Rustaq to hand
over the town on receiving the sum of 2,200 Crowns, and a certain date for this
settlement had been given.96 In fact at the time of Salih b. 'Ali's departure from
Muscat, Ibrahim acknowledged the success which had been achieved by him in
Muscat. On 7th March the 1874, the encouragement of Salih b. 'Ali had convinced
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Ibrahim, and he attached himself to some tribal Shaikhs on the Batinah coast.97 He
was joined chiefly by of the Hinawi section of 'Yal Sa d , with whom he attacked al-
Masan'ah and took control of the fort after plundering a large amount of property
belonging to the British subjects in the town ,98 The British Agent at Muscat realised
that since his return from Sohar, the Sultan seemed to be unable to face all his conflicts
alone, so proper support should be given to him to ensure their cooperation in times of
danger.
So when Sayyid Ibrahim b. Qais had taken possession of al-Masna'ah, Major
Miles sent a telegram on 7th March 1874,to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,
Colonel Ross, in which he informed him that he would make it clear to Ibrahim b.
Qais that he would be considered as acting in a hostile way against the British
authorities if he refused to withdraw his force from there.99 However, the British
Political Resident was not in absolute accord with the Agent's proposed
communication with Ibrahim, as it would be considered improper to aid directly the
Sultan in his recent troubles, or even his activities on the Batinah coast. Despite the
Resident's disapproval, the Governor-General in Council replied to the Agent s
telegram on this question with agreement, saying that Sultan Turki was a British ally,
that they should watch any proceedings by Sayyid Ibrahim, and that Ibrahim would be
responsible for any damage which affected British subjects on the coast.100
On 13th March, Major Miles proceeded towards al-Masna'ah on board the
Philomel accompanied by an officer of the Sultan. He was able to regain valuables to
the extent of 11,000 Rupees which were removed quickly from the fort to H.M.S.
Philomel, and Sayyid Ibrahim was forced to pay for the rest of the damage done by
his forces. The Agent also instructed him to surrender the fort to the Sultan. Sayyid
Ibrahim initially refused all these requests, but he was warned that if the rebels did not
evacuate the place, they wouldbe compelled to do so by force. Consequently, when
the warning reached them, they were shelled until they left the fort, and Ibrahim
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subsequently agreed to pay the cost of the damage. The Government of India whole
heartedly approved of the Agent s action in al-Masna'ah.101
Sayyid Ibrahim s main supporter in the action was Shaikh Muhammed b.
Sulayyim al-Gharbi, a former adherent of Sayyid 'Azzan b. Qais, who now had a
religious following on the Batinah coast. The other effective supporters were the 'Yal
Sa'd, the largest tribe in the area at that time.102
The British authorities in Muscat and the Persian Gulf were instructed to take
effective action against the hostilities on the Batinah coast. The Resident was
instructed to proceed to Muscat as a result of these troubles. On 26th March, Lt.
Colonel Ross and the Agent, Major Miles, headed again towards al-Masna'ah, on
board H.M.S. Hugh Ross, leaving two of the Royal Navy ships, the Rifleman and
the Philomel, anchored off the Muscat coast.103 They undoubtedly wanted to build
on the action which had been taken by the Agent previously, as well as to show that
they would not desert the Sultan in times of trouble, and to indicate to his opponents
that when the situation became urgent, their support would quickly be within his
reach.
Sayyid Ibrahim was asked again by the British, on behalf of the Sultan, to
withdraw his force from al-Masna'ah and to pay the cost of the damages, but he
refused for a second time. On this occasion Sultan Turki's wish was to demonstrate
his strength against al-Masna'ah.104 In accordance with this request, H.M.S.
Rifleman, Philomel, and Hugh Ross were instructed to bombard and destroy the fort.
Compensation of $MT 15,000 (considered as the loss to the British subjects, was
imposed on Sayyid Ibrahim and his allied tribe of 'Yal Sa'd, by the British Political
Resident in the Persian Gulf, Colonel Ross, who then left the issue under the Agent1 s
consideration.105
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The Sultan revealed his pleasure at the British action against al-Masna' ah in his
meeting with the British Resident at Muscat on 29th March 1874, and confirmed that
in order to bring about peace in the country, he had accepted the offer made by the
religious leader in al-Batinah, Shaikh al-Gharbi, to mediate in the trouble between the
Sultan and Sayyid Ibrahim.106 In fact this effort ended unsuccessfully, when the
Sultan entered into negotiations for a settlement in April 1874, and returned to Muscat
on the 18th of the same month to discuss the question with Major Miles. On May 16th
Major Miles had reported the issue to the Resident and informed him of Ibrahim s
departure to al-Rustaq, probably to escape the promised payment for the damage.107
Sayyid Ibrahim b. Qais then communicated with the Political Agent from al-
Rustaq. He wrote to Major Miles saying that he had received the Agent's letter on that
request, and had already sent his delegation to the Batinah coast where the injury took
place to discuss the problem; this had delayed the payment by the people of the
district. Sayyid Ibrahim said that he would inform the Agent soon about their
discussion regarding compensation.108 Sayyid Ibrahim also requested the Political
Agent to use his influence upon these people if they refused to pay this compensation,
and even persuade them to pay it in annual instalments as they were very poor and
might be unable to pay the whole amount immediately. He asked the Agent to contact
them directly, trying to find a quick solution to this question, and supporting him with
any information that could be obtained for such a settlement, while he would remain at
peacewith the Sultan.109 Communications continued between the British Agent and
Sayyid Ibrahim relative to that matter, and to the Sultan1 s position on the Batinah
coast.
On 30th May 1874, the paramount Sheikh of the 'Yal Sa d tribe contacted the
Political Agent at Muscat about the troubles in al-Masna'ah, and the fine imposed
upon them. They clarified their position towards Sayyid Ibrahim, and towards the
Sultan. All the Sheikhs of 'Yal Sa'd confirmed to Major Miles that the tribe and all its
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Shaikhs would never act against the wishes of the British officials in Oman or
India.110 However, they would never willingly give Sayyid Ibrahim any trouble or be
in dispute with him or his government on any issue, and they should be loyal to his
authority. They had presented themselves as Ibrahim's subjects, and it was their duty
to respect him loyally, and the payment of the compensation should be discussed with
Sayyid Ibrahim b. Qais who should be responsible for the payment of this
indemnity.111 The political Agent Major Miles kept in touch with the 'Yal Sa'd
Shaikhs for the purpose of reconciling that difficulty.
On 6th June, 1874, Shaikh Hamad b. Ahmad, the paramount Shaikh of 'Yal
Sa'd, and the rest of the tribal Shaikhs addressed a letter to the Political Agent, in
which they stated that the entire tribe were now in a very difficult financial situation,
and complained that Sayyid Turki was behaiving cruelly forwards them through his
officers. They requested the Agent mediate between them and the Sultan on this
matter, as he had always done during the course of troubles between the Sultan and
his subjects throughout the country.112 Shaikh Hamad confirmed that he and all the
people of his tribe would be very pleased to have the British Government
representative's suggestions on the matter, which would never be disregarded, and
any of his orders would be received respectfully and firm relations between them and
the British Government could be established.113
InMajor Miles s reply to the tribe of 'Yal Sa'd, he showed his satisfaction
in finding that they were in agreement with his request for payment of the cost of the
damages in al-Masna'ah. He clarified to them that obedience to that order would
certainly have reduced the necessity for the use of force against them and would have
ended the resentment of the British authorities at their behaviour in that province.114
In fact the British Agent was now in a position to represent the Sultan's wishes, and to
complete a settlement on the issue, and he considered himself as the power which
could emphasise the Sultan s position in the district in the hope of bringing peace and
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settlement. Miles was unable to reassure the Shaikh about the situation on the al-
Batinah coast, or to promise that the British would not be involved in the issue in the
future, but was able to inform the Shaikh that it was absolutely necessary that
rebellious activities should cease forthwith and the tribe's forces must be withdrawn
from a point close to al-Masna' ah within a certain time.115
On the following day the Shaikh wrote to the Political Agent confirming his
compliance with the British request, and saying that the friendly relationships between
them should continue, even though the trouble which had been caused was significant.
He also indicated to the Agent his true desire, and that of his tribe, to improve relations
with Sultan Turki, as soon as the Sultan prevented his wali from oppressing , killing
and plundering the people of the town.116 All these allegations, which had been
presented against the Sultan and his wali, were unproven, and the Agent could only
accept them as an excuse for 'Yal Sa'd's activities and their revolt against the Sultan's
power. The tribe had been known as one of those which had co-operated with Sayyid
Ibrahim b. Qais and Shaikh Salih b. 'Ali in their moves against the Muscat
Government on several occasions, and they had prevented the Sultan from exercising
his influence over the area in which they resided. So when they were involved in this
trouble, they requested the British authorities to mediate between them and the Sultan
in the hope of forgiveness for their earlier behaviour. They also persuaded the Agent
to encourage the Sultan to change his wali to someone who would be better inclined
towards the people and the country. Consequently, they would conduct themselves
peacefully to the Sultan and his people since it was their wish to obey and serve his
wishes faithfully, and they were willing to see him on the throne of the country rather
than anyone else.117 They wentmuch further when they stated that they would obey
no o^her ruler than him, as they were hereditary subjects of the A1 Bu Sa'id Dynasty
and their change of allegiance had occurred only on account of harshness and
brutality. They accused the Sultan's wali of tyranny when he sailed off from the fort
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on 5th June 1874 and burnt the houses of the poor and plundered what remained of
their property, and accused him of not having been able to do so before the arrival of
British support. They accused the British of being obliged to come to the support of
the Sultan in that operation.118 They acknowledged the Sultan s kindness, but they
wished to see him preventing the brutal actions of his officers. In fact the trouble
between the Sultan and the tribe of 'Yal Sa'd on the Batinah coast continued for some
time afterwards.
4.6.3. The attack on al-Suwaiq by the 'Yal Sa'd
On 6th June, 1874, the British Political Agent atMuscat, Major Miles, sent a telegram
to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Lt. Colonel Ross, informing him of a
new attack against al-Suwaiq by the 'Yal Sa'd tribe, in which they captured the town
and plundered the property of the resident. He also informed Colonel Ross of the
Sultan's request for immediate British support and the use of the British Agent's
influence upon the attackers to withdraw from the fort. 119
Because of this attack and the Sultan's request the British Agent proceeded
towards al-Suwaiq on board H.M.S. Magpie accompanied by one of the Sultan's
officers. When this expedition arrived they found the situation desperate.120 The
British Government in India approved the Agent's action on this account, and
considered it as suitable treatment, which gave the Sultan anew importance in the eyes
of the British authorities, and the impression that responded to any request from him
would be at any crucial time. The British Resident in the Persian Gulf, Lt. Colonel
Ross, was himself directed by the Government of India to continue with the same
support that was provided by the Political Agent to the Sultan.121 The warning was at
once issued by the Agent to Sayyid Ibrahim b. Qais and his supporters among the 'Yal
Sa'd Shaikhs, regarding their responsibility for the plunder of the town. The
Government of India were in absolute accord with the British Resident and the Agent
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at Muscat regarding policy. They confirmed their Representatives' actions in a
telegram to the Resident in which they stated the following :
"Asyou are convinced that strong measures are needed, they may be
carried out to the extent of enforcing any terms that you judge
reasonable and necessary. Viceroy would be glad if fair indemnity
could be arranged without resort to extreme reprisals".122
Regarding Sayyid Ibrahim's suggestion of the payment of the cost of the
damage by his supporters among the ' Yal Sa'd by yearly instalments, the tribe of ' Yal
Sa d rejected the allegations against them and the Resident did not accept either Sayyid
Ibrahim's excuse, or the 'Yal Sa'd's refusal.
In conjunction with the Agent, the Resident was now in a position to adopt any
suitable action against Sayyid Ibrahim and his allies to force them to fulfil their
responsibilities. On July 10th 1874, Ross and Major Miles, together with the senior
Naval Officer for H.M.S. Philomel and Magpie at Muscat headed towards the
Batinah coast with May Frere and a number of the Sultan's forces under the
command of his brother Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz who at that stage was on good terms
with the Sultan.123 The intention was to carry out their threat against Ibrahim b. Qais
and his adherents among the 'Yal Sa'd. The operation was completely successful, and
by the end of July 1874 an agreement was reached for the payment of the indemnity
within three months. The tribe submitted to the Sultan, the Batinah coast actions were
stopped, and al-Masna'ah and al-Suwaiq were regained by the Sultan1 s troops with
British support.124 In reality this agreement was not able to bring about the tribe's
allegiance to Sultan Turki's authority, and the trouble on the Batinah coast ebbed and
flowed. The indemnity had not been fully received on the exact date, but it was
completed in January 1875. Afterwards Sayyid Ibrahim b. Qais agreed to retreat in
exchange for the restoration of his allowance of $MT 100 per month and went to al-
Rustaq, which was his primary base.125
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4.7. The Sultan extends his authority
The Sultan's authority along the Coast was extended further north and his influence
upon Sohar firmly asserted, though some parts of the country went their own way
under various, troublesome leaders.126 Oman's trade appeared to experience slight
difficulties and suffered from some loss of profit during the year 1875, as it was
affected by the internal troubles. Generally, Muscat had been declining steadily as a
commercial centre in the region for some years past.127
The Sultan's reputation grew throughout the region and relations with his
neighbouring Shaikhs on the coast improved steadily. Dubai was his first strong ally
during his early days in power during 1871. The British support and approval, which
had been used by their Resident in the Persian Gulf, Lt. Colonel Pelly, to divide
Sayyid Ibrahim b. Qais and Shaikh Zaid b. Khalifah of Abu Dhabi, served the
Sultan's ends when he managed to convert the enmity into peace, concluding an
alliance ayearlater.128 This step led to a further extension of the Sultan's ability and
confirmed his dominance in the area, which persuaded more shaikhs in the region to
submit their allegiance to his authority.
On 14th May 1874, the Sultan's Wali in Sohar, his son Sayyid Muhammed
binTurki wrote to him from Sohar about the peaceful situation there, and supplied him
with the news he had recently received from the ruler of al-Fujairah on the Trucial
Coast. This was that he was anxious to place himself under the Sultan's protection
against Salim bin Sultan of al-Sharjah.129 Shaikh Hamad b. 'Abdullah b. Saif al-
Sharqi, the ruler of al-Fujairah, gave notice of his intention to give up his authority
over his fort, and asked the Sultan to send his soldiers and governor to take
possession of the region. He was to be considered a subordinate of the Sultan and
under the protection of his government, which the British Government considered
more able to contend with than Salim b. Sultan.130
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During the mid 1880s the authority in Muscat became interested in extending
its territory over some ports on the Omani coast, in particular Khor Fakkan, Daba and
Kalba. Further to the Sultan's desire to have other points of influence on the coast,
the people of the provinces were themselves interested in coming under the Sultan1 s
protection. Nevertheless, when attempts were made by the Sultan or his
representative in Sohar to achieve this goal, the British authorities always objected
strongly to any further enlargement of the Sultan's territory on the Omani coast, or to
his having a real influence upon any ports on that sea.
In fact the Sultan had been attracted to extending his possessions there by the
chiefs of the ports themselves. In June 1886, Shaikh Hamad bin Nasir, the Governor
of Sohar for Sultan Sayyid Turki, wrote to him saying that the people of Khor
Fakkan, Daba and Kalba wished to be under the Sultan's influence and protection.131
In relation to this issue the Sultan requested the Political Agent at Muscat, Lieutenant
Colonel E. Mockler, to obtain the advice of the British Resident in the Persian Gulf on
the annexation of those ports. The British Resident and the Consul to Fars, Lt. Col.
Miles, replied to the Sultan s request through his Agent, as follows:
"Any aggressive enterprise of the kind on the part of His Highness
Sayyid Turki against his neighbours the Qawasim, with whom he is
now at peace, would be, in my opinion, highly inadvisable, and
would probably, if undertaken, terminate in result very injurious to
His Highness".132
The British Government in India approved the Resident's action on this
question, and the Under-Secretary to the Government of India, Sir. W. J.
Cunningham, confirmed to him in a subsequent communication that:
"I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter and enclosure
No. 79 dated the 7th July, 1886, regarding a proposal made to the
Sultan of Muscat by the Wali of Sohar to annex three ports on the
Oman Coast. In reply I am to state your action in the matter is
approved by the Government of India".133
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The Sultan undoubtedly accepted this suggestion, and he directed his Wali in
Sohar to refrain from any action he might intend or any interference in the ports'
domestic affairs. It was very difficult for the Sultan to diverge from his British ally or
to act against their wishes, since he would still need their assistance on many issues in
the future. In his reply to the Political Agent in Muscat the Sultan confirmed that the
Resident's judgement on the matter had been considered respectfully as promoting the
purpose of peace in the region and in the Sultan's dominions, and the order had been
issued to the Wali of Sohar to refrain from interference in these affairs.134
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Sayyid Turki and Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz: Peace and
Conflict 1874 1888
Ont he basis of events described in this study so far, the manner in which Sayyid 'Abd
al-'Aziz came into conflict with his brother, the Sultan of Muscat, will be apparent. In
1874, Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz was being detained in Karachi under British surveillance
at the request of Sultan Turki. The relations between the two brothers had presented
many difficulties with regard to the rule of the country, and although they cooperated
on some occasions on many others they were in conflict. The Sultan had a great deal
of respect for his younger brother Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz, and one might assume the
former deserved his assistance, but because Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz was continually
under the influence of the Sultan's enemies, his activities were generally directed
against his brother. Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz was a very active person and a good
soldier. He established working relations with different tribes and Shaikhs inside
Oman, mainly the al-Hirth and their chief Shaikh Salih b. 'Ali. The shaikh used his
influence to persuade Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz to rise against the Sultan with his support
on various occasions.
It should be said that the Sultan maintained positive feelings towards Sayyid
'Abd al- Aziz, despite the troubles which he caused and through which the Sultan's
power in the country suffered considerable injury. However, throughout the Sultan's
entire life relations with Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz were unsettled, with the one exception
of the period between 'Abd al-'Aziz's arrival from Karachi in May 1874 and
December 1875. During this period the main thrust of the Sultan's policy was to
consolidate his power over the entire country, searching for a solution to his internal
situation and seeking fidelity from the shaikhs throughout Oman. He decided that a
way of maintaining a strong position in Oman would be to enlist the support of Sayyid
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'Abd al-'Aziz. He decided to try and reconcile their differences, hoping that this
would prompt Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz to offer him the support which the Sultan
desperately needed at this stage of his reign. But these difficulties were not resolved,
and Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz, was probably the main obstacle in the Sultan's political life
from that time on.
The return of Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz to Oman was undoubtedly a result of the
Sultan's efforts to persuade the British authorities in Muscat and the Persian Gulf to
use their influence upon the Government of India and allow his return to Oman. The
responce to this question influenced British policy in the region. The British
representatives in the Gulf and Muscat and the Indian authorities responded positively
to the Sultan's request.
The permission for Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz to leave Karachi had been
communicated to the Commissioner in Sind on 6th May, 1874. He had been asked to
let Lt Colonel Ross accompany Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz to Muscat.1 The Sultan saw
Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz's arrival as a significant step forward in his relations with the
Government of India. On 12th May 1874, the British Political Resident in the Persian
Gulf reported to the Government of India that Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz had arrived in
Muscat.2 The Sultan welcomed Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz warmly, and the two brothers
were now reunited, although the Sultan was now suffering from the illness which
continued to afficthim until his death. Sultan Turki did not conceal from his brother
any of his government's difficulties nor any detail of his position in relation to the
continued disorder and disturbances in the country. The Sultan had considered Sayyid
'Abd al-'Aziz's return to Muscat as beneficial to his sovereignty, and though his
strong support would be sure to consolidate the Sultan's position in Oman. Sayyid
'Abd al-'Aziz was appointed the Sultan's deputy in Muscat and the whole country.3 It
may appear that Sultan Turki behaved somewhat naively towards Sayyid 'Abd al-
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'Aziz, but the return of Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz to Muscat was conditional on Sayyid
' Abd al-'Aziz complying with the following:4
1. Sayyid'Abd al 'Aziz was to display sincerity and benevolence to his brother Sultan
Turki, and was to be in unity with him, and his guidance for the Sultan was to be
moral.
2. He was to be friendlywith the Sultan, and was to exclude all harmful wishes from
his heart and was to be on good terms with the Sultan's government, ignoring all evil
intentions.
3. He was to separate himself from any trouble-maker, or any hostile groups, and pay
no attention to any of their requests which would affect the two brothers' relationship
and draw them into enmity.
However Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz considered these points to be a mere written
formality which were not obligatory and caused no restraint on him from acting
against the Sultan's authority when the situation permitted him to do so.
Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz felt an opportune moment for his action against the
Sultan soon after his arrival at Muscat, when he exploited the Sultan's weakness as a
result of his illness. The Sultan's illness had seriously affected his position, and
Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz exploited the situation effectively in concentrating the country's
power in his hands. From early 1874, the Sultan1 s illness had noticeably affected his
position in power; his authority was undermined as a result and his rule was resented
by his enemies within the country.
5.1. Sultan Turki's consolidation of power in the country
By August 1874, Sayyid Ibrahim b. Qais was at al-Hazim, following the settlement of
the trouble on the Batinah coast which was discussed in Chapter Three in this study.
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The situation in the interior of Oman did not remain in the Sultan's favour. Sayyid
Ibrahim left al-Hazim shortly afterwards and proceeded towards al-Rustaq, and
succeeded, with the support of the al-'Abriyyin tribe, in taking al-'Awabi district and
Wadi Bani Kharus. In al-'Awabi Sayyid Ibrahim prepared himself for the fight to
strengthen his position with the intention of taking power in the country from the
Sultan.5 On 11th August 1874, Lt. Colonel Miles reported that Sayyid Ibrahim b.
Qais now showed a disposition to withdraw from further opposition to the Sultan of
Muscat, and had agreed to come to a better understanding with him. The Sultan's new
wali for al-Suwaiq, Saif bin Hamud, had been approved by Sayyid Ibrahim b. Qais,
who proceeded towards al-Suwaiq to meet with him there in order to discuss the
differences between himself and the Sultan of Oman. This meeting produce a
satisfactory result.6 Sayyid Ibrahim again confirmed his obedience to Sultan Turki's
authority, and his willingness to accept any allowance which could be offered by the
government of the Sultan.
Notwithstanding, Lt. Colonel E. C. Ross, the Political Resident, in his report
which was included in the Persian Gulf Administration Reports in 1875, drew
attention to the fact that from the beginning of that year, the political situation in Oman
was not favourable to peace and prosperity.7 Although the Sultan had been able to
settle many of his problems through conciliation and emphasise his position as the
only Ruler of the country, his health had affected his decision-making and had
prevented him from dealing effectively with the remaining disturbances in his
dominions. He became less energetic than at any time since taking power in the
country. By the end of July 1874, the British Resident in the Gulf had obtained the
Government of India's permission to pay six months of the Zanzibar subsidy in
advance to the Sultan of Muscat, since the Sultan had, at his own financial cost,
supported British operations on the Batinah coast during that year against Sayyid
Ibrahim b. Qais and his allies the 'Yal Sa'd.8 Sultan Turki urgently needed the money
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at this stage for supporting his operations in the interior against the tribes of the Bani
Reyam, who were looking for certain territorial gains in Nizwa and Birkat al-Mouz, a
problem which had began in September 1873. Samail and Nizwa were particularly
disturbed, due to the conflict between the Hinawi and the Ghafiri factions who were
openly at war.9 All the Ghafiri tribes in the country as well as those of the Hinawi had
prepared themselves for this conflict and were ready to take part in it.10
In these disturbances the Sultan had supported the Hinawi faction, and assisted
them effectively not only with money but with force as well: he sent a field gun and
ten artillery men to Izki to fortify the fort of the town, allowing its guard to join the
main assault. 11 Sultan Turki was by this stage incapacitated by his illness and his
strength had deteriorated, and so his mediation in this quarrel was provided by his
representative. He was obliged to proceed towards the interior, so that he could bring
this unsettled situation to a conclusion and left his brother Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz in
charge of Muscat affairs. Soon after his arrival in Samail he gained the Bani Reyam1 s
(Ghafiri faction) submission to his authority, and finally an agreement between the
two parties was reached. However, the dissent between the Hinawi and Ghafiri tribes
in Oman had spread to involve the tribes of al-Zahirah district, where a satisfactory
settlement was reached in June 1875.12 Unfortunately it was not a settlement in
which the Sultan could feel content: Because Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz outlined his
dissent. Further complications a rose as Sultan Turki's health began to fail.
On 14th May 1875, the Agent at Muscat, Lt. Colonel Miles, reported to the
Residency at Bushire that Muscat was the scene of a dispute between the Sultan and
the Bani Bu Hasan who had recently been replaced by the Baluchis and the Wahhabis
in the garrisons of Muscat's forts .13 His brother, Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz, who was
now the Governor of Muscat, managed to reconcile the dissatisfied tribes, granting all
their claims under his brother's authority on condition that the tribe return to obeying
the Sultan.14 Following this settlement, relations between the Sultan and the tribe of
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Bani Bu Hasan appeared to continue in a friendly and satisfactory manner. But the
most serious challenge to the Sultan emerged from his brother Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz,
who was by this stage thinking of exploiting the Sultan's illness to his own advantage.
The British authorities' assessment of the situation in Muscat was that it was
being adversely affected by the Sultan's health. They observed that given the
circumstances of the time, it was impossible to look with confidence to a secure
continuity of the Sultan's rule. The Sultan informed the British Political Agent at
Muscat about the settlement between him and part of the Hinawi tribes, and noted that
an agreement between himself and his brother Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz had also been
achieved in order to pacify the situation in Muscat.15 As for the situation with his
brother Sayyid 'Abd al 'Aziz, the Sultan wrote to the Political Agent informing him
about the new agreement in which the Sultan had agreed to make him his consultant
and adviser. The Sultan had also agreed to follow his brother's advice in the
expenditure of the customs and revenues of Muscat, and had dismissed Namish his
old servant in the custom house.16 In fact the Sultan had given Sayyid 'Abd al 'Aziz
great access to his affairs in order to keep him under his control. The following
responsibilities had been trurned overto him:
"All payments, non-payments, increments and reductions of
subsidies and salaries be in accordance with my advice. That he be
allowed to exercise my discretion in regulating the allowances to be
given to the Governors of fortresses, soldiers, and other servants of
the Government. Secondly, that in ail matters relating to politics my
advice be followed; if I consider anything determined to the well
being of the Government and require its discontinuance a withdrawal
of it shall be done, as also should I consider anything essential to the
prosperity of the State it shall likewise be granted".17
However, the quarrel between the Sultan and his brother over the custom
house, and over the Sultan s relations with the Hinawi tribes were considered to be
slightly different from those which had faced the Sultan on previous occasions since
his deputy governor Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz, was now on the Sultan's side. Sayyid
'Abd al-'Aziz undoubtedly saw this opportunity as an auspicious omen of his political
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future in the country, since the Sultan was affected by his illness and so in a weak
position to deal with the major disputes in Muscat's affairs. This led the disaffected
tribes in the interior to rejoice at his weakness and strengthen Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz's
status.
In fact the new arrangement which was reached in July 1875 between the two
brothers was soon affected when differences about internal policy forced Sayyid 'Abd
al-'Aziz to abandon the settlement and submit his resignation to his brother Sultan
Turki. This happened on 10th August 1875, when the Sultan refused Sayyid 'Abd al-
'Aziz's demands to dismiss the Baluchi garrison from the forts of Muscat. Sultan
Turki and carried on his rule of the country without Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz's support
for a few days. The tribal Arabs were anxious to replace the Baluchi in those
positions, and the Sultan was then forced to accept their wishes and to surrender the
forts to their guardianship.18
5.2. Sultan Turki's temporary retirement to Gwader
5.2.1. The recognition of Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz
Following the difficulties from which the Sultan had suffered, he prepared for a short
break away from Oman and its burdens. On 14th August 1875, the Sultan wrote to
the Political Agent at Muscat, mentioning the situation between him and his brother
Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz. He informed the Agent that the new differences between them
had led to more disturbances because of the plotting of dissidents who hoped for the
separation of the two brothers. However, his wish to keep the unity with Sayyid
'Abd al-'Aziz was very important for the strength of the country and the conciliation of
its disputes.19 The Sultan had realised that the suppression of such a dispute, which
had been revived by those who were interested in seeing him in dispute with his
brother, should not be allowed to come between them. He came to the conclusion that
any attempt at long-term peace in the country could be frustrated by this dispute with
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his brother and the affairs of Muscat might be injured. Accordingly the Sultan
authorised his brother Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz to act as he saw best in the interests of
Oman and its people, because the Sultan's health prevented him from acting positively
himself to fulfil this design.20
On 15th August 1875, the Sultan confirmed his wishes to Lt. Colonel Miles in
another letter: he had decided to retire to his dominion on the Mekran Coast of
Gwader, and had officially appointed his brother Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz to act as his
Naib or representative, and empowered him to carry on the government of Oman
during his absence as he wished.21 The Sultan had instructed him to show every
favour and indulgence towards the British subjects in Muscat, and added that he hoped
that the Political Agent at Muscatwould look upon Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz favourably as
Sultan, and be close to his government.22
5.2.2. The Sultan's departurefor Gwader
The Sultan found that he had undertaken more than he could physically cope with,
given his poor health. He realised he was unable to carry on the government of
Oman, even with the support provided by the British. The Sultan had also found
himself under strong pressure from the disaffection of those tribes which had been
granted his favour and been made his official royal guards. On 15th August 1875,
and after the above-mentioned disturbances against his authority, as well as from his
brother in some respects, Sultan Turki boarded the corvette al-Rahmani and left for
Gwader, appointing Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz to act in full liberty as governor of the
whole country during his leave with the exception of Gwader which was to remain
under his direct command.23 Accordingly, the British Political Agent at Muscat
ordered certain precautions be takenfor the protection of British interests in Muscat, as
he was fearful of the confusion which might follow the departure of the Sultan to
Gwader. He requested Captain Fort of H. M. S. Daphne to come to Muscat from
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Karachi, and the Political Resident in the Gulf instructed H.M.S. Hugh Ross, the
Residency steamer, to be ready to meet any order from the Political Agent at Muscat.
Meanwhile the vessel Rifleman was instructed to carry the Sultan to Gwader.24 The
Sultan left Muscat on 21st August 1875, having assured the Political Agent, Lt.
Colonel Miles that as soon as he recovered his health his return to Muscat would
ensure the continuation of his rule of the country.25
The Sultan's health problems had affected him so much, that when he took
over the rule of the country his physical appearance had led many of the tribes in
Oman to consider him as an easy target, but his accession had been accepted by the
British, who had offered him solid support after his success in taking pcwer in the
country. The Sultan s energy and his military qualifications, upon which he depended
for successfully ruling to the throne of the country soon became affected by his
illness. In fact the Sultan's side had also been affected by the following factors:26
1. The desertion of his old allies among the Ghafiri tribes, to whom he was
totally indebted for his strong position at the beginning of his political life.
2. The success of Shaikh Salih b. 'Ali in his campaigns against Muscat with
the assistance of the Hinawi tribes of al-Sharqiyyah, was another point which
contributed to the deterioration of the Sultan's position in Oman.
3. Sayyid Ibrahim b. Qais's repeated operations along the Batinah coast, also
played their part, as did in addition to Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz's activities, which showed
the Sultan's power to be without a real foundation at this time.
4. The Sultan's favours to the Hinawi tribes and the support of the Baluchis
did not appear quite enough to assure his strong position during the first period of his
reign. For all these reasons, the Sultan was unable to deal with his internal
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difficulties, or use the skill which he would later demonstrate during the second period
of his rule.
5.2.3. Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz's difficulties in his new appointment
As noted above Sultan Turki retired to Gwader, he entrusted the country and its
financial arrangements to his brother Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz, allocating himself an
amount of $MT 1,000 a month and requesting Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz to keep paying
him that sum while he stayed at Gwader.2 7 Though the financial position of Oman
after the departure of the Sultan was very damaged, Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz managed to
deal with it successfully; sending the Sultan's monthly amount to Gwader showed his
diplomatic skill.28 Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz was faced with another problem soon after
his occupation of the new position, when a large number of Omanis protested against
his success. This showed their ability to cause the state harm at any time. Sayyid
'Abd al-'Aziz appeared confident with the main support which came from Shaikh
Salih b. 'Ali, who prepared himself to come to his aid from the moment Sayyid 'Abd
al-'Aziz's appearance on the throne. He arrived in Muscat leading 400 men, chiefly
Hinawis, and entered into an agreement to assist him in governing the Sultanate;
Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz appointed him to be his first adviser.29
Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz became more popular and his authority soon increased:
he seemed to be more widely accepted each day. Most of the Hinawi tribes in Oman
promised to offer their support to the new ruler of the country, although most of the
Ghafiri tribes remained detached from the new authority in Muscat.3 0 But gradually
the Ghafiri tribes befriended Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz, and some of their Shaikhs visited
Muscat to promise their submission to his authority, only two months after his
accession to power.31 It is clear that the position of Shaikh Salih b. 'Ali in the new
government influenced and affected the other tribes, especially the Ghafiri faction
which felt that his position had become more influential in shaping Sayyid 'Abd al-
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'Aziz's policy. However, many of these tribes, like the Bani Reyam, Bani Jaber,
Janabah, and the Bani Bu 'Ali clearly did not recognise the sovereignty of the new
regime. Not only these but even the wali of Sohar, Badrb. Saif resisted Sayyid 'Abd
al-'Aziz's authority with help from the Bani al-Na'im tribe of al-Buraimi district.32 In
addition to these internal problems, the situation in the country was affected by an
external event.
On 24th September 1875, the ex-Sultan Sayyid Salim b. Thuwaini crossed in a
native Baghlah from Qishm towards Oman with the intention of taking power from
Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz. The Political Agent at Muscat was fully aware of this
development and soon after the news of this attempt reached the Agency he requested
H.M. S. Daphne to arrest Sayyid Salim and to block his move. On October 11th
Sayyid Salim was seen off Suwadi on the Batinah coast where the British detained
him. The Political Resident in the Gulf, Lt. Colonel Ross, immediately directed the
Commander of the Daphne to take him prisoner to Hyderabad fort, where he died of
smallpox on 7th December 1876, as already mentioned in Chapter Four.33
The official British attitude towards Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz's reign was to
consider him as a representative of the Sultan in power during his leave, and they
rejected Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz's request for recognition as the Sultan of Oman and
refused to offer him any military aid. They made it clear to him that if any military
assistance were provided by them in urgent circumstances, or in the case of a grave
emergency atMuscat, it would only be in answer to a written request in the name of
Sultan Turki.34 These conditions were strong enough to ensure that, if he was
considering declaring himself ruler of Oman, the British would certainly prevent him
from doing so, and his authority would meet with no recognition.
On 5th October Shaikh Salih b. 'Ali al-Harthi left Muscat for al-Sharqiyyah,
where he was engaged to watch the situation on behalf of his ally Sayyid 'Abd al-
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'Aziz.35 The new government also had direct interest in this province, namely to
pacify the jealous attitude of the Ghafiri tribes to the position of Salih b. All and his
prestige in the new government.
5.3. Sultan Turki's abrupt restoration to the Throne
At this time Sayyid ' Abd al-' Aziz was in a position where he was obliged to affirm his
appearance as ruler of Muscat throughout the whole country and to force the dissident
tribes to come under his direct influence. To achieve this abject, Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz
had left Muscat on 11th December 1875 in the direction of Barka, and then headed to
Samail with the aim, it was believed, of replacing the Ghafiri garrison of the town's
fort with one based on the Hinawi tribe. He left the affairs of Muscat under the
control of Sayyid Muhammad b. 'Azzan.36
By this time SultanTurki had recovered his physical health and spirits, and felt
he was sufficiently strong to resume his country's rule. On the night of 13th
December, the Sultan arrived in Matrah unexpectedly, crossing from Gwader on board
a native baghlah. The town's fort was guarded by the Baluchi who immediately
submitted to the Sultan and accepted his return without any resistance.37 At this
juncture Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz was still in Samail, where he wrote to the acting
Governor of Muscat, Muhammad b. 'Azzan, requesting the defence of Muscat to be
continued. He would collect as many men as he could, and come to their assistance
soon.38
The Sultan was now planning to retake Muscat, but he was prevented from
doing so by the Bani Bu Hasan garrison in Muscat's fort. The Sultan communicated
on 14th December 1875 with the Political Agent at Muscat, Lt. Colonel Miles,
informing him of his arrival and of his obtaining possession of Matrah. The Sultan
then sent a delegation to the Political Agent in Muscat, consisting of Sa'id b. Khamis
and 'Ali b. Husain stating that soon after he had regained Matrah, Muscat had shown
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Strang resistance. The Sultan therefore requested British assistance in preventing the
arrival of any Arabs from the interior to Muscat by sea.39 Sultan Turki added that it
was his obligation to inform the Political Agent that if or when the Bedouin arrived in
Muscat, the situation would undoubtedly become more complicated and efforts
towards a settlement would achieve nothing. The Sultan also informed the Agent that
Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz was only his representative during his absence and while he was
on good terms with him, Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz had begun to oppose the official
authority and had strongly encouraged Muscat's garrison to stand against the Sultan.
Therefore, Sultan Turki informed Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz that he was to be removed
from his position of power since it was clear to him, the Sultan, that much of the
dissent in the country had been fostered by Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz.40 Sultan Turki then
addressed another letter to the Agent on 18th December, stating that he was preparing
to attack Muscat on the following day.41 He left Matrah on board a boat flying the
British flag and with a number of Omanis on board planning to attack the capital.42
On 19th December the Sultan was joined by a force of Ghafiri tribes from Nakhal,
and they took possession of the areas surrounding Muscat, while another attack on
Muscat from the sea was maintained by his force for two days, with losses on both
sides.43 Following this incident the Government of India instructed their
representative in the region that from now on the correspondence with Muscat should
be made directly to Sayyid Turki as the Sultan of Muscat.44 This was a clear enough
indication to Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz that he was no longer the authorised ruler of the
country, and he had to resign himself to being just one of the Sultan s subjects.
Sultan Turki quickly set about reinstating his position as ruler of Oman and
wasted no time in preparing for the final attack on Muscat. On 19th December 1875,
the Sultan wrote to the Political Agent about the action he planned that would confirm
his position in the country. He sent his messenger to Samail as this was a wise
political move with respect to the Sultanate's internal situation: the Sultan wanted was
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to regain his position among the Hinawi tribes there, and he managed to bring Shaikh
Hamud b. Sa'id al-Jahhafi of al Wahibah of the Hinawi faction to Muscat to reconcile
their differences.45 The Sultan had also sent the Agent a letter he had received from
the Bani Bu Hasan, part of the Hinawi faction, in which they were prepared to offer
the Sultan their allegiance. Sayyid Turki also informed the Political Agent that he had
already managed to collect his force from both factions, the Hinawi and the Ghafiri, to
attack Muscat. The Sultan requested the Political Agent in Muscat to send him any
useful advice which could help to bring the opposition party to a settlement, so that the
otherwise inevitable conflict with his brother1 s force could be avoided.46
On December 21st the opposition party in Muscat offered to surrender to the
Sultan, and agreed to enter into negotiations with him. There were completed when
the Sultan entered Muscat with his troops and resumed charge of the Government.47
On 30th December the British Political Resident in the PersianGulf, Lt. Colonel Ross,
telegraphed the Government of India to say that all the forts of Muscat should show
their respect to Sultan Turki with no further opposition. Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz was
still in Samail with a small force, and the Sultan requested the Political Agent in
Muscat to prevent Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz from coming to Muscat by sea.48 In response
the Government of India replied that it did not wish to interfere in the internal dispute
between the Sultan and his brother unless British interests were directly affected.4 9
However, the British Political Resident in the Gulf, writing to the Sultan,
showed his displeasure with Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz regarding the outbreak of hostilities
with the Sultan after the amicable relations which had been achieved after the latter1 s
return from Karachi. In his letter to the Sultan of 31st December 1875, Lt. Colonel
Ross expressed his wishes for the unity of the Sultanate and her people, and
recommended an intelligent conciliation of the continued dispute between the two
brothers. This would undoubtedly benefit the country and her people. Ross also
conveyed to the Sultan the British satisfaction regarding the Sultan's kind response to
189
the British subjects and their interests in Muscat after his return, (this had been in
responce to a request from the Political Agent in Muscat).50
The British authorities in India immediately recognised the restoration of the
Sultan s power in Oman: they considered his absence in Gwader to be only a rest
because of his illness. Whether the Sultan had officially announced his return or not,
he had already made arrangements regarding this controversial issue with the British
before his departure for Gwader. The Government of India were also interested in
seeing a settled situation in Oman, while the dispute over the sultanate in the country
had caused them serious trouble and expenditure when they offered their military
support for the Sultan against his enemies.
By the end of December 1875 Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz had left his position in
Samaii and had headed for Samad, to join his main ally Shaikh Salih b. 'Ali to work
out his next move with him. However, he was completely without funds. Sayyid
Abd al-'Aziz started planning for his future, while the situation in the country seemed
to be quiet, and the Sultan Sayyid Turki was progressing towards stronger
government. Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz communicated with the Sultan from Samad,
asking him to grant him Samaii fort, and to pay him an allowance of $MT 500. 51 The
Sultan refused his request and instructed his wali in Sohar, and the most powerful
commander in his service, Badr b. Saif A1 Bu Sa'idi, who was conducting the
operations against Samaii, to enter into negotiations with Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz for an
arrangement. The mission was successful, and the Sultan took possession of the fort
of Samaii in February 1876 and controlled the situation by the deployment of his
garrison there. 52
Afterwards Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz found himself obliged to oppose the Sultan,
and resolved as soon as he could to collect a reasonable force and enough support to
fight to regain his position in Samaii, if not over the entire country. From then
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onwards Sayyid 'Abd al-' Aziz remained in open hostilities with his brother the Sultan,
but without any acknowledged success, and the British Government tried many times
without real success to bring this disturbance to a settlement.
5.4. Salih b. 'Ali and al-Jahhafi's Campaign Against the Sultan
Sultan Turki was now faced with another difficulty from another trouble-maker,
Hamud b. Sa'id al-Jahhafi, who renounced his friendship with the Sultan. He became
the leader of the main campaign in Oman against the authority of the Sultan during the
year 1876. He started his main operations on the Batinah coast, which extended to
the surrounding areas of Muscat like Hail al-'Awamir in Seeb. In September 1876
Hamud al-Jahhafi, without approval or assistance from any of the Sultan's opponents,
such as Salih b. 'Ali, Ibrahim b. Qais or even Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz, attacked al-Seeb
via al-Rustaq, and plundered the town's market and property.53 When the Sultan
learned about this attack, he immediately sent a force of 700-800 men under the
command of Badr b. Saif to al-Seeb, but when these troops arrived they found al-
Jahhafi had already proceeded to Saham, where he seized Banian goods to the value of
worth Rs. 5000. He allied himself with the al-Ma'awili tribe inWadi al-Ma'awil, who
had been in a continued dispute with the Sultan's authority.54
The British abstained from involvement in this quarrel, and preferred the
Sultan to use his own resources against al-Jahhafi. The Sultan managed to expel al-
Jahhafi and proceeded to Barka, which was exposed to a new raid by Sayyid Ibrahim
b. Qais. Sayyid Ibrahim's operations ended unsuccessfully when the tribe of 'Yal
Sa'd refused to offer him the required assistance to accomplish this move.55 By the
end of the year, Sultan Sayyid Turki had achieved another arrangement with Sayyid
Ibrahim b. Qais, by which the conflict between them had been settled again and trade
resumed on the Batinah coast. Hamud al-Jahhafi was induced by the Sultan to retire
to al-Sharqiyyah district on the payment of a sum of money.56
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During the second part of 1876, the Sultan's position in the country rapidly
improved. This fact was confirmed by Lt. Colonel Miles's trip to al-Jabal al-Akhdar,
where he found the situation quiet, settled and peaceful, and the Sultan1 s authority in
this district well-exercised. He clearly stated that the safety of his tour was the
responsibility of the Sultan, who instructed him to make the necessary arrangements
with the tribes to provide the Agent with a suitable escort during his journey in the
interior of Oman.57 Although the Sultan's power over the tribes of the interior had
been restored, the situation there remained the main issue in the Sultan's internal
policy.
However, the Sultan's main problem at this stage was the dispute with his
brother Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz, who was under the influence of Shaikh Salih b. 'Ali,
who became Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz's adviser in any offer by the Sultan to ease the
dispute between them. Shaikh Salih b. 'Ali represented Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz with the
Sultan and had been deputed by Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz either to accept or to reject the
Sultan's offers of settlement.58 In May 1876 the Sultan offered Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz
a monthly allowance of $MT 500 on condition that he should leave the country and
agree to reside anywhere he liked in India, but he declined the offer. In August 1876,
Salih b. 'Ali had suggested that Sultan Turki should allow Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz to
reside in al-Seeb, or somewhere else where he could not sustain intrigue, but the
Sultan rejected this suggestion, and no settlement was achieved.5 9
The Sultan was now in conflict with Shaikh Salih bin 'Ali. The latter prepared
himself with the support of the al-Sharqiyyah tribes for another attempt to attack
Muscat and overthrow the Sultan. In April 1877 his plans were well known in the
district, and this resulted in persuading the tribes there to rebel against the Sultan's
authority under his leadership. The Sultan tried to buy him off with an allowance, but
disagreement arose about the monthly payment.60 Salih then proceeded towards
Muscat accompanied by forces from the al-Sharqiyyah tribes and assisted by Hamud
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b. Sa'id al-Jahhafi, but they failed to persuade Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz who refrained
from joining them. On 14th June 1877 Shaikh Salih was able to take Matrah without
notable resistance from the Sultan's garrison in the town.61 Muscat was threatened,
and the British realised that their interests also seemed to be at risk. The Sultan
himself asked the Acting British Agent at Muscat, Mr. P.J.C. Robertson, for military
support against the rebel. At this time Mr. Robertson had no available gun-boat, but
when the gun-boat H.M.S. Teazer arrived in Muscat on 15th June, the Sultan1 s hope
of assistance was revived.62 Two days later the rebellion spread to another location
on the Batinah coast, where Sayyid Ibrahim b. Qais joined the manoeuvres. The
Sultan's position in Muscat was weakened: the small number who defended the
capital, about 200 men, faced attackers estimated at totalling 1000 to 1500 fighting
men.63 The Sultan's wishes were carried out when the Teazer fired on the rebels on
18th June 1877. This induced the rebels to enter into negotiations with the Sultan on
the following day and he insisted upon their retreating from their location in Matrah,
some parts of Muscat and the places around them, and entering negotiations very
quickly. Thus the rebels had no option but to comply with the Sultan's orders.64 The
Government of India signified approval of the action which had been taken by the
Acting Political Agent atMuscat.
When negotiations between the Sultan and the rebels took place in Muscat the
Sultan refused all the conditions laid down by Salih bin 'Ali al-Harthi if he were to
agree to retire from Muscat and its territory. Salih finally complied with the Sultan's
order and left Muscat for Samad, while Ibrahim proceeded to al-Rustaq.65 However,
the Sultan realised that the threat from Hamud al-Jahhafi against his authority would
continue to affect the Sultan's position on the Batinah coast if he rejected all Hamad's
claims. In the end a settlement was reached and the Sultan agreed to pay him a amount
of $MT 2500 to ensure that his subjects in that areawould be treated with respect.66
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Meanwhile, the Sultans foreign relations at this stage showed his
determination to rule effectively. In July 1877, Sultan Turki b. Sa id exchanged a
Commercial Declaration with Holland, in which the Dutch Consul at Bushire
requested the co-operation of the British Resident, and this was successfully dealt
with.67
5.5. The renewal of the hostilities between Turki and 'Abd al-'Aziz
Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz b. Sa'id was at Samad during the troubles caused by Salih and
al-Jahhafi, but in September 1877 he started his own activities against his brother: he
left Samad for Ja'alan to urge the Bani Bu Hasan to join him in his future struggle
with Sultan Turki and his plan to invade Muscat. The tribes there declined to offer
him the required support, and his action on this matter ceased as a result.68
Nevertheless, Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz remained in contactwith some paramount figures
among the Omani shaikhs. He was in regular contact with Shaikh Hamad bin Sa'id b.
'Ali al-Barwaniin al-Sharqiyyah, who suggested that he should leave the country for
India to ease his relations with Sultan Turki and leave the affairs of the country to him.
Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz could certainly not accept this advice, as his desire was to remain
in Oman to resist the manoeuvres of the Sultan.69 Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz then visited
Shaikh Salih b. 'Ali at Samad to discuss the former issue with him, but their views
differed and nothing came of this meeting; and Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz returned to
Ja'alan to be with his main supporters among the Ban Bu Hasan.
On 14th January 1878 Lt. Colonel Miles, who by now had returned to his
position as the Political Agent and Consul atMuscat, became involved in the matter of
Sayyid 'Abd ai-'Aziz's attempt to rise against his brother.70 The Agent informed the
Political Resident, Lt. Colonel Ross, that one of the effective supporters of Sayyid
'Abd al-'Aziz was Shaikh Khamis b. Rashid of the Bani Bu Hasan, one of the
Sultan's former prisoners, who had arrived in Muscat from Sur with about 60
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followers. The subject of Khamis s visit was to induce the Sultan to grant his brother
Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz a pension through him, with permission to let him stay in
Oman.71 When these two matters were first submitted to him the Sultan very quickly
rejected the requests, and asked the shaikh not to bring them up again. In fact the
Sultan gave his promise to give more consideration to the question of his brother s
residency in Oman, and his reply on this matter would be given subsequently.72
Unfortunately the open activities of Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz against his brother's
supremacy induced the latter to reject the request to allow Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz to
reside in Oman whatever the circumstances, but he agreed again to offer him the
previous allowance if Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz would accept residency in India. But none
of this took place, the hostilities between them worsened, and the situation continued
without any conciliation.
Subsequent to this the Sultan received letters and reports from various Shaikhs
in the interior, commenting on the movements of Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz and the efforts
of Shaikh Salih b. ' Ali to organise a fresh coalition from the tribes of the interior to
revolt against the Sultan and to overthrow him. Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz had already left
his position in Ja'alan for al-Qabel, where he held a meeting with Salih b. 'Ali to
assure him of his support in this attempt, but nothing serious emerged from this
interview and Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz found himself without Salih's support for the first
time when he advanced to Samail by himself.73
The campaign appeared to have collapsed, as Shaikh Salih bin 'Ali had been
unable to give his support to Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz's efforts to provoke rebellion.
Accordingly, the Sultan informed the Agent atMuscat officially about Sayyid 'Abd al-
'Aziz's plans for intrigues against the Sultan's possessions, supported by some of the
al-Sharqiyyah tribes, though his efforts to effect a coalition with Salih b. 'Ali appeared
to be unsuccessful. In spite of all these troubles, as a result of the Sultan's efforts the
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internal situation in Oman was calmer, and there was a harmony over all the forts in
the country.74
Sayyid lAbd al-'Aziz desperately insisted on encouraging the people of al-
Sharqiyyah to give him their support after his failure in his attempts to bring al-Harthi
to his aid. In April 1878, he felt that he was ready to leave Ja'alan, and proceeded
towards Muscat, leading a force of 300 fighting men. The Sultan immediately asked
the British Agent for military assistance against any such attack upon Muscat.75 The
Government of India did not delay in approving the same action, taken by the Acting
Political Agent Mr. Robertson, during the former operations against Muscat under the
leadership of Salih b. 'Ali al-Harthi. Moreover Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz failed to proceed
beyond Samail, and subsequently, he retired to Samad.76 In the following month the
Sultan's position had gained some strength through the gift of a steamer from his
brother in Zanzibar, Sayyid Barghash, which reached Muscat on 29th May 1878. The
British Political Agent at Muscat showed his readiness to cooperate with the Sultan to
keep the steamer in his service. He immediately informed the Sultan that he would
offer such quantity of coal for the steamer, theDaral-Salaam as might be required.
This was to come from the Government of India Depot until the Sultan's own
arrangements, for coal supply were completed.7 7 The steamer soon became ready for
the Sultan's service, and full a supply of coal on board was assured.
By this stage the Sultan had managed to increase his power in the country and
exercise his authority over most of the Omani tribes and he settled almost all of his
troubles during the following year. On 2nd January 1879, the Sultan succeeded in
gaining the submission of the most powerful Shaikhs such as 'Amir bin Salih, Rashid
b. Juma of the Bani Bu Hasan, Hamud b. Sa'id al-Jahhafi and his brother 'Ali b.
Sa'id al-Jahhafi of al-Wahibah.78 But Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz and Shaikh Salih b. 'Ali
remained the main source of trouble to the Sultan's authority. The Political Agent at
Muscat agreed to put Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz's activities under surveillance on behalf of
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the Sultan, and he communicated with Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz on many different
occasions urging him to cease hostilities against his brother and to return to his
allegiance. However, Sayyid 'Abd al 'Aziz considered this advice unacceptable.79
Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz was not likely to challenge the Sultan s authority if he were to
remain separated from Salih b. 'Ali's coalition. Sultan Turki's popularity was
growing among the tribes in the country, and there was no obvious sign of
disturbances for the following three years.
5.6. Some Aspects of the Sultan's internal affairs 1879-81
5.6.1. The Sultan's trouble in Ras al-Hadd
However the most troublesome dispute during the year 1879, in which the British
were involved indirectly, was the dispute between the Janabah of Sur and the tribe of
Ras al-Hadd and Khor-Jarama a few kilometres east of Sur. This was regarding the
free use of the inlet by the Suris. The Sultan wrote to the British Political Agent at
Muscat, Major C. B. Euan Smith, as follows:
"What we have to represent is that invariably the people of Ras al-
Hadd oppress the craft which seek shelter in Khor Jarama without
reason for so doing. We have dissuaded them from such acts
because the craft of various nations request the Khor, and some of
them carry the British flag, while the rest carry the goods of British
subjects. In the days when our friend Mr. Robertson was here, he
sent a man-of-war and in her was one of our officers. Since then no
oppression has been practised, but now we hear of the immediate
closing of the Khor again and our vessel not being here, and we are
compelled to trouble you and solicit your assistance against these
troublesome people, by asking you to despatch a man-of-war
thither". 80
The Political Agent replied to the Sultan in a positive manner, by contacting the
the Naval Officer requesting that one of the British ships visit the place. H.M.S.
Ready was instructed to advance to Khor Jarama and Ras al-Hadd via Sur, under the
Command of Naval Officer Edward. He helped to negotiate a settlement, and reported
to the Agent that the respective chiefs had confirmed their promise not to close the inlet
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in any way in future.81 Communications between the British officials in the region
and the British Government of India continued to follow up the situation. On 31st
October 1879 Lt. Colonel Ross, the Resident in the Persian Gulf, wrote to Major C.
B. Euan Smith from Bushire acknowledging his actions and expressed his support for
the action taken by Major Smith in requesting the Naval Officer of Ready to represent
the British in the quarrel and instructing him not to be involved directly.82 The
Government of India in reply to the correspondence with the Political Agent at Muscat
regarding to the quarrel endorsed all the measures adopted by the Naval Officer to
settle that dispute, and approved the Agent's action in the matters.83
When this quarrel arose again in December 1880, Commander Cunning of
H.M. S. Woodlark and the Sultan's steamerDar-al-Salaam were instructed to proceed
to Sur to watch over the British interests there and to investigate the cause of the new
quanrel, which by this mission was brought to a final conclusion.84
5.6.2. The Sultan strengthens his position in the interior
The settlement of the Janabah dispute with the Malkhi tribe of Ras al-Hadd, further
strengthened the Sultan's position and his influence was felt all over the country. In
November 1880 the Sultan despatched his son Sayyid Faisal b. Turki to Nizwa to
assert his power there. During this month, Sayyid Faisal was able to confirm his
father's authority at Nizwa and the surrounding area, and a salute of 21 guns was fired
at Muscat on this occasion in recognition of this. The Sultan then appointed him as
Wali of Nizwa in the same month, under the supervision of Sayyid Hamud bin Saif A1
Bu Sa'idi who had held this position for many years. This was as a privilege granted
by the Sultan with the promise of support from Shaikh Hilal bin Zaher al-Hinaei.85
Sayyid Faisal reported to his father from Nizwa on 21st Dhu 1 Hijjaah 1297, (20th
November 1880) informing him about the situation in the district and the allegiance of
its people, and confirming the full submission of Izki, Berkat al-Mouz and the
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surrounding area to the Sultan's authority. There was no mention of any troubles.
Sayyid Faisal also obtained the submission of the Dhuru'a, the Janabah of the interior,
and the Bani Hinah tribes.86 In a subsequent letter Sayyid Faisal b. Turki mentioned
the assistance which he had received from Shaikh Hilal b. Zaher asserting the
authority of the Sultan in the interior, especially during the trouble with the Bani
Rawahah in late 1880 which had been suppressed with his support.87 Sultan Turki,
the eldest son of Sayyid Muhhamed bin Turki was appointed as Governor of Sohar
from 1878,to the Sultan's death in 1888.88
At this stage Oman was enjoying a relatively peaceful time: since the last
attempted revolt by Sayyid 'Abd al-' Aziz in July 1878 there had been no serious
dispute with the Sultan s rule from either Salih b. 'Ali or Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz, and
the Sultan had sustained his authority throughout the whole Sultanate from north to
south. The appointment of his son Sayyid Faisal as Wali of Nizwa and its
surrounding area, of Sayyid Fahed as Wali in Barka, of Sayyid Mohammed as
Governor of Sohar, of Sulayman b. Suwailim as his Wali in Dhofar, the receiving of
his brother's gift of the Dar-al-Salaam and the British support for his government all
contributed to strengthening his position in Oman during this period.
The Sultan also managed to demonstrate his ability to settle his difficulties and
used skill and intelligence to affirm his position. All the country's tribes had shown
their allegiance and respected the state's security, and all over the country his garrisons
had exerted the Sultan's influence peacefully. Under all these circumstances, the calm
situation in the country had created a good opportunity for the Sultan to develop his
foreign relationships. In August 1880 Louis Maguire, a British merchant trading and
residing in Muscat, became the Consul of the United States of America.89 Mr.
Maguire was also recognised by the Sultan as the French Consular Agent for the
Sultan s dominions in April 1881.90
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5.6.3. Sultan Turki's suggestion of relinquishing power to Sayyid Barghash
Though the Sultan seemed secure in ruling his country during the previous years and
his position was recognised at a high level, he had been through difficult and
agonizing experiences since his return to power in December 1875. These had greatly
affected his activities and his interest in ruling the Sultanate. As noted above, there
were troubles between the Omani tribes, the revolts of Sayyid Ibrahim b. Qais and
Salih b. 'Ali, disputes about the Sultan's authority, and the problem of his brother
Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz who was determined to extend his influence in the country and
acted vigorously to replace him in power. This accumulation of events had persuaded
the Sultan to suggest that he relinquish his power in Oman to his brother Sultan
Barghash of Zanzibar, who was now in amicable relations with him. The issue was
very serious. The British Government of India, who at this time had built a strong
relationship with the Sultan, enjoyed freedom of movement for their Agent and
Representatives throughout the country. These good relations with Muscat, which
had been confirmed through the correspondence between the Sultan and the
Government of India, cannot be easily dismissed. On 8th June 1880 the Viceroy and
the Governor-General of India Sir Edward Robert Lytton stated in his letter to the
Sultan that the friendly relationships between the Government of India and the
Government of Muscat, which had so long continued with benefit to both the
Sultanate and the Government of India, would be strengthened in future.91 The letter
was sent on the occasion of the Viceroy's departure from office in India. As soon as
his successor George Frederick Ripon replaced him, he wrote to the Sultan about the
present good understanding between the Government of India and the Sultan s
Government, and that the British Government would assist him to strengthen his
position and the continued welfare and prosperity of his country.92 The Government
of India was clearly interested in continuing the friendly relations and assurances
which had been given by the formerViceroy.
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In accordance with all these assurances to Sultan Turki, the Government of
India soon became involved in the issue of his proposed abdication, and considered
the consequences of this. The Government of India had strong objections to any
possible unity between Oman and Zanzibar, and promised the Sultan of Muscat all
possible assistance if he felt that he would be unable to deal with all these difficulties
without British assistance at any time of dispute in the country. The British made it
clear to SultanTurki that they wanted the present situation to continue.
When the proposal appeared likely to be put into effect, the British Agent and
Consul at Zanzibar, Dr. Kirk, reported on 8th March 1880 that Sayyid Turki was
aware of his inability to rule over the trouble-makers in Oman, and that he was indeed
thinking of abdicating his throne to his brother in Zanzibar, Sayyid Barghash b.
Said, and that SultanTurki had already communicated with Barghash on this subject.
Sultan Turki was strongly in favour of retiring to a foreign country, and the matter
was planned for discussion either at Muscat or Zanzibar.93 However, the British
Resident in the Gulf, in relation to this matter, stated that no official news had
transpired at Bushire or at the Muscat Agency till now, and he kept in touch with the
Political Agency in Muscat to follow up the situation there. On the 8th April 1881,
one year later, the Resident in the Persian Gulf, confirmed for the Government of
India that the Political Agent at Muscat had ascertained that the negotiations between
the Sultans of Muscat and Zanzibar had undoubtedly taken place and were no longer a
secret issue, becoming the topic of street conversation in Muscat.94 Sultan Turki was
very anxious about his position and his health problems, which he considered might
cause his sudden death. Then the succession would be disputed. This issue was the
topic for discussion with the British officials in India.95
The Sultan's power at that time was regarded as strongly established, and his
authority during his lifetime was unlikely to be seriously disturbed in Oman. But his
health was in an unstable state, and in case of his sudden death, the whole country
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would undoubtedly be brought into dynastic disorder. Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz and his
main supporter Shaikh Salih b. 'Ali would never accept any of Sultan Turki s sons as
be the head of the Sultanate in these circumstances. Sayyid Ibrahim b. Qais was also a
strong figure and was supported by a large number of tribes, even by Salih b. 'Ali
himself, who would have easy access to the Batinah coast during a time of
disturbances.
Accordingly the British policy which had been adopted by the Government of
India with regard to the succession, to work towards stability without direct internal
involvement, was to offer asylum to the Sultan's sons, if their personal safety was
threatened and if theywere determined to avoid any conflict for the throne and to seek
the protection of the British Government.96 Miles's views were supported by
Government policy, which offered protection to the Sultan1 s sons from any immediate
danger. In fact the issue was passed to the British Political Resident in the Gulf, to be
guided by the situation in the Sultanate.9 7
The Government of India realised that the Sultan1 s intention to relinquish his
throne to the Sultan of Zanzibarmust be prevented as it would bring the re-unification
of Muscat and Zanzibar. However, the Government of India would view with
satisfaction the succession in Oman of one of the descendants of Sayyid Sa'id b.
Sultan, provided he was able to preserve internal order and was capable of conducting
the government of the tate.98 They had also informed the Political Agent at Muscat
that the succession must be settled by the chiefs and the people of the country, and that
his first objective was to protect British subjects and their interests in times of
dispute.99
In fact none of this speculation had been concerned with Omani land, and
Sultan Turki had resumed his position in strong opposition to the demands of his
brother, Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz. With reference to the unity between Muscat and
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Zanzibar, the people in Oman certainly did not seem to want this whatever the attitude
of the British authorities. As a result of this speculation, Sayyid 'Abd al 'Aziz had
emerged very active in presenting himself as the future successor, and took the
Sultan's indecisive action in this question as a good sign to renew his rebellion against
him.
5.7. Sultan Turki's Dispute 1882
5.7.1. British helpfor the Sultan
At this stage Sultan Turki was in a position to assert his power before his people after
the previous unsettled situation, and restore with confidence his authority over the
Sultanate. As was so often the case, the situation of the interior and al-Sharqiyyah
districts was not in his favour. He tried to use his own friendly relations with the
British and their promises of support to strengthen him in his administration. The
Government of India were eager to approach the point where they could act promptly
in the case of troubles in Oman. As described above, when the cooperation between
Shaikh Salih b. 'Ali, and Sayyid Ibrahim b. Qais was established and the rebels
occupied Matrah in June 1877 before reaching Muscat, the guns of H.M.S. Teazer
prevented them from advancing to Muscat. The British Acting Political Agent there
encouraged the Sultan not to accept Salih bin 'Ali's offer of a settlement. This episode
was followed by a time of tranquillity in Oman, and the Sultan s position became
dependent upon the intervention of his friends, who were ready to offer reasonable
support as soon as he requested it.
Lt. Colonel Ross, the British Political Resident in the Gulf, had come to the
conclusion that the British interests in Oman would be well served if the tribes of the
country learned that the Government of Indiawas determined to protect Sultan Turki's
authority whatever the cost. This policy, however, was imposed as a measure of
assistance to the Sultan only in order to protect the British strategic and commercial
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interests in Muscat and its coastal territories. The Resident in the Gulf always
maintained the recommended stance of no change in this policy. The Viceroy himself
urged the establishment of a strong relationship with Muscat's present authority, and
help was promised to sustain this cooperation. In this development of the British
policy towards Muscat, the Sultan1 s relation with the British Government encouraged
the people opposed to his policy to claim that the Sultanate was in practice a British
protectorate, and it was probably this beliefwhich gave the 'ulema the excuse to revolt
against him time and again. However, the Sultan considered the relations between
him and the British as the only way of preventing major troubles in his reign.
The Sultan's position in the country had clearly strengthened, and by the
beginning of the year 1882 he was able to exercise his authority directly and through
his Walis upon many wilayahs, like Muscat, Matrah, Shinas, Sohar, Nakhal, al-
Suwaiq, al-Masna'ah, Barka, Seeb, Qurayyat, Sur, Dhofar, Samail, Sohar, Ebri,
Dhank, Izki, Nizwa, and Ja'alan, and peace had been established for the whole
country. On 22nd August 1881 the Sultan left Muscat for Gwader for a change of an¬
on board H.M.S. Woodlark, and returned to Muscat on September 19th 1881.100
5.7.2. Theproposed coalition against the Sultan
By the beginning of the year 1882, a new and serious dispute was developing in
Oman. A formidable coalition between Sayyid "Abd al-'Aziz, Shaikh Salih b. 'Ali,
Ibrahim b. Qais and Hamud b. Sa'id al-Jahhafi for the purpose of invading Muscat
and Matrah appeared to be a great challenge to British policy in Oman as it was the
most effective challenge to the Sultan's authority in the country. The situation was
monitored closely by the Political Agent at Muscat, who responded swiftly to any
subversive activity.101 On 9th January 1882 the new Political Agent at Muscat, Major
Charles Grant, reported to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf on the arrival of
news from the interior that Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz, Sayyid Ibrahim b. Qais, Shaikh
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Salih b. lAli al-Harthi, and Hamud al-Jahhafi of al-Wahibah had come to an agreement
to attack Muscat, to raid the Batinah coast, and to attack Sur simultaneously.102
This news was soon confirmed by Sayyid ' Abd al-'Aziz, who on 13th January
1882 sent a letter to the British Political Resident in the Gulf, Lt. Colonel Ross, who
was in Muscat. In this letter he criticised the policy of the Sultan, accusing him of
carelessness in ruling the country. Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz also complained to Colonel
Ross about the Sultan's neglect of his duties towards his subjects, which had resulted
in such an excess of violence on the part of the Omani people. The situation in Oman
was affected by the absence of the control over crime and the protection of the
subjects, which it was mainly the Sultan's duty to maintain for the sake of his
citizens.103 On the basis of all these allegations, Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz stated that the
most intelligent and wise of the chiefs of Oman had induced him to join them in a
rebellion against Sultan Sayyid Turki. These chiefs proposed to launch an attack on
Muscat immediately. They now insisted upon Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz joining them
quickly, while his wish was to do so.104 Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz considered the
Sultan's attitude towards the interior situation a good opportunity to ask the Resident
for British approval for this rebellion, or at least that the British abstain from assisting
the Sultan against him and his coalition when the attack took place. He confirmed to
the British Political Resident that his attack upon Muscat was inevitable, and begged
the Resident to tell the British Political Agent atMuscat to take measures for the safety
of the British subjects by asking them to leave the town when he and his troops
approached Muscat.105 Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz knew that the British Government
would in no way offer him the required assistance against the recognised ruler, but his
aim was only to encourage them to abstain from supporting his brother, the Sultan.
With regard to this question the British Government confirmed to the Resident in the
Gulf that British interests and the safety of their subjects should be the main factors to
influence any decision. However, any attack would endanger the present position of
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the Sultan in Muscat, and the British authority there would have no choice but to
prevent this sort of action.106 Accordingly the Resident replied to Abdul Aziz as
follows:
"You are aware of the relations subsisting between the British
Government and His Highness Sayyid Turki, which relations have
never been altered since His Highness' accession to the Sultanate. It
is therefore almost unnecessary to tell your Highness that any attack
on Muscat at present would be quite against the wishes of the British
Government".107
5.7.3. Ibrahim's attack on al-Masna 'ah
On 11th March 1882, Sayyid Ibrahim bin Qais took al-Masna'ah by surprise, and the
Sultan wrote to his brother in Zanzibar, Sayyid Barghash, asking for aid.108 The
Political Agent and Consul-General at Zanzibar, John Kirk, confirmed for the British
Government in India that Sultan Turki had written to his brother Barghash giving an
account of the disturbances in Oman and the difficulties which faced him, requesting
financial aid. Sultan Turki also asked the Sultan of Zanzibar to confiscate the
property there of one Juma bin Sa'id al-Maskri, who had been accused of being the
ringleader of the antagonistic tribes in Oman. The Sultan sent an agent to collect
funds, Ahmad b. Ibrahim, who brought to the Sultan the amount of Rs. 32,000 from
his brother in Zanzibar.10 9
The British Political Resident in the Gulf, Lt. Colonel Ross, directed the
Political Agent at Muscat to send the British gun-boatReady to al-Masna'ah to protect
the British subjects and their interests, where they would be able to watch the situation
closely.110 On 4th April 1882 the Sultan himself left Muscat for al-Masna'ah on
board his steamerDar-al-Salaam, taking with him an 18-pounder siege gun and 150
fighting men. He also sent an equal number over land, passing through Barka and
collecting a further force to support the Sultan in his attack from the sea. On 10th
April the Sultanmanaged to regain the portby force, and compelled Sayyid Ibrahim to
retreat to al-Rustaq.111
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5.7.4. Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz and al-Jahhafi's coalition
In June 1882, Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz greatly damaged his reputation by joining an
expedition, one of whose leaders was a disreputable trouble-maker, Hamud b. Sa'id
al-Jahhafi. This movement was directed against Matrah and Muscat, despite the
British warning which had been announced by the Political Agent at Muscat, who
stated that the attackwould be against theirwishes.112 At this time the attackers were
at al-Watayyah, only a few kilometres from Matrah.113 While the British attitude in
Muscat towards this event was not clear, H.M.S. Arab arrived at Matrah on 24th June
1882, and anchored off the town. The appearance of the Arab induced the rebels to
enter into negotiations with the Sultan, and these negotiations soon took place in
Muscat on the 27th and 28th of the same month, which resulted in the Sultan agreeing
to pay Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz $MT 200 and Salih b. 'Ali $MT 50 as a monthly pension,
provided the rebels agreed to leaveMuscat immediately.114
Accordingly, Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz wrote to the Political Resident in the Gulf,
Lt. Colonel Ross, informing him of his recent movements with al-Jahhafi against
Matrah and Muscat, and stating that peace and friendly relations with the Sultan had
been restored.115 Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz was not in complete conformity with Sultan
Sayyid Turki, as he still thought that the situation in the country desperately needed an
effective settlement, and he offered his efforts to mediate in the troubles between the
Sultan and those who had opposed him.116 The British Resident replied to him
expressing appreciation of his offer, and confirmed for him that the British
Government s only desire was the maintenance of the existing dynasty, adding that the
British Government were linked with the Sultan Turki by a friendly alliance
system.117
Therefore, Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz understood that armed opposition to the
Sultan would certainly be displeasing to the British Government, whereas sincere
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support for his Government would be looked upon favourably. However, Sayyid
'Abd al-'Aziz s settlement with the Sultan did not last very long: Sayyid ' Abd al-'Aziz
breached his assurances with the Sultan by entering into a new intrigue against his
brother with Salih b. 'Ali al-Harthi in October the following year, which affirmed his
enmity to Sultan Turki.
5.7.5. The Attack on Muscat of 1883
During the first half of 1883, Salih b. 'Ali was very active in preparing himself for a
challenging task, collecting his forces to attack Muscat again to depose Sultan Turki
from power. In fact, however, Salih had lost Sayyid Ibrahim's support at that time,
because the latter had already resumed friendly relations with the Sultan after his last
raid on al-Masan'ah in the spring of 1882, and had promised to abandon the
antagonism in April 1883 with the acceptance of $MT 100 as a monthly pension.118
Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz joined Shaikh Salih in his preparation for this operation against
Muscat, ignoring all his assurances to the Sultan. In October 1883, Salih led the
Hinawi faction of the Sharqiyyah tribes, such as al-Hirth, al-Habus, and al-Hajriyyin,
through Wadial-'Akk to launch his attack on Muscat.119 When they reached Sururin
Wadi al-'Akk about 80 kilometres from Muscat, Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz wrote a letter
on 19th October to the Political Agent at Muscat, in which he informed him of an
impending attack on Muscat, requesting the Agent to evacuate the British subjects
from the disputed area.120
Accordingly, the Sultan concentrated his defence on Muscat with 500 men,
leaving Matrah virtually unprotected. 121 The discussion of the matter between the
Political Agent and the British Political Resident in the Gulf resulted in agreement to
provide armed support to the Sultan and to prevent the rebels advancing towards
Muscat. On 21st October 1883 the rebels were in Ruwi, just a few kilometres out of
Matrah, which came under their control on the following day, and was chosen as their
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base for the next attack against the capital of Oman.122 Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz was now
considered as the main figure in this plot confronting Muscat. On 23rd October, on a
dark night, Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz mounted an attack via al-Wadi al-Kabeer about 6
kilometres from Muscat. Sultan Turki demonstrated his ability to overcome the crisis,
and strengthened his position, when he displayed energy and skill in conducting
Muscat's defence. However, Muscat was not yet out of danger. On the same day the
Sultan received about 70 fighting men of Janabah from Sur on board his steamer Dar
cd-Salaam to reinforce his garrison at Muscat.123 The British promise of support to
the Sultan had been confirmed by the arrival of H.M.S. Philomel, and she fired on
the rebels when the Sultan became unable to close the pass to Muscat via al-Wadi al-
Kabeer. The rebels were thereby prevented from advancing towards Muscat.124 The
Sultan made another request to the Political Agent for more shots to be fired to keep
the rebels at a reasonable distance from Muscat, and the request was granted.
However, the rebels' attempts to break the Sultan s defence continued for two more
days; it appeared impossible for the rebels to win after the Sultan received further
support of about 700 men from various places in Oman, and while the shots from the
gun-boat Philomel continued to fire.125
On26th October, Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz and Shaikh Salih b. 'Ali retreated to al-
Sharqiyyah district having gained no advantage. Afterwards, the Sultan found that the
forces which had gathered for his support had increased to about 3000 fighting
men.126 So he was encouraged to follow the retreating rebels, and to punish those
tribes who had given the leaders their support. The Sultan despatched his son Sayyid
Faisal, leading about 1700 men, to Samail, where he soon gained the tribes'
submission to his father's authority.127 Sultan Turki's position was now ostensibly
secure and tranquil, though the troubles in the interior and the threats to his
sovereignty remained active for the rest of his time in power. The Batinah coast,
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stood as another obstacle to his stability from time to time; however, the Sultan always
controlled the situation in the country because of his skilful policy and British support.
5.8. Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz's attitude towards the Sultan 1885-88
Relations between Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz and his brother Sayyid Turki from then
onwards had a direct effect on the Sultan's position and continued to create an
unsettled situation, though the Sultan urged him strongly to be on good terms. This
matter was a power struggle over who had the right to rule the country, and directly
linked to this was the position of the tribes in Oman involved in the disagreement
between them. Despite British mediation to solve the matter, Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz
always rejected any suggestion which could help to resolve the difficulties; this trouble
lasted for the whole of Sayyid Turki s time in power, and continued later on between
Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz and Sultan Faisal up until Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz death.
In January 1885 Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz wrote to the Political Agent at Muscat
Lt. Colonel Miles, seeking another settlement to his troubles with his brother the
Sultan, and requesting the Agent's good offices in effecting a reconciliation with
Sayyid Turki.128 The Sultan agreed to take part in this negotiation, and this time
promised to pay his brother Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz the previous allowance of $MT 500
as a monthly pension, on condition that Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz should reside in India.
However, this negotiation ended unsuccessfully when Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz refused
the Sultan's suggestions, and the Agent showed his regret that an amicable
arrangement had not been achieved.129 Accordingly Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz stayed in
al-Sharqiyyah district planning another aggressive move against Muscat with Shaikh
Salih b. 'Ali. In the summer of that year, the British authorities in the Gulf
communicated this information to the Government of India, while the Political
Resident in the Gulf suggested that British policy in Oman should work at a more
obvious level and offer a more definite process for supporting the Sultan, though it
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would not need to be extended to his sons or successors.130 A few months later
Colonel Ross, the Resident in the Gulf, informed the Government of India of some
news he had just received from Muscat about Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz, in which he
mentioned his determination to renew his attempt to raise a rebellion and to attack
Muscat. The Resident added that, in view of the significant commercial interests in
Oman, the generally friendly relations existing between the British Government and
the Sultan of Muscat, and the active support which had been offered to him on many
different occasions by this Government, the Government of India should accept these
arguments for providing the British support to the Sultan of Oman and his country.131
He also clearly mentioned that Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz and the other hostile leaders
should be informed that even in the event of their gaining possession of Muscat or
Matrah, they would be expelled by British Government forces and the Sultan would
be restored to power.132 He was of the opinion that such strong action by them in
Muscat to secure the Sultan1 s position would put an end to the repeated quarrels and
threats which the Sultan had suffered repeatedly over a short period.133
The Government of India described the Political Resident s suggestions in
their reply to him as a change of policy, which might imply a commitment to support
by force of arms a ruler who was already troubled with a number of conflicts.134 So
they did not recommend the policy or any rapid change in it without careful
consideration, at least for the time being. The Secretary to the Government of India
stated in addition to this that British policy in Oman should be to abstain from
entanglement in the dynastic disputes.135 The British feared that this sort of policy
might imply upholding of the rights of the Sultan who probably could not have had his
position in power without their support. However, the Government of India promised
further consideration of this question which might put them under an obligation to
support Sultan Turki during his lifetime. This in turn might create embarrassment
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after his death, when this support would be claimed directly by his son or
successor.136
Colonel Ross expressed his views on the matter more precisely when he
mentioned that British policy in Oman should be also definite, consistent and effective.
He made it clear that the adoption of the suggested policy in Oman would not entail
further accountability beyond that which had been assumed during the time of the
attack on Muscat, but on the contrary tended more to the avoidance of an embarrassing
situation there.137 The Resident was very close to the major events in Oman, and he
contemplated that to lay down a clear decision for a definite policy might reduce the
internal trouble in the country. He based his views upon the following:
"Firstly: that the normal and permanent policy of Government
towards Muscat should be, as heretofore, non-interference in dynastic
struggles and internal Administration, and avoidance of employment
of armed force.
Secondly: that when special circumstances compel recourse to armed
intervention either to support the Muscat Government or protect
British interests, such intervention should be thorough. It should be
understood that such action has in reserve to back it the whole power
of the Government and that any failure could be temporary, and
would be promptly repaired.
Thirdly, that the case of Sayyid Turki is exceptional and that it is
impossible with credit, and consequently with expediency, to refuse
him armed support when he solicits".138
Colonel Ross had reached the conclusion that when the tribes of the interior of
Oman definitely knew that the British Government would never leave the Sultan of
Muscat in any difficulties, without determined support from the sea, they would do
well to consider the outcome of any attempt against Muscat or its territories. Ross had
recommended no real change in the British policy towards Muscat, but simply
supported the friendly relations that linked them with the Sultan of Oman and had been
accepted and practised by the two governments. The Resident made it clear that Royal
Navy vessels had been requested on many different occasions to support the Sultan,
and had been authorised by the British Government to take that action against his
rivals. Withholding this support from him in future would undoubtedly result in
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serious damage to British prestige in Oman. So as an exceptional measure, Sayyid
Turki should receive active assistance, and any refusal of this policy at the present time
would be regarded by the Sultan as a policy of tergiversation.139 In fact Sultan
Turki1 s policies from the beginning of his time in power had depended upon British
support, no matter whether this assistance was confirmed to him or not, and he had
never been left neglected, or without instant consideration in the course of hostilities
against Muscat.
With reference to the same issue, the Government of India also requested the
Political Agent at Muscat, S. B. Miles, to submit his views on the matter. So he wrote
on 17th October 1885 to Colonel Ross saying that his views were in agreement with
the Political Resident in the Gulf.140 He added that in the present situation the Sultan
could not maintain his position in Muscat without proper support from the
Government of India. The Agent linked this situation of friendly relations with Sultan
Turki and the aid requested from the British. It had been affirmed during the reign of
his father Sayyid Sa'id b. Sultan the great, who enjoyed British armed support and the
intervention of the Indian Navy in times of troubles, and the British should consider
Sayyid Turki's need for support to be similar to that his father needed and receiced.141
The question was discussed extensively in the Foreign Department, but official
opinion was undecided on any action that would help them to impose a measure of
control on the Government's liberty in adopting this policy.142 On 9th February 1886
the Government of Indiawrote to the Political Resident concerning their confidence in
Colonel Ross's knowledge of the situation in Muscat and informed him of their
decision: approval for his recommendation on this issue. They authorised him to
declare to the Sultan and the whole country that the British Government intended to
assist Sultan Turki in any aggression from now on, and that this policy would be
continued during his time in power.143 The Sultan was also informed however, that
the active support by the Government of India would not be necessarily granted or
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presumed to his children, heirs or successors, and that the British policy towards
Muscat would be one of non-intervention in dynastic disputes or the internal
administration.144 In a subsequent communication between the Government of India
and the authority in the Gulf, both confirmed that their support to the Sultan would
only be continued as long as Sayyid Turki conducted his Government in a manner
conducive to British Government policy.145
Sayyid ' Abd al-'Aziz was taking resolute action to depose his brother Sultan
Turki, and had been moving from one place to another to achieve his object. Sayyid
'Abd al-'Aziz's activities were extended to include some places outside Oman when he
contacted the shaikhs of the Trucial Coast to ask for their support against Sultan Turki.
The British Political Resident in the Gulf had already learned that Sayyid 'Abd
al-'Aziz had written to the Shaikh of Dubai to urge him to rise with him in opposition
to Sayyid Turki. Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz promised to give the Shaikh great support,
with all his men marching towards the Batinah coast and Sohar to make an attack on
the dominions of the Sultan in order to create troubles in that part of his possession.
The delegation from al-Sharqiyyah had certainly arrived in Dubai to discuss the
situation more closely with the Shaikh.146 In reply to these requests the Shaikh of
Dubai wrote to the Sultan of Muscat, offering his own mediation in the quarrel, in
order to establish the two brothers' relationship.147 However, the Shaikh of Dubai's
offer was rejected by the Sultan, who showed his displeasure at Zaid's attitude
towards this matter in a written letter to him. Despite this the shaikh maintained a
friendly attitude towards Sultan Sayyid Turki, and promised to take no further action
in favour of Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz in future.148
When Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz lost the prospect of support from the Shaikh of
Dubai, he took advantage of the Bani Battash rebellion against the Sultan's authority in
Qurayyat during the month of September 1886.149 In early October 1886 he was in
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al-Hajer, a few kilometres from Muscat, with 200 men, mainly Habus, in order to
attack Muscat. When the news reached the Sultan of Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz's most
recent hostilities, he despatched a force of 1200 men with one field-gun under the
command of Badr b. Saif and his sons to the area, which been evacuated on Saif s
arrival.150 The rebels of Bani Battash were destroyed and eventually submitted to the
Sultan's authority with an obligation of paying a fine of $MT 10,000. The dispute
was finally concluded in November 1886.151
As a result of these challenges to the Sultan's authority, and thinking of the
future defence of Muscat, the Sultan decided in June 1887 that his guns in the forts of
al-Jalali and al-Mairani were clearly inadequate for the required defence of Muscat if
attacked. The Sultan therefore requested the Government of India to supply him with
12 pounder guns which he would pay for. The Government of India authorised the
supply on the recommendation of the British Political Resident in the Gulf in a letter to
the Political Resident in the Gulf on 11th August 1887.152
5.9. Shaikh Salih b. 'Ali's and Sayyid Ibrahim's intrigue in 1887
During this year the situation in Oman was leading up to another dispute, when the
tribes of al-Sharqiyyah were gathered, as before, under the command of Shaikh Salih
b. 'Ali. They tried to establish a general coalition of all the Hinawi tribes and Sayyid
'Abd al-'Aziz in order to overthrow the Sultan's regime in Oman.153 On July 1st
1887, Lt. Colonel E. Mockler, who had replaced S. B. Miles as Political Agent at
Muscat on 16th April, reported that news of Sayyid Ibrahim b. Qais's new attempt to
attack the Batinah coast had reached Muscat. Mockler reported accordingly that he
was in league with the Bani Ghafir Hinawi faction and other tribes, attempting to
obtni" possession of al-'Awabi. Mockler also wrote that the Sultan was urged by the
people of the Batinah to take swift action against this intrigue, with their support.154
However the Sultan took no effective steps to prevent Sayyid Ibrahim from carrying
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out his threat, taking the fort of al-Suwaiq by surprise on the night of 1st July 1887,
and beginning to threaten to attack al-Masan'ah in his next move. The Sultan then sent
his force with his three sons and the Commander Badr b. Saif. However, he felt that
this operation would not be sufficient to restore the situation to normal and to drive
Sayyid Ibrahim out of his position without effective support from his British allies.155
Interestingly, Sayyid Ibrahim had not been informed that practical support had always
been granted to the Sultan in the course of trouble by the British. The Political
Resident, Colonel Ross, arrived in Muscat on 9th July 1887, and shortly afterwards
proceeded to al-Suwaiq with Lt. Colonel E. Mockler on board H.M.S. Lawrence to
offer the Sultan the necessary support and impose the unconditional surrender of
Sayyid Ibrahim b. Qais.156
Sayyid Ibrahim found himself in a difficult situation and agreed to evacuate the
town and its fort peacefully and unconditionally. He then retreated to his base in al-
Rustaq. On 12th July al-Suwaiq was again in the Sultan's possession and garrisoned
by his troops.157 The Government of India fully supported the action of the British
Political Resident. As a consequence of this success of the Sultan in al-Suwaiq, the
coalition plan for a general Hinawi rebellion against the Sultan failed.158 On 13th
November 1887, the Sultan left for Gwader for a short rest, and returned on 2nd
December 1887.159
With the suppression of all movements against the Sultan, the situation in
Oman became more stable. The Sultan established control all over the country from
north to south, without any challenge to his authority. His sons were very active in
consolidating his power and led many successful campaigns which brought down
many of the hostile elements which threatened the Sultan during his reign. During this
period it appears that the Sultan's health was unstable and his illness became serious
again. His brother Sultan Barghash of Zanzibar visited him at Muscat on his steamer
Nyanza on 4th March 1888.160 Sayyid Barghash himself was suffering from ill-
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health, and had been recommended to bathe in the hot spring at Ghala near Bowsher
27 kilometres out of Muscat for the sake of his health.
During that short visit Sayyid Barghash presented his brother Sayyid Turki
with a present of Rs 50,000 before he went back to Zanzibar on 17th March 1888.161
In May, Sultan Turki1 s health deteriorated rapidly, and he became critically ill on the
15th; the question of the sultanate rose again. The Sultan had been visited by the
British Resident, Colonel Ross, who arrived in Muscat on board H.M.S. Kingfisher
and remained there for two days before proceeding to Bushire.162 The Sultan did not
live long after the departure of the British Resident, dying an 3rd June 1888.
This life had been a full of events and adventure; having regained power for
his line of the dynasty, but also suffered greatly from the deportation to India and
Bandar Abbas. However, he also gained great satisfaction from his attempts to
establish a central and stable Government as far as circumstances would allow, whilst
preventing injury to the dignity or the self-respect of the tribal shaikhs or the people of
the country as a whole, the Sultan's death led to a real disaster and chaos in the
country.
Sayyid Faisal, the second and the most active of his sons, immediately took
over the leadership of the country from his father, and took it with the complete
agreement of the British Authorities, though his official recognition was not to be
granted until February 1890.163 Despite Sultan Turki's success in creating and
maintaining a relatively stable state during his own lifetime, this situation did not
continue after his death, as the country descended into chaos over the issue of the
succession-a clear failure on the part of Sultan Turki in establishing long-term peace
and stability for Oman.
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In nineteenth century Omani relationships were crucial both within ruling families and
between their leading members, as well as with the British and the French. Wealth
and power, and the struggle for them underpinned each situation. Relations between
the sons of Sayyid Sa'id b. Sultan, Sayyid Thuwaini (the eldest surviving), Sayyid
Turki, Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz, Sayyid Majid and Sayyid Barghash were characterised
by jealousy, deceit, and animosity, with spells of cooperation. Sayyid Thuwaini kept
the news of his father's death in 1856 secret from Sayyid Turki and his other brothers
to ensure his succession by securing affirmations of loyalty from the people in the
important towns. Sayyid Thuwaini and Sayyid Turki b. Sa'id were the two principle
contenders for power in Oman while Sayyid Majid and Sayyid Barghash were the
ones in Zanzibar. Sayyid Thuwaini found himself in disagreement with his brother in
Zanzibar, and prepared his force to invade Zanzibar for the purpose of reuniting
Muscat with Zanzibar. They were not utirene brothers, and this may have played a
role in their relationship.
When the news of the death of Sayyid Sa'id reached Oman by the Zanzibar
messenger to Muscat, Sayyid Turki was the Wali of Sohar, and he claimed the
sovereignty of the district. Sayyid Thuwaini felt that his duty was to foil this attempt
and to force Sayyid Turki to be one of his ordinary subjects. The British tried to
mediate, and supported Sayyid Thuwaini in his operations. To achieve these aims,
Sayyid Thuwani despatched his fleet to Sohar and soon gained possession of the
town. Both the British authorities and the British Political Agent in Muscat supported
the Sultan and welcomed his victory. Sayyid Salim b. Thuwaini became the Sultan1 s
Wali, undpaid Sayyid Turki an allowance of $MT 400-500. During this dispute the
British representative Pengelly over-stepped his authority by helping to capture Sayyid
Turki. The Government of Bombay believed that the British Agent in Muscat had
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misunderstood his duty as British Agent. The action was not entirely accepted by the
Government of India, who were keen to see Sayyid Turki freed.
By 1862, the decision to release Sayyid Turki had been taken and Sayyid
Thuwaini made an important concession to the British when he agreed not to deport
Sayyid Turki to East Africa. This settlement was significant in bringing the two
brothers together, and Sayyid Turki provided his support to Sayyid Thuwaini in
fighting the Wahhabis. As a result of this action the Bombay Government instructed
Pengelly to inform the Sultan that the Government of Bombay wished to make it clear
to the Sultan that any abuse of British friendship would likely lead to withdrawal of
the British Agency from Muscat. The British were keen to see Sayyid Turki freed and
Sayyid Thuwaini was ordered to free Sayyid Turki and to subsidise him financially.
Sayyid Sa id had intended his son Khalid (who died young) to inherit his
African dominions and Sayyid Thuwaini to inherit Oman; Sayyid Turki merely became
ruler of Sohar, and Zanzibar went to Sayyid Majid. As Zanzibar had been the source
of wealth to Muscat and its government, Sayyid Thuwaini had no intention of being
deprived of the contribution which it made for the Muscat treasury. In early 1857
Sayyid Thuwaini managed to conclude an arrangementwith Sayyid Majid whereby the
latter agreed to transmit to Muscat an annual payment of $MT 40,000. There was
some ambiguity about the Zanzibar subsidy, centred on disagreement about whether it
began as a tribute or a friendly contribution to a poorer brother. This ambiguity led to
conflict when in 1858 Sayyid Majid broke his promise to his brother and refused to
send the $MT 40,000 to Muscat. Accordingly, at the end of the year Sayyid Thuwaini
decided to settlematters between him and Sayyid Majid once and for all, by preparing
to proceed militarily against Zanzibar.
In 1859 Sayyid Thuwaini had taken steps to invade Zanzibar, but this was
thwarted by the British who forced him to return to Muscat and promise to secure a
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settlement of the problems quickly as possible. Meanwhile Sayyid Majid helped
Sayyid Turki to rise against Sayyid Thuwaini; the northern tribes were in revolt, and
the British supported Sayyid Majid while the French supported Sayyid Thuwaini and
Sayyid Barghash.
The British recommended the separation of Zanzibar and Muscat for many
reasons, first to settle the question of the subsidy. Secondly the British considered the
letter of Sayyid Sa'id b. Sultan to the Earl of Aberdeen on 23rd July 1844, of
expressing his wish to divide his Empire between his most qualified sons a major
factor in how to proceed. Thirdly, the British were keen to suppress the traffic in
slavery between Muscat and Zanzibar, and they viewed the separation as the most
effectivemethod of controlling this illegal trade. Fourthly, British interests in Africa
and in Zanzibar in particular led to the demise of Omani power with the Canning
Award compensating the Sultan of Muscat with $MT 40,000 for the loss of Zanzibar.
Sayyid Majid was to rule Zanzibar and pay Sayyid Thuwaini, ruling Muscat, 40,000
Crowns annually. The payment of the subsidy was later transferred to the British
India Government following the 1873 anti-slavery treaty with Sultan Turki. It was
then continued from the Foreign Office in London after India achieved independence
in 1947.
In 1866, after the murder of Sayyid Thuwaini by his son Sayyid Salim, who
claimed the throne and imprisoned Sayyid Turki again, Sayyid Majid protested at the
payment of the Zanzibar subsidy to a parricide. However, the British recognised
Sayyid Salim, and the subsidy continued. During the following year Sayyid Turki
was plotting with the Trucial Shaikhs, seeking support with the aim of establishing a
revolt against Sayyid Salim b. Thuwaini. Sayyid Turki strongly believed that he was
the rightful heir to control Oman instead of Sayyid Salim who was only the grandson
of Sayyid Sa'id b. Sultan. However, because of the threat of British bombardment
and the British refusal to consider Sayyid Turki as ruler, he withdrew in exchange for
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a generous pension from Sayyid Salim, and accepted exile in India. Sayyid Turki
agreed to this arrangement as he wished to establish good relations with the British
Government and the political representatives in the region to build on for the future.
Opposition to Sayyid Salim now came from Sayyid 'Azzan b. Qais, supported
by the conservative tribes ( who generally were in favour of a religious leaders rather
than a secular one-this meant specifically that they supported the Imamate over the
Sultanate) and the 'ulema, and he succeeded in expelling Sayyid Salim from power in
1868. He immediately announced himself the elected Imam of the country. The
conservative element attendant through Sayyid ' Azzan's accession to the Imamate
embodied several features of interest. Sayyid 'Azzan to them was the senior member
of the government rather than the absolute ruler of Oman. As Sayyid 'Azzan agreed to
share power with Shaikh Sa'id b. Khalfan al-Khalili and Shaikh Salih b. 'Ali al-
Harthi, the 'ulema felt that this policy would bring lasting government and stability to
Oman-on their terms, of course. Under this circumstances the British were interested
in ongoing peace included the safety of their communications cable via Muscat. The
British, after 'Azzan's success in taking power .offered Sayyid Salim b. Thuwaini
asylum on board H.M.S. Vigilant which took him to Bandar Abbas.
Sayyid 'Azzan was now in charge of the Imamate. The conservative tribes
could not rebel against the Imam, as they had supported him against Sayyid Salim and
continued to do so. Their attitude was partial to the regime of Sayyid 'Azzan b. Qais.
Meawhile other tribes in Oman still wanted to see Sayyid Turki back from India. The
British were at first ambiguous about this, even though they were unhappy with
'Azzan's rule. They decided to release Sayyid Turki, and at first gave him their tacit
and then more practical support to regain the throne of Oman. In 1869 Sayyid Salim
tried to win the Trucial Shaikhs and the Wahhabi governor in al-Buraimi over to his
cause. His attempt to recapture Muscat was unsuccessful as the British warned him
againist disturbing the peace at sea. Although Sayyid 'Azzan's regime became
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established, because the British did not accept his sovereignty he did not receive the
Zanzibar subsidy. The British had no interest in the stability of Azzan's sovereignty;
but no violation of the maritime regulations would be tolerated and this hindered his
opponents.
In 1870 the French and the Dutch recognised Sayyid 'Azzan b. Qais but still
no British recognition was given. At this stage Sayyid Turki travelled privately to
Muscat without material British support. Sayyid Salim b. Thuwaini was also still
trying to take over, in competition with Sayyid Turki. Sayyid Turki1 s first attempt at
invasion was diverted by the British, but his next move soon took place in the south of
Oman. At this stage Sayyid Turki's confidence about returning to Oman apparently
vanished, and he believed that his plan concerning the Omani coast would only be
achieved with British approval. In fact while Sayyid 'Azzan was away fighting the
Wahhabis, the British forced Sayyid Turki to return to Bandar Abbas on many
occasions, though they had no real objection to his oveall intention of taking over the
territories of Muscat. By August 1870, Sayyid Turki had gained ground, and the
British authorities gradually and significantly advocated the claims of Sayyid Turki,
who confirmed his power and ability to them, as well as to the people of Oman.
Sayyid 'Azzan was losing support, and the British warned both Sayyid 'Azzan and
Sayyid Turki that no military maritime movements were permitted. By this time
Sayyid Turki had left Bandar Abbas, and the British Government of Bombay was
making enquiries about the situation to its representatives in the region. The British
Political Resident believed that Sayyid Turki was determined to take Muscat from
Sayyid 'Azzan. Sayyid Turki then managed to land in the north and fortune now
favoured him. After rallying the border tribes to his support he effected a surprise
defeat on 'Azzan at Dhank. Sayyid Azzan then retired to Muscat preparing for the
main battle while Sayyid Turki proceeded to Sur. At Sur Sayyid Turki assembled a
large force commanded by Saif b. Sulayman and marched northwards to Muscat in
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January 1871. In the fighting which followed Sayyid 'Azzan was defeated and killed
atMatrah, and Sayyid Turki moved to Muscat in February 1871. Subsequent to this
Sayyid 'Azzan's advisor Shaikh al-Khalili was in Muscat, where the British Political
Resident tried to mediate, using British neutrality as a tool in the dispute. Shaikh al-
Khalili agreed to surrender himself to Sayyid Turki. Al-Khalili and his son were
afterward imprisoned in al-Jalali fort where they died in suspicious circumstances.
In April 1871, the British recognised Sayyid Turki s rule, and encouraged him
to complete his dominance of Muscat territories. Sohar was still not taken, and Shaikh
Salih and Ibrahim b. Qais were plotting against Sayyid Turki. Threats to the stability
of Sayyid Turki1 s rule included Sayyid Ibrahim b. Qais, who held Sohar and a large
part of the Batinah coast, and threatened Muscat. Later threats of invasion came from
Bandar Abbas and then from Gwader where the ex-Sultan Salim was in exile planning
for a return to recapture power in Oman. Meanwhile the Wahhabis in al-Buraimi were
unruly. In all contests, the British authorities were fully informed about the situation
in Oman, through their Agent in Muscat and the British Political Resident in the Gulf.
They were able to put pressure on the various parties, when in June 1871 the British
authorities in both London and India officially recognised Sayyid Turki as Sultan. His
close relations with the British enabled them to be more effective and influential in the
affairs of Oman, while the Sultan recognised his dependences on this inluence for
keeping him in power. The British were encouraged to maintain the presence of
warships off the Omani coast.
In July 1871 Sayyid Turki started his operation against Sayyid Ibrahim on the
Batinah coast, but failed to evict him from Sohar and had to draw up an agreement:
Sayyid Ibrahim was allowed to remain there. Later in February 1873 Sultan Turki
was able to recover the important towns on the Batinah coast from Sayyid Ibrahim s
control, like al-Khaburah, Barka and Sohar. As a result of these losses, Sayyid
Ibrahim agreed to enter into negotiation with the Sultan which resulted in the surrender
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of the rest of the towns on the coast to the Sultan. In this settlement Sayyid Ibrahim
immediately received the sum of $MT 5,000 and a monthly pension of $MT 100
conditional on his not rising against the Sultan. Sayyid Salim and Sayyid ' Abd al-
'Aziz continued feuding in Gwader on the Mekran coast; Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz was
captured at sea by the British and paid to stay away. Sayyid Salim maintained his
efforts, but was also captured by a British ship on his way to Sur, and imprisoned in
India.
Shaikh Salih b. 'Ali was still threatening Sayyid Turki in al-Shaiqiyyah where
he mounted an operation to attack Muscat in August 1873. Sultan Turki enjoyed
British support which was guaranteed to Muscat in the event of any attack.
Negotiations between Shaikh Salih b. Ali and the Sultan were arranged, and the
attackers accepted the Sultan's offer. Shaikh Salih temporarily retired to the interior in
1874. At the same time Sayyid Ibrahim encouraged by the latest attack on Muscat by
Salih b. 'Ali, returned from al-Rustaq to attack the towns on the Batinah coast.
However, the British supported Sayyid Turki, as the the British subjects in the area
were suffering. This led to further negotiations, and the British imposed fines on
those causing damage to British subjects or property. The losses of the British
subjects were estimated at $MT 15,000, which was imposed on Sayyid Ibrahim and
his allies of 'Yal Sa'd, by the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Colonel Ross, in
the form of a fine. Thr Resident left the issue under the Agent's consideration.
Sayyid Turki's authority was considerably strengthened, and his reputation grew
through out the region. During the mid 1870s and 1880s the authority in Muscat
became interested in extending its territory, to some ports belonging to the Qawasim,
including Khor Fakkan and al-Fujairah. The British were opposed to any further
enlargement of the Sultan's territory and prevented him from acting on this front.
Relations between Sultan Turki and his brother Sayyid 'Abd al-'Azzan b.
Sa id, who tried to remove him from power, were cordial only between mid-1874 and
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late 1875. At all other times Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz was influenced by Sayyid Turki's
enemies, especially Shaikh Salih b. 'Ali al-Harthi, who was the paramount Shaikh of
al-Hirth and had control over all his tribe and the rest of the Hinawi tribes in al-
Sharqiyyah and the interior of Oman. Shaikh Salih with the support of the
conservative tribes led many attacks against Muscat to try and overthrow the Sultan s
government and set up an Ibadi state in Oman. The conservative method of building a
state was based on tribal organisation, and used their religious position as an effective
force to atchievethis aim. The consevative' tribes were unsuccessful in working with
the British, mainly because the British feared their government would have a harmful
effect on the commercial interests of the British Indian subjects and the British
supported their opponents with which the Sultan had laid the foundation of a stable
order in Oman.
Subsequently Sayyid Turki persuaded the Government of India to release
Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz, in the hope that he would assist him. He was appointed his
deputy, on written conditions which he ignored. During the year 1875, while Sayyid
Turki was suffering from illness, Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz planned his own rising. In
August the same year he resigned as deputy but Sayyid Turki needed to withdraw
temporarily from power because of his health, and he prepared for a short break from
Oman and its burdens, and re-appointed him. In power, Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz and his
newly-appointed advisor, Shaikh Salih b. 'Ali, faced a numbers of problems,
including the resumption of hostilities by Sayyid Salim b. Thuwaini. Sayyid Turki
soon found his health sufficiently strong to resume power in December 1875,
returning from Gwader. The Sultan immediately launched his attack on Matrah where
Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz's garrison refused to submit the town to the Sultan's authority,
and the Sultan had to threaten to attack Muscat before Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz
surrendered and was later paid to stay away, though his plotting continued.
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In 1877 new enemies were plotting: Shaikh Salih b. 'Ali, and Hamud al-
Jahhafi of al-Wahibah led the principal attacks in Oman on the Sultan's authority, and
Shaikh Salih's allies prepared for another attack on Muscat. At the same time Sayyid
Ibrahim started his campaign against the Sultan on the Batinah coast, but Sultan Turki
arranged to make payments to all these involved to prevent trouble. Meanwhile the
British supported Sultan Turki by fending off Shaikh Salih and Sayyid Ibrahim who
had a remained source of trouble to the authority of Muscat. In 1879 the British
Political Agent in Muscat detected Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz' activity on Sultan Turki's
behalf, seeking a rejection of hostilities. The Sultan also gained further British
support in the dispute of 1879-81 between the Janabah of Sur and the Malkhi tribe of
Ras al-Hadd, a few kilometres east of Sur, when the British broke the Ras al-Hadd
blockade by deploying a warship.
In 1881 Sultan Turki proposed to relinquish his rule in favour of his brother
Sultan Barghash, as he was affected greatly by the troubles his opponents caused him
as well as by his worsening health. The British took a strong stand against this
suggestion because they wanted to maintain the separation of Muscat and Zanzibar,
and were willing to support Turki in his illness, believing that Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz
and Sayyid Ibrahim b. Qais would never accept Sayyid Turki's sons in power. The
British observed developments closely, and dismissed any plan that might upset the
status quo. Sayyid Ibrahim b. Qais's conquest of al-Masna'ah on the Batinah coast
was quickly overturned with the help of Sayyid Barghash's money and British
support. The Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz and Hamud al-Jahhafi coalition which threatened
Sayyid Turki in 1882 was dismissed and paid off. The Sultan also agreed in 1883 to
pay off Sayyid Ibrahim b. Qais, who agreed to change sides, while the British use of a
gunboat frightened off Shaikh Salih b. 'Ali who was planning to attack Muscat.
However, plots by Sayyid 'Abd al 'Aziz, Shaikh Salih b. 'Ali and Sayyid Ibrahim b.
Qais against Sultan Turki continued. By themiddle of 1883 Shaikh Salih b. 'Ali was
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joined by Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz in his preparation against Muscat, denying all his
previous assurances to the Sultan. Between 1885-88 Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz acted
effectively in raising a rebellion and attacking Muscat. In 1887 Shaikh Salih b. ' Ali
and Sayyid Ibrahim were operating against the Sultan's authority. Sayyid Ibrahim
was planning to re-establish himself on the Batinah coast but this operation was
swiftly demolished by the Sultan s military. Sayyid Ibrahim then found himself in a
difficult situation and retired to his base in al-Rustaq. Shaikh Salih b. 'Ali's move
against Muscat ended unsuccessfully following British threats against any hostilities
against Muscat. As a result of British policy towards Muscat, and the British belief
that stability could notbe achieved without their active support to the Sultan, all rivals
to Sultan Turki's throne were forced to give up their attempts to wrest power from him
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SULTANATE OF OMAN
Produced by the Ministry of Information, September 1994
Based on National Survey Authority OR 1, edition 6 dated June 1994
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Family tree of the A1 BCT Sa'id Dynasty















(d. 1816) See below
lajid Barghash Khalifah 'Abd al-'Aziz 'Ali Turki Thuwaini Other

















Source: al-Hashimu S. M., Imam Salim b. Rashid in the Imamate Revival in Oman. 1913-1920, (Ph D)
University, 1994.
265
Family tree of Sayyid Thuwaini b. Sa'id
Thuwaini b. Sa'id
RO 1857-1866
Murdered by his son Salim
'Aliyah Salim Nasir Harib Hamdan 'Abd al-Aziz Muhammad Hamad
(RO 1866-1868)
Khali fah
'Ali (RZ from 1911








(b. 1929(b-l936) RZ Deposed 1964)
Hamud Khalid
Muhammad Khalifa
Nasir Numair Jaifar Qais Muhammad
Muhammad Sa'id Su'ud Salim 'Ali Khalifa Abdullah Wasfi Gharib
Hamud
Source: Hawley, D., Oman and its Renaissance, London; 1977.
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Family tree of Sayyid 'Azzan b. Qais
Qais bin Ahmad bin Sa'id
Wali of Suhar
Killed by the Qawasim 1808
'Azzan
Wali of Sohar
d. in Mocha 1814
Returning from Hajj
Qais
Headed revolt of the A1 Sa'd 1861
Killed in battle
Wali of Sohar and Rustaq
Hamud
Nominated for Imamate by al-Khalili in 1840
d. in prison in Muscat 1850
Ibrahim
Military Commander d. 1898
'Azzan
(RO as Imam 1869-1871)
Married daughter ofal-Khalili
Killed in battle at Matrah
Ibrahim Ahmad Sa'id
Minister of Interior Murdered by his cousins























Source: Hawley, D., Oman and its Renaissance, London; 1977.
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Table of the British Residents in the Gulf
The following table shows the British Political Residents in the Persian Gulf from
1862-1905
Name Dates in post
Lt-Col Lewis Pelly November 1862-October 1872
Lt-Col Edward Charles Ross October 1872-March 1891
Lt-Col Samuel Barrett Miles 1885- October 1886 (acting)
Lt-Col AdelbertCecil Talbot March 1891-May 1893
Major James Hayes Sadler June 1893-July 1893 (acting)
James Adair Crawford July 1893-December 1893
Major James Hayes Sadler December 1893-January 1894 (acting)
Col FrederickAlexanderWilson January 1894-June 1897
Lt-Col Malcolm John Meade June 1897-April 1900
Lt-Col Charles Arnold Kemball April 1900-April 1904 (acting)
Source: Political Agency Muscat, 1800-1947
R/15/6
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Table of the British Agents in Muscat
The following table shows the British Political Agents at Muscat from 186 to 1905.
Name Dates in post
Lt. W. M. Pengelley May 1861 to January 1862
Major M. Green February 1862 to October 1862
Lt. Col. Herbert Disbrowe January 1863 to February 1867
Captain G. A. Atkinson March 1867 to February 1869
Lt. Col. Herbert Disbrowe April 1869 to January 1870
MajorA. Cotton Way January 1870 to May 1871
Major E.C. Ross May 1871 to December 1872
CaptainS.B. Miles December 1872 to June 1877
Mr.P. J.C. Robertson June 1877 to January 1878
Lt. Col. S.B. Miles January 1878 to June 1879
Major C. B. Euan Smith July 1879 to January 1880
Major Charles Grant February 1880 to October 1880
Lt. Col. S. B. Miles October 1880 to August 1881
Major Charles Grant August 1881 to March 1883
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MajorE. Mockler April 1883 to September 1883
Lt. Col. S.B. Miles September 1883 to April 1886
Lt.Col. E. Mockler April 1886 to October 1886
Lt. S. B. Miles November 1886 to April 1887
Lt. Col. E. Mockler April 1887 to March 1889
Lt. W. Stratton March 1889 to December 1889
Major C. E. Yate December 1889 to March 1890
Lt. Col. E. Mockler December 1890 to October 1891
Major J. Hayes Sadler November 1892 to April 1895
Captain J. F. Whyte May 1895 to November 1895
Major J. Hayes Sadler November 1895 to April 1896
Captain F. A. Beville April 1896 to June 1897
Major C. G. F. Fagan September 1897 to September 1899
Major P. Z. Cox September 1899 to January 1904
Major W. G. Grey January 1904 to April 1908
Source: Political Agency, Muscat, 1800-1947
R/15/6
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Table shows the rulers of Oman 1856 to 1888
Sayyid Thuwaini b. Sa'id October 1856-February 1866
Sayyid Salim b. Thuwaini February 1866-October 1868
Sayyid 'Azzanb. Qais October 1868-February 1871
Sayyid Turki b. Sa id February 1871-June 1888
Source: Records of Oman, vol. lv, 1867-1947, London, 1988
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Translation of a Communication from His Highness the Imam of
Muscat, to the Right Honourable the Earl of Aberdeen; dated Zanzibar,
23rd July 1844, 6th Rajab 1260.
BE it known to your Lordship that we are always grateful for, and sensible of, the
kindness of the British Government. We are, as it were, overwhelmed with a sense of
received favours.
2. In the treaty between us and Her Majesty Queen of England, concluded and signed
at Muscat, on the 22nd July 1840, it is mentioned that the obligations are binding on
us, and our posterity, and for which we all feel happy; please God, during our
lifetime, all will be duly fulfilled on our parts, we will abide by it.
3. And after us (on our death), we constitute and appoint our son Sayyid Khalid to be
the ruler of all our African possessions; that is to say, all places on the continent of
Africa, betweenMogadisho, situated in about 2 10 north latitude, and Cape Delgado,
situated in about 10 42 south latitude, together with the adjacent islands, now subject
to our rule, and under our dominion. And in like manner our son, Sayyid Thuwaini,
to be ruler over all our possessions in Oman, in Arabia, in the Persian Gulf, and on
the coast of Persia. And please God the two before mentioned, our sons, Sayyid
Khalid and Sayyid Thuwaini, will strictly conform to the stipulations of the treaty,
and, furthermore, do things in conformity with the wishes of the British Government;
and our hope and desire is, that the British Government may be favourably disposed
towards these our sons, Sayyid Khalid and Sayyid Thuwaini. And we feel certain that
the Government will not withhold its friendship from them.
Whatever you require of us, it is for you to signify.
From the expectant of God's mercy.
(signed) Sa'ld b.Sultan (signed) Atkins Hamerton. Zanzibar, 14 April 1859
Source: Pariamentary Papers, vol. xii, (1871). 272
Letter from His Highness Sayyid Thuwaini bin Said
To
His Excellency Lord Canning, Governor-General of India
In the name of the Great" God "
After compliments, at a most propitious and favourable time we were honoured with
the receipt of your esteemed letter and were highly gratified with its contents. What
your Excellency has stated is most satisfactory to us, more especially as regard your
award betwixt us and our brother Majid, we heartily accepted the same and are at a
loss how to express our regret for having occasioned you so much trouble, and our
appreciation of the kindness which had beenmanifested towards us in this matter. We
thank "God" for your efforts on our behalf, praying also that your good may be
rewarded and that you never cease to be our support. We further pray that our sincere
affection may always be towards the Great British Government, and that it may
increase continually: Moreover, that, your exalted affection and noble solicitude may
always be exercised towards us, and that we may never be deprived thereof. As regard
our brother Majid, we pray "God" during our life-time he may never experience
anything from us but kindness and hearty good will. Furthermore, we rely implicitly
on your Arbitration between us.
What your Excellencymay require in anyway from your attached friend, a hint alone
will suffice for its accomplishment, and we shall feel honoured in executing it.
We pray finally that you may be preserved to the highest honour and the most perfect
health. We send you the solution of peace as the best conclusion.
From your truly sincere friend the servant of "God", who confide on him as the Giver
of all good. 273
4th of Dhul-Ka'dah, 1277 Hijri equivalent 15th May, 1861.
Thuwaini bin Sa'id bin Sultan.
Source Parliamentary Papers vol. xii, (1871).
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